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I . INTRODUCTION
The nascent subject of Chinese-Middle East relations has
been little acknowledged and even less understood, yet is not
of inconsiderable importance. Both China and the Middle East
figure prominently in their own respective strategic, economic
and political spheres; the manner in which these two regions
or spheres choose to interact - or not to interact - may well
have larger import than our traditional regional analyses of
these areas would indicate. As nations world-wide currently
reexamine their roles within the rapidly evolving geopolitical
arena of the 1990s and beyond, analyses pertaining to regional
interaction deserve timely attention. The many readily
apparent economic, political and/or social evolutions now
occurring throughout Eurasia, the Middle East, and the Pacific
(plus evolutions that are perhaps not so readily apparent)
,
lend the question of Chinese-Middle Eastern relations fresh
and, as it will be shown, uniquely pertinent import.
Immediate and long term implications of recent events
throughout the Middle and Far East highlight the importance we
ascribe to occurrences within these regions. The interaction
of these occurrences, both directly and indirectly, generates
and reflects considerable impact on the rest of the world.
Our understanding (or perception) of the implications of these
events as well as, secondarily, the events themselves combine
to govern our formulation and prescription of policy. Some of
the more recent and prominent of these events, a few of which
are quite remarkable, include Khomeini's reign and legacy,
Chinese student-led appeals for democracy and the Tienanmen
massacre, Iraqi hostilities with Iran and Kuwait, continued
Arab-Israeli dilemmas (illustrated as well as exacerbated by
the Intifada) , and recent Middle East peace initiatives. This
thesis concerns itself with the circumstances and implications
of these and other events, viewed both regionally and inter-
regionally, then entertains conclusions regarding Chinese and
Middle Eastern interaction along with suggestions for the
focus and direction of related U.S. policy.
Inherent to the introduction within this first chapter
are two major premises. First, that there indeed is, has been
and will continue to be, a definite level of measurable and
purposeful activity between China and the Middle East.
Secondly, that despite the complex, fluid and seemingly
disparate qualities associated with so many variables resident
within each of the two regions, there yet remains a viable
basis for considering the question of current and subsequent
interaction (s) between China and the Middle East.
Chapter II reviews the historical sweep of relations
between China and the Middle East and concludes with an
extensive chronology of Chinese-Middle Eastern events and
interaction, plus other significant occurrences, since 1949.
Although the Middle East itself may be described as an area
from the Atlantic to the Indus and from the Sudan to the Black
Sea, the area addressed here is located primarily within the
fertile crescent; this abbreviated area is the hub of the
region and more than adequate in scope for this discussion.
Pakistan is included within the group of Middle Eastern states
due to its ties both to China and to the Middle East. The
year 1949 was selected as the primary point of departure
because it collectively represents: the establishment of the
People's Republic of China (PRO; the first full year of
Israel's existence as a modern state; the basic time frame
beyond which the contemporary shape of the Middle East
coalesced.
^
Chapter III considers determinants of foreign policy both
for China and for the Middle East in terms of their specific
regions. Middle Eastern topics will be apportioned, respec-
tively, between Israel and the other Middle Eastern states.
An additional premise of this thesis assumes that foreign
policies serve the national interests of their respective host
states, which incorporates a final major premise holding that
any study of foreign policy, especially as a cornerstone for
looking at interaction between two or more countries or
regions, entails a broad discussion. This discussion in-
cludes: 1) national domestic and/or cultural fabrics; 2)
compositions and relevancies (or legitimacy) , of state
leadership; 3) evident policy machineiry; 4) national
perceptions of international realities and related security
requirements; 5) dynamics stemming from interaction within
the international community. Salient aspects from each of
these issues, as they relate both to China and to the Middle
East, are requisite components in the consideration of foreign
policy determinants. Discussion will be confined to salient
aspects only, otherwise the subject would readily digress.
Those above several elements include, or might be
collectively referred to as, the comparatively recent disci-
pline of Political Culture.^ I do not mean to serve as
apologist for this new discipline, nor to consider the various
ways, quantitative or otherwise, in which Political Culture
might eventually acquire sufficient stature so as to incorpo-
rate predictive capabilities. Rather I intend to entertain
what seems to me an intuitive, seat-of -the-pants procedure:
namely, if you want to know what the other guy is thinking or
planning, then you have to know what is important to that
person or group. This must be done, as far as is feasible,
from his/her/their own perspective. Culture, state machinery,
and all the rest, are certainly ingredients for uncovering
priorities of any one person or group, especially within a
governmental or foreign policy framework. The world is not
yet small enough, despite explosions of mobility and access to
information, to nullify the idiosyncracies of domestic fabrics
that are distinctive formulative ingredients of thought
processes and also of knee jerk reactions. Indeed, even
language, its phonetics, vocabulary, syntax and written form,
may well have a profound place (both formative and symptom-
atic) , in the process of shaping thoughts, ideas, and hence
priorities
.
Domestic and regional topics are considered with an eye
to their explicatory assistance for cross-regional interac-
tion. China will be considered in two periods, the first
being from 1949 to the arrival of Deng Xiaoping' s leadership
and then subsequently through to the present. Possible policy
directions and impacts of recent economic and political
changes within China will be included. For the Middle East,
Israel's formation and execution of foreign policy will be
considered, followed by a look at the policy development,
priorities and dilemmas of the other primary Middle Eastern
states. National and/or demographic variations among these
Middle Eastern states will be taken into account. As with the
discussion on China, impacts of growth plus other current and
projected events within the Middle East will be considered
when postulating probable directions of national and regional
concerns in that region.
The international scope and practical levels of Chinese-
Middle East interaction itself are addressed in Chapters IV
and V. Actual and likely activities of China in the Middle
East, as well as Middle Eastern activities vis-a-vis China,
will be considered. Economic, cultural, security and diplo-
matic issues encompass the areas to be addressed.
Chapter VI recaps the central implications and discusses
the central conclusions of whether or not meaningful and long
term policies of interaction exist between China and the
Middle East (or the Middle East and China)
,
plus their likely
continued evolution. Against a backdrop of historical
interaction and concomitant consideration of Chinese-Middle
Eastern national fabrics and regional interaction since 1949,
considerable support is provided for showing purposeful intent
within Chinese-Middle Eastern relations. By way of contrast,
it will be noted that occasional third party political
analysis, from examining selected issues only (e.g. politics,
or economics, or arms sales), regards interaction between
China and the Middle East, or portions thereof, as sporadic at
best and/or opportunistic at worst. I submit, however, that
such attempts at analysis are too narrow and very misleading.
Similarly, and related to the long term and purposeful
Chinese-Middle Eastern interactions here postulated, a no less
important conclusion states that the gain or benefit derived
from these purposeful policies and interactions (compared to
interactions between the Middle East and powers other than
China) , has far exceeded the relatively limited scale of
operational endeavor upon which, so far, these policies have
been conducted. That is, the Chinese (and perhaps also the
Middle Easterners), have indeed received a big bang for their
buck and may well have planned it that way. One additional
conclusion maintains that conditions of Chinese-Middle Eastern
relations may indeed serve as a general bellwether for Chinese
international relations and intentions as a whole.
Implications for U.S. policy stemming from the above will
be considered in Chapter VII, pertaining both to China and to
the Middle East. Aspects of these closing comments include:
1) the place of ideology; 2) what it means to be a superpower
(including perceptions of national decline and/or evolution)
;
3) the role of an honest broker for the Middle East; 4)
effects of the internecine dilemmas within the Middle East
itself; 5) China's increasing role within Asian and world
affairs; and 6) corresponding impacts of China and the Middle
East on U.S. domestic politics.
An appendix containing notable dates for both China and
the Middle East - important birthdays, anniversaries of
significant events, holidays and cultural landmarks - has been
included. The unique forces at work in these regions quite
frequently are associated with or catalyzed by, to the extent
of being explained or characterized by, calendar reference
points
.
There is one last assumption, in addition to those
utilized above by the thesis, within which the entire thesis
is located, as in a venue. Namely that there is an ongoing
generic need for reexamining traditional concepts and methods
of measurement whereby conclusions are formed regarding
domestic and international proclivities of other states or
regions. Such reexaminations are requisite, due to the many
faceted nature associated with any examination of foreign
policy, and especially now for all concerned with the contin-
ued emergence (or perhaps, simplistically, the "realignment"),
of China and the rest of Asia through to and including the
Middle East (not to mention Europe and the former Soviet
Union) . It is these overall reexaminations that help to give
shape to our recognition and understanding of Chinese-Middle
Eastern relations. Post war conceptions such as "bipolarity
"
,
plus the traditional nation-state system as derived from the
European model (which dominated thinking for centuries)
simply no longer apply, if they ever did; this, in turn,
effects our perceptions (or new reality, if you will), of
current regional interaction. Ferreting out, or making sense
of, another count2:y's or region's perceptions and policies so
as to better address our own is only as valid as the concepts
and measuring devices employed throughout the process. If
attempts to understand others' perceptions and policies
utilize weak or brittle conceptual tools, then incorporation
of subsequent conclusions and directions into our own policies
based on those attempts will serve primarily to generate or
even perpetuate the possibility of out-of-sync relations as
well as the likelihood of bad policy.
This thesis began at a time when the Berlin Wall still
appeared secure in its divisiveness . I was confident of
finding long term undercurrents of Chinese-Middle Eastern
interaction, and wondered then how to best postulate what I
took to be their inevitable growth and impact. Since 1989,
the world has rapidly shelved long-held traditional assump-
8
tions not only in Berlin and Europe, but also in Moscow,
Beijing, Baghdad and most recently in Arab-Israeli capitals.
Concomitantly, Chinese-Middle Eastern interaction has steadily
emerged into public view and requires, now, not so much a
postulation of its existence but rather a characterization of
its tenor and scope. Also, since undertaking this project,
and via assignments throughout the Pacific Rim, Persian Gulf,
and Arabia, it became increasingly apparent to me, somewhat
unexpectedly, just how much information, both relevant to this
topic and available within the public domain, is already "out
there" waiting to be culled into informative narratives. This
material, in the aggregate, is voluminous and found (sometimes
piecemeal), in scores of private and public collections
throughout these and other regions. Furthermore, as China
grows more accessible, despite setbacks, to pursuit by
outsiders of indigenous sources, the scope of available
material increases exponentially. Information regarding the
Middle East is, in similar fashion, substantial and growing:
this is an indication not only of increased activity in that
region but also of our interest in it. Most of the material
employed in this initial study utilizes secondary sources and
is but a fraction of the whole. My occasional access to
primary sources indicates their tantalizing potential and the
intriguing nature (as it seems to me), of this subject. I
have tried to keep all material proportionately representative
and to weave historical perspective through the political and
social analysis.
Continued development of this subject must include, at
the very least, liberal use of primary source material gleaned
from national and regional capitals, industrial sectors,
agriculture, banking and finance, academia, the military,
technical development, telecommunications, diplomatic inter-
change, and personal voices within all of the above named
sectors and also from within the countries to be considered.
Despite the introductory nature of this current project, I
remain absolutely convinced of the direction and general
veracity of its conclusions.
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II. CHINA (PRO AND THE MIDDLE EAST
Since the Hellespont is a traditional dividing line
between Occident and Orient, portions of the Middle East
(certainly Iran and Pakistan, perhaps also Iraq and Syria)
,
may be said to be parts of Asia. Other portions of the Middle
East are said to be African (Egypt, Libya, the Sudan), while
still others are said to bridge continents (Arabian Peninsula,
Israel, Jordan, Kuwait). Regardless of the geographic rubric
under which the Middle East is placed, it is important, first,
to regard both the Middle East and China not as immutably
fixed locations under this or that label, but rather primarily
as centers of fluid activity depicted within national parame-
ters .
Common perceptions of China picture it as a timeless and
immutable monolith (full of Asian mysteries, to be sure, but
monolithic nonetheless), between the Pacific and Hindu Kush,
yet the borders of China have migrated rather frequently and
extensively over the centuries. This historical flexibility
continues into the present. Xinjiang's incorporation within
the PRC, as an example, is by no means as historically
inevitable as is that of the provinces closer to the coast.
Since 1949, Chinese interests in Tibet plus border consulta-
tions and confrontations with Pakistan and India, respective-
ly, are additional illustrations of the mutable dimensions of
the PRC. Other changes preceding and during World War II
11
resulted in the readjustment of China's border in the Mongo-
lian and Manchurian sectors. Negotiations already completed
and others pending or anticipated regarding Macao, Hong Kong
and Taiwan, will further adjust China's national configuration
(and add to her diverse national character as well) . Novel
developments in the Spratlys already promise both actual and
perceptual readjustment of China's southeastern frontiers.
Still other regions, such as Outer Mongolia, the Maritime
Provinces, Korean Peninsula, Ryukyu Islands and portions of
Southeast Asia, were at various times integral elements of
China
.
Similarly, the Middle East has only recently acquired its
current cartographic guise. Its contemporary national
boundaries, created for the most part by third parties with
vested colonial interests, not infrequently serve as fictional
(and also frictional), lines between tribal or other more
primary and stronger allegiances. These nominal boundaries
have been subject to fairly constant flows of redefinition and
alteration resulting from a plethora of Middle Eastern
sources. These alterations, within the time period we are
considering, are not as likely to occur primarily as functions
of outlying provincial relations to a strong or weak regional
center - as has been the case, historically, with China.
Rather, ongoing conflicts or tensions (Hashemite-Saudi,
Shi ' ite-Sunni , Iraqi-Iranian, Iraqi-Syrian, Iraqi-Kuwaiti,
Progressive-Conservative, Iraqi & Iranian & Turkish vs.
12
Kurdish, Persian-Arabic, Arab-Israeli and Palestinian, Pan-
Arabian vs. Nationalist, Secular Zionist vs. Judaic Orthodox,
Ashkenazic-Sephardic, Sabra-Immigrant , etc, ) , render the
Middle East susceptible to a kaleidoscopic host of pressures
from several directions, often simultaneously. The extensive
integration of contemporary Middle Eastern economics into
global markets further extends these pressures onto a wider
audience. Whether belligerent or beneficent, major or minor,
these pressures often generate de facto and de jure alter-
ations of national landscapes and/or priorities within the
region.
China and the Middle East are also fluid in a demographic
sense. Chinese culture has touched every corner of the globe
and Middle Eastern influence has been legendary in scope.
"China Towns" exist within most major cities worldwide and the
range of peoples who consider the Middle East as home,
ancestrally and/or religiously, are too numerous to count.
Demographic influences also move in the opposite direction as
well. Significant inputs of ideas and, again, people (most
recently dating from the previous century) , have penetrated
China, now and again, along trade routes and from the coast
inland. Moreover, Chinese students, scores of thousands of
them, have lately been pursuing academic or practical prepara-
tion abroad, beginning with an influx to Japan prior to
hostilities during the late Qing and early Republican years,
then largely to Europe and now, after a temporary hiatus of
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enforced isolation, predominantly to the United States. This
youthful and/or professional peregrination provides another
very rich source of ideas and experiences for the mainland;
this influx of ideas is not unrelated (indeed, it is very much
related) , to events of current concern to Chinese political
leadership. Israel in the Middle East (in the sense of a
Jewish homeland) , is a nation comprised during the last 100
years almost entirely of immigrants, while the Arab countries
have historically - albeit cyclically - always felt the
movement of other peoples (merchants, soldiers, clerics,
etc.), into and through their precincts. Most if not all of
the Arab states, especially along the Persian Gulf, now act as
hosts to vast numbers of foreign workers as well as experienc-
ing unprecedented transient movements of their own peoples
through non-Arabic and non-Islamic cultures. An outgrowth of
this new mobility are expatriate and immigrant Arab communi-
ties appearing throughout Europe and North America. In all of
these other Middle Eastern countries, various new requirements
and adjustments related to societal management, education,
political participation, economics, values, immediate informa-
tion processing, plus increasingly transitory population
movements have contributed greatly to cross pollination of
peoples and ideas. Such movement and avenues of access, taken
largely for granted in the U.S., Europe and even now (almost)
in Japan are, for China and much of the Middle East, more
threatening than not to current established conservative
14
hierarchies although again not historically uncommon (espe-
cially along traditional trade routes, coastal areas and
population centers). For demographic and national reasons,
then, both China and the Middle East are very fluid in
character.
Still, there remains a fixed timelessness to both
regions. China has never truly been conquered, even by the
Mongols or Manchurians, for China's Chineseness has always
assimilated the would be usurper. China's propensity for
focusing on itself as an inland power through the centuries
contributes to maintenance of this "Chineseness". For
example, the Chinese name for "China" means Middle Kingdom
around which all other countries are located. Mongol and
Manchurian invaders both quickly recognized the practicality
and need for utilizing extant administrative machinery to
control populations much larger than their own (entrenched and
extensive bureaucracy is one of China's many inventions).
Transitions, for the new arrivals, from political management
into adopting cultural practices and eventual absorption into
the Chinese domestic fabric became variants of when and not
if. During the relatively recent so-called colonial era,
China was never entirely under territorial control by European
or other powers, much less cultural domination. The Unequal
Treaties, plus China's general impotence from the late Qing
years through to the first portion of this century, were acute
15
embarrassments and indicative of severe political difficul-
ties, but not the stuff of complete domination by an outsider.
On the other hand, and contrary to this experience of
China, Middle Eastern states have for the most part seldom if
ever been free of a conqueror's domination, yet their region
also retains a timeless mystique; Levantine and Arabian
uniqueness, coupled with the attraction of Jerusalem and
Mecca, have been magnets that no conqueror could ever truly
control or overcome. Whether politically beholden to Rome,
Constantinople, London or Paris, the practicalities of Middle
Eastern sovereignty and economic management have not altered
the continued primary focus of all concerned with intangibles
forever resident in phrases such as "via dolorosa", "the hajj"
or "next year in Jerusalem"
.
Portions of the Middle East have, however, escaped
colonization: much of Arabia (comparable in size to the U.S.
east of the Mississippi), never felt the sway of anything more
sedentary than Bedouin nomads, adding to that region's
mystique and timelessness . Another unusual Middle East
circumstance, mentioned here if for no other reason than to
highlight little known aspects of Arab history and to abrogate
stereotypical perceptions, is the Sultanate of Oman; though
once saddled with foreign occupiers (Portuguese from 1508 to
1650, Persians from 1741 to 1744), and host to a resident
British consul since 1800, Oman has had an unbroken and
extended history, mercantile and sedentary, more-or-less its
16
own for centuries, encompassing far flung extraterritorial
acquisitions such as Zanzibar (separated in 1856), and Gwadar
(sold to Pakistan in 1958) . Regardless, then, of whether the
Middle Eastern states were colonized, or atypically, as in the
case of Oman, themselves colonizers, or neither of the two
(Arabia) , the respective sacred tenets of Christian, Moslem
and Jew, as well as other traditions, have given the region a
unique aspect, rife with variations, all its own.
17
A. GENERAL HISTORY OF INTERACTION
Given these combined fluid as well as timeless character-
istics of China and the Middle East, plus their continental
proximity, it is not surprising to learn of their historical
contact through the ages. Although this contact was limited
in scope by the formidable natural barriers inherent to both
regions (the Himalayas in the south and other mountain ranges
and deserts spanning the remainder of China's frontiers, plus
an effectively inaccessible interior to all but the coastal
areas of Arabia) , there was definite and measured human
traffic between China and regions contiguous to it. The
famous overland Silk Road is the most prominent example of
this two way flow of people and goods; along it travelled
ancient commerce to and from China and Central Asia, the
Middle East, and beyond. Maritime routes supplemented the
Silk Road. Occasional Chinese fleets, most notably the Ming
dynasty voyages, journeyed from the South China Sea to Arabian
waters to advance commercial interests and the tribute system,
but these expeditions suffered the fates of political contro-
versy; rulers of China have continuously debated the merits of
maritime power (a debate which still continues).^ Seafarers
from the Persian Gulf also supplemented Silk Road commercial
flows. Arab traders regularly carried goods between Africa,
India and China and back to Arabia. Excavations near Salalah
in Oman are now uncovering an ancient trade center at least as
grand as Pompeii, which is possibly the fabled city of Ubar
18
(from The Arabian Nights) and/or Iram (from the Koran), with
artifacts that span millenia from Rome, Greece, China, Egypt
and Syria. Once in Arabia, whether in present day Oman,
Shatt-al-Arab, or somewhere in between, caravans then carried
these sea-borne goods to the Mediterranean. This latter
nautical and caravan link thrived until the 16th century with
the arrival of colonialism; Arab societies then fell inland
and an attendant growth of coastal piracy occurred. In 1853
a treaty of maritime truce amongst various Gulf Sheikdoms,
giving rise to the term "Trucial States", roughly terminated
the 200-300 year decline of nautical trade in the Persian Gulf
area. Subsequent contemporary transport of petroleum, the
goods attendant to its capital generation, and also the Suez
Canal on the other side of Arabia, have been leading factors
for the resurgence of nautical trade in the region.
For many scores of centuries, commerce along these well
defined trade routes continued to be the primary and perhaps
only link between China and the territories beyond her western
frontier (the Middle East, Russian Principalities and Europe)
,
The only near successful attempt to unite these two areas
politically was the work of Genghis Khan and his sons. They
pushed their Mongolian empire from the seacoast of northern
China almost as far as the Danube, as well as south around the
Himalayas to the Persian Gulf and the vicinity of Baghdad.
They reached Asia Minor and had a large window on the Mediter-
ranean, nearly enveloping the Black Sea in the process and
19
stopping just short of bursting into Europe/ All other
empires, before and since, remained centered either on the
Mediterranean, on Persia, on South Asia, on Central Asia, or
on China itself; never again was one political entity to span
both China and portions of the Middle East. Even Arab
national expansion and the resultant Ottoman Empire did not
exceed, politically, the Indus or Caucasus. Subsequent
Islamic religious expansion did, however, continue centrifu-
gally into Africa, Southern Europe, Astrakhan, further into
Central Asia, South Asia, Indonesia and beyond, providing
significant and lasting cultural bridges.
Distinguishing between Islamic religious growth and its
political boundaries is not an easy task; difficulties with
this distinction are related to Islam's initial 7th century
theocratic rush of expansion and its traditional predilection
for governing in both civil and religious affairs wherever it
resides.^ This historical Islamic preference, whenever
possible, for the mosque as the preferred seat of government,
in addition to clerical or moral authority, effectively
removes the distinction between secular and sacred venues and
is a primary reason for the muddied distinction between
Islamic political - and religious - growth or cohesiveness
.
Thus political, as well as cultural, connections might be seen
among contiguous Islamic settlements, regardless of the
timing, purpose or sponsorship of their growth, and the
presence (if any) of adjacent or intersecting "national"
20
boundaries, etc. But in terms of concurrent, singular, and
genuine political unification spanning both traditional China
and the Middle East, only the great Genghis Khan - a central
force from the Asian Steppes - has so far been able to bring
this about, and then for only a very brief period.
I want again to reemphasize the fluid national and
demographic activity historically inherent within China,
especially when considering her expansive interior spaces and
the various peoples resident there. This human and historical
diversity is not unimportant, even though now comprising, in
the sense of population, a mere percentage of China's vast
masses. Hard references to steady commerce of goods and ideas
between China and the Mediterranean region via the Silk Road
date from as early as Ptolemy and, even earlier, from the Han
Dynasty. The periodic overland east-to-west migrations by
peoples of the Steppes began at least by 500 A.D.; Attila,
Genghis Khan and Tamerlane are only a few of the many who
contested for power throughout this broad region. Arabs,
Mongols, Tibetans, Chinese and others regularly seesawed
through Kashi (Kashgar) and/or adjoining areas. Buddhism and
Islam traversed the Silk Road through Central Asia. Chinese
suzerainty extended, on occasion, around the Pamirs and into
Kabul. Kashi and Urumqi are, culturally, as much or more of
a home to Pakistanis from the south or former Siberian nomads
to the north as they are now, almost, to Han Chinese from the
east. Traditional China doesn't even begin to begin until
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Jiayuguan, where the Great Wall has its terminus in Gansu
province at the eastern fringe of the Taklimakan Desert. This
interplay of peoples and rivalries surrounding the routes of
Silk Road commerce had perhaps its grandest manifestation
during the 19th century's Great Game when Russia, Britain and
China all jockeyed for strategic position within Central Asia.
Current PRC-sponsored Chinese migrations into Xinjiang now
find hureaucratized Kan peoples living rather uneasily side-
by-side v;ith the free spirited Uygurs, Kirgiz, Kazakhs, and
others. Xaticnal identities throughout central Asia, from
Jiayuguan uo Kashi (in China) and again as far on the other
side of !:he FRC-CIS border to the Caspian Sea (in the former
So"Lez 'Jnicni
,
parallel many of the flavors and complexities
of nationalism and other concerns found in the contemporary
Middle East:. That "hese central Asian complexities are
them.selves physically adjacent to the Middle East does little
to inhibit their volatility. Current activity - a reawakening
or resurgence of nationalistic and Islam.ic interests through-
out central Asia - is having an increasingly significant
irrpact on Chinese and Middle Eastern (and Russian) decisions
made in capital cities thousands of miles distant from each
other. Consideration of this resurgent activity will reappear
throughout these pages.
When commerce with China was taken up by the maritime
interests of industrializing Europe and, subsequently,
America, commercial flows along the old overland Silk Road
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became superceded in volume and dominated by direct sea routes
largely bypassing the Middle East. (Sea routes between Arabia
and China had existed for centuries, but as competitive
alternatives rather than as monopolistic requirements).
During this period the Qing dynasty was the last to rule
Imperial China; forms of colonialism and mercantilism proceed-
ed to infiltrate interaction between China and the rest of the
world. The Middle East had, by this time, passed from the
arabian and Islamic Umayyad Dynasty to eventual Ottoman rule.
It was not until this century's two World Wars that the
general demise of colonialism then present within Asia and
elsewhere occurred, along with the fatal weakening of the
Ottoman Empire; Wilsonian self-determination plus the frame-
work of the United Nations were causal influences as well as
symptomatic indicators of colonialism's closure. China and
the Middle East were now basically, after a fashion, on their
own again.
Because of the heated internal Chinese dispute over the
direction and directors-to-be of mainland China after the
Qing, the People's Republic (FRC) was not proclaimed until
late 1949. During the protracted three-way conflict in China
involving the Communists, Nationalists and Japanese, Mao
Zedong closely observed the Second World War's progress beyond
China with an eye to its effect on China's own security; he
concluded, as had apparently many Chinese rulers before him,
that the Middle East played a pivotal strategic role as far as
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the ultimate safety of China was concerned/ If the Germans
(or in later decades the Soviets or Americans), should gain
uncontested domination over the Middle East, then China's own
security would become that much more tenuous. For if Germany
gained control of the Levant in the 1940s, that would have
isolated South Asia from the global conflict then in progress,
thus weakening Europe and providing largely unobstructed
avenues for Axis coordination against China from the west,
south and east. These observations of Mao were later to
expand into his Intermediate Zone theory and the Three Worlds
doctrine .''
Meanwhile, rule was established in Moscow by the Russian
Communists in 1917 and Egypt, after attempts by Saudi Arabia
and Yemen, became the first Arab state to establish continuous
relations with the USSR in 1943. Other occurrences within
this formative period included creation of the UN and Israel,
which were among the Second World War's more prominent
byproducts. (The War acted, among other things, as catalyst
for generation of a forum for nascent ideas of world govern-
ment, which in turn supported Zionism's drive for a state of
Israel. Disclosures of the holocaust provided further impetus
for the formation of Israel) . Even the PRC may be said to be,
indirectly, a byproduct of the postwar era; the struggles
which led to the PRC ' s formation had been in progress,
roughly, since the turn of the centuiry and held to their own
timetable, although concluding (at least for the time being)
,
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in 1949. Israel then became the first Levantine country to
extend recognition to the PRC in 1950, with Pakistan, also in
1950, being the first Islamic country to recognize the PRC.
Although China and Israel did not then quite manage to
normalize relations, other countries in the Middle East did
succeed in establishing bilateral relations with China. There
has subsequently been a steadily increasing involvement of
China with the Middle East, and vice versa, since 1949.
Before jumping into post-1949 developments, it is
instructive to note that despite the fluid (as well as the
timeless), qualities of China and the Middle East, plus their
relative geographic proximity, China is one of the very few
countries where Middle Eastern demographic or cultural
influence is relatively sparse. References are made to
communities of Arabs and other traders along the Silk Road and
coastal areas where commercial activity entered and departed
China. ^ These settlements, however, either became absorbed
outright by the Chinese through the centuries, or assimilated
as in the case of the north central Hui minority, or otherwise
drifted away, failing to exert sufficient presence to ensure
their distinctive survival. Islam itself penetrated central
Asia and became prominent in China's outlying provinces (which
were not always part of China) , although its direct impact on
China as a whole has been slight; at present China's popula-
tion is only 4% Muslim and Buddhist (with perhaps only a few
hundred Jews, if any) .^ China is learning, however, of the
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potential public relations value intrinsic to its (relations
with its) minority peoples and of having over 20 million
Muslims resident within her borders. China must also deal
with the fact, now unpleasant to Beijing, that much of her
outlying territory, though sparsely populated, has been
populated almost entirely with Islamic minorities . ^°
Likewise with Christianity: Christian impact within China
remains comparatively mild, but shows signs of recent (since
the 1700s) growth. Official PRC tolerance for approved
religious observances within the last decade has afforded a
respite for Chinese Christians and other religious groups,
though only to a limited and as yet sporadic extent via
officially sanctioned churches, both Protestant and Catholic.
Initial Chinese restrictions against Christian proselytizing
began from the mid-18th century and were instituted for
primarily political reasons (catalyzed, paradoxically, by
Rome's reaction to Jesuit practices at China's Imperial
court) . These sanctions grew to cultural proportions,
becoming periodically quite severe against all missionary
activities, especially during the formative years of the PRC.
Recent events in Poland and Romania sufficiently roused
contemporary Chinese leadership to renew sanctions against
nonof ficial or unapproved Christian groups and other religious
activities in the PRC. Overall, however, monotheistic
religions of the sort descended from Middle East patriarchal
lines are generally accorded just enough indigenous merit,
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receive just enough international attention, and have just
enough open or hidden local support to currently warrant
grudging official tolerance within the PRC . (Tibetan Buddhism
also enjoys, now and again, similar tolerances). So despite
the recognition we ourselves might find for such practices,
examples of historically Middle Eastern presences within
modern China remain few.
The lack of a historical Chinese presence in the Middle
East is similar to the present relative dearth of Middle
Eastern influence within China. Although Chinese have settled
in almost every corner of the globe, there have been very few,
if any, to take up residence within the Middle East.^^ Hence
the curious dichotomy of naturally occurring and practically
inevitable historical and commercial links between China and
the Middle East, yet with a modern tradition prior to 1949
largely devoid of lasting or shared cross-national and cross-
cultural influences. We will reconsider this dichotomy later.
B. CHRONOLOGY SINCE 1949
Primary events occurring within China and the Middle East
since 1949, plus other notable events of international and
mnemonic import, mundane and tumultuous, are set in table
format during the following pages. Direct Chinese-Middle
Eastern interaction and concerns pertaining to their inter-
relationships are printed in italics. Fair sprinklings of
detail are chronicled, incorporating material indicative of
emotive environments as well as items containing political and
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diplomatic impact. This format, full yet economical, serves
as a hard reference for discussion of post 1949 events of
China and the Middle East; it also, in its straightforward
fashion, helps to reduce the emotive content of a subject that
is frequently associated with significant degrees of passion.
It is necessary to have this type of international overview of
primary political and social developments (in conjunction with
contemporary U.S. domestic milestones), to better appreciate
the interactions, and our perceptions, of two globally
constituent regions. What might be important to us, at any
given moment, might not be important to someone else, or
otherwise found to be important or related in different ways.
This overview will help to foster bird's eye views of interre-
gional and international relationships that contributed to, or
at least coexisted with, Chinese and Middle Eastern events and
by extension our understanding of those events.
YEAR MIDDLE EAST CHINA U.S. /OTHER
1949 1st Arab-Israeli war U.S. occupation of
Japan
Israel-Egypt cease- CCP forces enter
fire Beijing Acheson is Secretary
of State
Israel shoots down 5
U.K. aircraft over
Egypt NATO formed
CCP forces enter USSR jams VOA
Nanjing
Berlin blockade ends
Israel joins UN CCP forces enter
Shanghai Japan reparations
payments terminated
U.S. DOD and JCS






CCP U.S. responsible for
over 45% of world's





CCP forces enter explains loss of
Guangzhou China to the CCP
PRC demands KMT leave
UN
USSR detonates its
CCP forces enter 1st atomic device
Chongqing (SEP)
PRC has relations
with USSR, E. Europe,
Mongolia
USSR atomic weapons
Office of Israeli ban proposal is





YEAR MIDDLE EAST CHINA U.S. /OTHER






Marriage Law of 1950
Agrarian Reform Law
Pakistan is first Muslim state
to recognize the PRC
Israel is first Middle East
Levant state to recognize PRC
Arab League agrees









fers to Middle East
Israel decides that
there will be no
return by Arabs to
Israeli-held terri-
tory





70 times from May
1949 to Feb 1950
PRC troops told to
liberate Tibet
PRC demands to take
part in U.S. -Japan
treaty discussions
Truman says U.S.








are in State Dept
Korean War
Truman orders: aid
for ROK; 7th Fleet
to Taiwan Straits;
military mission to
ROC; aid for S.E.
Asia
U.S. -led embargo on
all Western goods to
PRC




YEAR MIDDLE EAST CHINA U.S. /OTHER
1951 Israel establishes
cont Dept. to recruit
foreign scientists Taiwan's population
less than 8 million
Arab League ponders
joint foreign policy
PRC selects Egypt and Pakistan as
part of 7 nation group to consider U.S. -Pakistan sign
the Far East situation technical assistance
agreement
Israel wants finan- Taiwan's total ex-
cial credit from any ports are $58m
state, East or West
Arab League in diiro calls itself
"Block (Hest and South Asia), to
balance East and Uest'
PRC opposes Japanese
rearmament
Egypt stays neuti'al at UN regarding
Korea
Israel-South Africa "Elimination of
Civil Aviation talks Counterrevolution-
aries" campaign









1st PRC revision U.S. -Japan Peace and





Egypt treaty of 1936
PRC supporting Viet




YEAR MIDDLE EAST 1 CHINA U.S. /OTHER
1951 Israel agrees wi th U.K. and France
cont about supporting direct U.S. -PRC
talks on Korea; says troops should
not be wasted in Korea
1952 Anti British riots in
Egypt; U.K. -Egypt
fighting "Five-Anti" campaign





rural mutual-aid ANZUS formed
teams
State Dept bans all
Pre-1949 production travel to Communist





Hussein is King of give CCP direct
Jordan contact with half Eisenhower elected;





election in Iraq PRC reliance on USSR
assistance
USSR stops relations











U.S. urges Egypt to (1953-1957)
join a collective USSR H-bomb
security pact
Khrushchev to power
Pakistan begins vote against
PRC in the UN
U.S.-ROK Treaty
Kinq Ibn Saud dies
1954 USS NAUTILUS, 1st
U.S. begins military nuclear submarine
aid to Pakistan
Population is 586 U.S. -Japan Defense




lYEAR MIDDLE EAST CHINA U.S. /OTHER





5 Principles of Geneva Conference on
Peaceful Coexistence Indochina; Dulles
refuses to shake
PRC-U.K. relations Zhou Enlai's hand
Egypt-U.K. Suez
agreement; Britain PRC shoots down U.K.
withdraws from Suez jairliner
1st National People's SEATO formed
Congress; 1st State





1955 PRC-Afghani Stan relations
Baghdad Pact





PLA officer corps Warsaw Pact formed
patterned after
Soviets' Japan joins GAIT
U.S. agrees, in
principle, to sell Soviets leave Port
arms to Egypt Arthur naval base
Sino-Egyptian tfi }de agreement
PRC-U.S. talks
commence at Geneva





Friendship treaty Rural collectives and
urban public owner-
Egypt, Syria, Saudi ship are accelerated
Arabia agree on Joint
military command
Compulsory military





YEAR MIDDLE EAST CHINA U.S. /OTHER
1956 Yemen-Czech arms deal
Pakistan becomes an
Islamic Republic




















in USSR at 20th
Congress of CPSU
U.S. sends aid to
Israel
U.S. H-bomb air test
U.S. refuses to














1st UN attempt to
seat PRC = 16-33-10





invades Egypt; U.K. &
France invade Egypt
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1956 USSR invades Hungary
cont
Eisenhower reelected
PRC offers volunteers to assist
Egypt during Suez crisis White collar and ser-
vice sector workers
PRC provides funds to Egypt; now outnumber blue
PRC-Egypt cowmodities agreement collar workers
61st meeting between
PRC-U.S. ambassadors
is held in Beijing
Zhou Enlai visits Pakistan,






UN urged by U.S. to "On the Correct Way
pressure Israel's of Handling Contra-
withdrawal to borders dictions among the
of armistice People" by Mao
U.S. authorizes Little Rock, Ark.
cooperation with Piny in romanization
Middle East against is developing
communist aggression Treaty of Rome:
PRC reappraises European Economic
Suez Canal is opened relations with U.S.
,
Community (EEC)
by UN to all but Japan; returns to begins
the largest vessels Hard Line (1957-67);
encourages worldwide U.K. eases trade
Coup attempt in Jor- Peoples' Uars vs. restrictions with
dan; all political Imperialism PRC; Italy, Japan
parties are banned
"Anti-Rightist"
and FRG follow suit
U.S. -Iran Treaty campaign
Nasser is President 24 U.S. news groups
allowed to visit PRC
Syria-U.S. crisis in on trial basis USSR tests ICBM
diplomatics
Almost all peasants
Syria-USSR credit are collectivized
agreement
Mao in Moscow; PRC-
USSR's Sputnik
USSR disagree about Asian-African
Middle East policy Solidarity Conf.
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I YEAR MIDDLE EAST CHINA U.S ./OTHER
1958 Egypt-USSR assistance
agreement 2nd 5-yr plan
Yemen Crown Prince 1st Arab leader
to visit PRC; PRC-Yemeni industry













1st PRC shipment of goods to
Baghdad
Zhou Enlai assures Iraq of PRC
support









Lebanon PRC bombards Quemoy
and Matsu
PRC-Iraq begin relations









voids 2nd 5-yr plan
NASA begins
U.S. -ROC agree that





lYFAR MIDDLE EAST CHINA U.S. /OTHER
1959 8 Iraq delegations to PRC and
3 PRC delegations to Iraq from




Arafat forms Fatah: assistance agreement
Palestine Liberation through 1965
Movement Castro to power
Liu Shaoqi becomes U.S. -Iran Defense
Iraq-USSR Economic Chairman of PRC pact
agreement
Arab Petroleum Conf. Factionalism within
in Cairo CCP beginning Herter is Secretary
of State
UAR ambassador t< » PRC recalled
Iraq-U.S. military, Massive drought
economic assistance
agreements cancelled Lin Biao Minister of
Defense; PLA Party
Ba'ath tries to Committees restored
shoot Qassem
PRC and Egypt di.ipute anti-
communist issue
U.S. -Pakistan treaty CCP has 14 million
of friendship members
Mao now stays away
Peaceful uses of
Antarctica treaty
from direct admin- Rusk calls for
istration reassessment of PRC
1960 Aswan Dam begun
OPEC formed
Several hundred PRC workers still
in Yemen France detonates its
PRC-Nepal Border 1st nuclear device
Iran says Iraq is Agreement and Aid
violating Shatt Package
al-Arab agreement U.S. giving increas-
3rd visit of Zhou ing aid to South






YEAR MIDDLE EAST CHINA U.S. /OTHER
1960 U-2 incident over
cont Severe flooding;
worst in 100 yrs
USSR
USS TRITON completes






PRC-Afghan Friendship and Nixon-Kennedy
Non- aggression Ti^eaty
Zhou Enlai tells a
visitor that PRC has
taken "first step in
debates
a journey of 10,000 Benelux union
miles"




U.S. -Pakistan treaty PRC buys Canadian









Defense Treaty U.S. -USSR Vienna









CCP has 17 million
Hammarskjold killed





YEAR MIDDLE EAST CHINA U.S. /OTHER
1962 Iranian Agrarian Mao sees a trend to
Reform Law revive capitalism
within PRC/CCP
Syrian military coup
PRC oil and military delegations
in Iraq
37 nation Conference
Coup in North Yemen in Cairo dealing
forms a Republic; "Quotations from with problems of
recognized by PRC Chairman Mao" is economic development
and USSR; civil war published by Lin
ensues between Biao (aka: Little
Republicans and Red Book)
Royalists
Si no -Indian border
Algeria Independent war Cuban Missile Crisis
Nasser mediates between PRC and
India
1
PRC delegation to UAR to explain
PRC side of Sino-Soviet disDute
1963 Ba'athist coup in Mao reasserting
Iraq; recognized by Class Struggle pri-
PRC and USSR macy in PRC and CCP
PRC -Syria econom c credit
2nd Afro- Asian
Sino-Pakistan border agreement; Conference
1st PRC-Pakistan agreement on
trade
Military coup in PRC-USSR talks on
Syria (Ba'ath) ideology fail






1st of 9 essays by
PRC on differences
Iraq recognizes between CCP and CPSU












JFK shot; LBJ takes
office
Zhou Enlai visits Egypt & nine
other Middle East and African
countries
1964 Arab summit discusses





1st Fatah delegation to PRC








Zhou Enlai on tours
to Africa and Asia,
including Pakistan
Mao makes changes to
education system
Yemen President visits PRC;
PRC-Yemen trade credit
2nd Non-Aligned Conf;
47 countries meet in
Cairo
Israel-Syria fighting






















Syrian Foreign Minister to PRC
First PLO delegation to PRC
Nasser reelected to
3rd term







IYEAR MIDDLE EAST CHINA U.S. /OTHER
1965
cont
UAR Premier visits PRC
I
PRC delegation to Kuwait
Zhou Enlai visits Cairo en route to
Algiers Conference; Zhou Enlai also
visits Syria; abortive attempt by PRC










PRC gives diplomatic aid to
Pakistan during Indo-Pakistani








Kuwait trade delegation to PRC
I

























1966 3rd 5-yr plan;
voided by GPCR














YFAR J MIDDLE EAST CHINA U.S ./OTHER
1966 Zhou Enlai formally
cont announces GPCR Japan borrows total
of $863 million (m)
"May 7" schools from World Bank since
1953; largest debtor
Thermonuclear test nation









First PRC arms shipment to PLO
Guided missile and
nuclear test ASPAC founded
Deng Xiaoping purged Asian Development
Bank inaugurated
PRC nuclear test




billion ($1.5b) Red Guards dispute
amongst themselves
Soyuz I accident
Suez closed to use and with others




Jerusalem, Sinai, Turmoil in Hong Kong
Golan and West Bank by Red Guards, U.K.
police contain it
Martial law in Jordan
1.2 million urban
Suez closed entirely youth resettled to
countryside 1957-66
USSR breaks relations
with Israel Wuhan incident
PRC trade credit to Egypt
N. Yemen coup ends Hong Kong capitalism
Civil War, returns begins to skyrocket
pro-Saudi government
PRC detonates its
Israel applies its 1st hydrogen device
law to all Jerusalem
42
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1967 PRC agrees to build
cont railway in Tanzania
Thurgood Marshall
All PRC Ambassadors recalled except to Supreme Court
for Ambassador to Egypt
Nixon writes PRC
Israel relying on cannot be left
U.S. more than France Red Guards storm "forever outside the
for military arms Soviet and British
embassies
family of nations"
South Yemen formed, UNSC Resolution 242
recognized by PRC and
USSR 7th PRC atmospheric
nuclear test
1968 U.S. -PRC talks resume
in Warsaw
Iraq nuclear reactor TET offensive
completed PLA beginning to








Iraqi Ba'ath Party Robert Kennedy shot
again in power; coup|
d'etat USSR invades Czechos-
Revolutionary Com- lovakia
Israel relies on mittees now at every
level of PRC society Brezhnev Doctrine
S.Yemen Foreign Minister in PRC;
PRC-S. Yemen diplomatic relations;
PRC economic credit to S.Yemen
Nixon elected;
CCP establishment Rogers is Secretary
Iraqi Kurds fight fights GPCR to keep of State, Kissinger




Iraqi Kurds U.S. relaxing bans
9th Party Congress; on American contact
GPCR formally over and trade with PRC
Iran-Iraq dispute but turmoil remains,
Shatt al-Arab Lin Biao is heir,
new CCP Constitution
43
I YEAR MIDDLE EAST CHINA U.S. /OTHER
1969
cont
Iraq Chief-of-Staff to PRC
I
PRC-Yemen technical school agreement
Kuwait has to allow
Iraqis in Umm Qasr
Jordanian Civil War:
1969-70
PRC-Iraq civil air agreement
Rogers Peace plan |






1970 PRC aid delegation in S.Yemen
PRC completes textile mill in
Yemen
I
Arafat visits PRC (and USSR)
Kurds and Iraq reach
another agreement
Jordan civil war
with PLO, forces PLO
into Lebanon; Syria
aids PLO
PRC is 5th state to




5. Yemen delegation in PRC;






PRC completes Yemen technical
school
I
Israel does not support vote to
keep PRC out of UN; PRC gains
1st majority vote for seat at UN
Japan signs Non-
proliferation Treaty




























PRC delegation in Yemen for
anniversary
Riots in Poland
1971 U.K. withdraws from
Persian Gulf; Iran
and Saudi Arabia are
asked/aided by U.S.
to fill the vaccuum
4th 5-yr plan
Mao willing to talk
with Imperialists
PRC discontinues support to
PFLOflG
PRC's 2nd satellite
Kuwait recognizes the PRC
Jordan recognizes the PRC










Pakistan assists as intermediary
Syria closes border
with Jordan
Death of Lin Biao;
prominence of PLA
starts to recede
PRC admitted to UN
Second Indo-Pakistani war; PRC















U.K. 6th state to
launch a satellite
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YEARJ MIDDLE EAST CHINA U.S. /OTHER
1972 Nixon visits PRC;
Attempted pro-Soviet PRC-U.S. Shanghai Soviet- Iraqi treaty
coup in Egypt Communique
Nixon to USSR; ABM,
Campaign begins to SALT II Treaties;
discredit Confucius Detente; 1st U.S.
President in USSR
PRC sends arms to Pakistan
Watergate commences
Sadat expels 21,000 Deng Xiaoping
Soviets reappearing Philippines 1st
ASEAN state to rec-
Kuwait govt dele\ nation to PRC ognize PRC
Syria agrees to PLO PRC provided $4. 4b Okinawa reverts to
control by Arafat in foreign aid from Japan from U.S.
in S. Lebanon 1953-1971
Japan gives full
1st PRC purchase of recognition to PRC;
Clandestine meeting U.S. wheat regrets and repents
of Israeli official past aggression in
and King Hussein PRC, at the UN, does
not approve of PLO
China
Union attempted by terrorism
North & South Yemen Nixon reelected
Kuwait trade deliigation to PRC
1973 Iran-Iraq begin PRC's 1st oil exports
clashes over Shatt go to Japan
al-Arab
New birth control






to form union French President to
PRC; 1st W. Europe
Syria border opened head-of-state visit Kissinger is
in PRC since 1949 Secretary of State
Arab- Israeli war;
USSR sends arms to PRC wants U.S. to
Egypt speed normalization
USSR threatens to
PRC tacitly approves intervene in Middle









lYEAR MIDDLE EAST CHINA U.S. /OTHER
1973 Israel now largely CCP has 28 million








25 meetings between buying of Western OPEC raises price of
PLO and Israel from industry and tech- oil by 300%
1973-77 (unofficial) noloqv
1974 Deng into Politburo Japan enters MFN
agreement with PRC
Sadat ends complete Lin Biao and Confu-




Vice Premier Deng at
Kissinger shuttle UN elaborates Three
diplomacy; Nixon Worlds theory
visits Middle East Nixon resigns; Ford
becomes new U.S.
PRC rejects U.S. President
PLO granted observer wheat because of
status in UN "smut"
PRC able to supp y spare parts
for Egypt's soviet arsenal India detonates its
first nuclear device
1975 Suez Canal reopened 4th National People's
Congress; 1975 State U.S. forces in ROC
Iraq and Kurds Constitution; Deng is are reduced
resume hostilities PLA's Chief of Staff;
"Four Modernizations"
PRC exports more to Kuwait than
to any other Middle East country
U.S. suspends aid to
Iran-Iraq accord RE: Israel during review






resumes: bus load Deng visits France: USS MAYAGUEZ
of Palestinians highest PRC official incident
massacred by Maron- ever to visit Western
ite Catholics in country
Beirut Cuban troops to
Angola
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closest Arab ally PRC begins active Helsinki Conference
from 1973-1979 role in UN agencies
Syria- Iraq quarrel TANZAM Railroad is
over Euphrates dam completed
1st FRG head-of-state
visit to PRC; PRC
Syria now receiving opposes "permanent
USSR's newest arms division of Germany"
President Ford to PRC
1976 5th 5-yr plan
Zhou Enlai dies
USSR says detente
12 million urban and revolution are






Arabs protest land purged again, Hua
seizures by Israel Guofeng made Acting
Premier













in Israel Gang of Four purged;




PRC Muslims betti ;r able to make Vance is Secretary
Hajj pilgrimage ilo Saudi Arabia of State
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1977 Begin is first Likud Deng Xiaoping begins
Prime Minister in to consolidate power
Israel
Food riots in Egypt
U.S. arms to Iran
PRC-Kuwait sign first cooperation from 1971-77 total
protocol $21b (only $1.2b
from 1950-70, $5. 7b
Libya-Egypt border in 1977)
clash "Production Respon-
sibility System" in
Both Iraq & Kuwait agriculture




payments and cotton CCP has 35 million
exports to USSR; members
forbids navy base
use to USSR 11th Party Congress;
new CCP constitution UN adopts Piny in as
Egypt allows multi- and revival of party international
ple political parties control after GPCR standard
2nd clandestine King College entrance
Hussein and Israeli exams required
meeting
PRC $35b arms budget
Sadat goes to Israel is 3rd largest; USSR
is 1st at $140b; U.S.
Carter calls for 2nd at SlOlb
Palestinian homeland Cuba sends troops
PRC wants to buy to Ethiopia
Arab Summit and Harrier jets
Tripoli Declaration
1978 Deng visits Burma,
Sadat and Saudi King Nepal and Bangladesh
meet; 1st Egypt-Saudi Brezhnev stresses
high level contact PRC ant i -USSR stance return to Geneva
is alienating some Conference for peace
Third World states in Middle East
EEC-PRC 5-yr. trade
agreement





YEAR MIDDLE EAST CHINA U.S ./OTHER
1978
cont




























with USSR because of
border tensions
agree to increase
EEC is PRC's largest
trade partner after
Japan
Hua visits N. Korea;
first trip abroad by
PRC leader since 1957
Deng's "Open Door"
policy














and W. Europe arms
to PRC
Hua Guofeng visits Iran
Camp David Accords
Martial Law in Iran
Iraq expels Khomeini














returns to one pri-
mary party (NDP)
Iraq shifting away
from USSR to West
for arms
Egyptian migrant
workers remit SI. 7b
PRC at first supports
Camp David
1st PRC-U.S. student
exchanges in 30 yrs.
PRC buys missiles
from France
Mao accused of aiding
Gang of Four
Deng Xiaoping is now
primary ruler in PRC

















more U.S. aid by 1979
than any one country
since Marshall Plan
Islamic revolution
in Iran; Shah leaves
PRC Deputy Prime
Pakistan



















all year in Senate
U.S. -Philippine 5-yr
base agreement





YFAR MIDDLE EAST CHINA U.S. /OTHER





YAR-PDRY fighting; in brief land war;
Arab League tries to PLA does poorly
stop it
Iraq makes YAR-PDRY Agriculture and con-






Baghdad Summit PRC-Portugal nor-
malize relations;
U.S. cuts aid to agree that Macao is
Pakistan following Chinese Territory
reports of near with Portuguese
nuclear capability Administration U.S. -Taiwan
Relations Act
PRC, via Pakistai7, sends regrets
to Iran about Se^1 '78 visit
Deng says U.S. may
Egypt given $1.5b monitor Soviet SALT
military credits compliance from PRC
by U.S. soil Pope visits Poland
U.S. authorizes MX
PRC reports success missile
Iraq-Syria unity with a ballistic
talks in Baghdad missile test
Deng tells Japan that





PRC added to Olympics
Andrew Young resigns
from UN after he
PRC-U.S. total trade meets with PLO rep
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1979 Israel-S.Africa joint
cont Indian Ocean nuclear
test
Hua on 23 day trip to
France, Germany, UK
Democracy Wall
Shah flies to NYC
U.S. -Iran hostage




in Islamabad PRC-USSR normalizing
talks end without
progress
Afghanistan invaded USSR building first
by USSR





1980 U.S. grain embargo
to USSR
PRC and U.S. agree to coordinate





PRC sends Muslim delegation to Sakharov exiled
Iran for first anniversary of
Islamic revolutic)n
Pakistan dismisses Deng persuading CCP
U.S. $400 million to limit concurrent Carter Doctrine
offer as "peanuts" CCP and PRC office
holders
PRC Foreign Miniiiter Huang Hua U.S. selling non-





PRC is now Pakisi'lan's primary agree on U.S. access
arms supplier; providing aid to bases
for Afghan resistance via
Pakistan
Selective Service
Israel expropriates 6th National People's revived in U.S.
land NE of Jerusalem Congress; Zhao Ziyang
becomes Premier
Saudi supports peace 50,000 refugees/yr
via UNSC 242 & 338 allowed into U.S.
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1980 Saudi Arabia is 6th
cont in military expen- U.S. attempt to
ditures, 1st in per rescue hostages in
capita; over $30b Iran
purchased from U.S.
since 1973 Vance resigns;
PRC tests CSSX-4 IBM Muskie is new
Jordan moving from successfully Secretary of State
Syria to Iraq
Hua Guofeng in Japan;
King Hussein will urges joint response France has neutron
join peace talks if to USSR; 1st Chinese bomb
Israel withdraws leader to visit Japan
from territories; in over 2,000 yrs




now $4. 9b per year U.S. boycotts
Israel states all Olympics
of Jerusalem is its Coastal special
Capital economic zones Birth of Solidarity
PRC arms sales and workers in
Middle East earn $lb/yr during
early 1980s
Iran-Iraq war begins U.S. to sell 11
advanced computers
PRC arms sales 1975- to PRC
Syria-USSR 20 yr. 1980 are $810m
friendship accord
PRC foreign trade Reagan elected;
Israel at UN asks deficit for 1979- Haig is Secretary
nuclear weapons ban 1980 is $3. 9b of State
in Middle East
Ganq of Four on trial
1981 Iran delegation ito Beijing; PRC Solidarity active
& Iran both proft^ss Ihird korld in Poland
membership
World refugee total
Saudi plan forms 12.6 million
Gulf Cooperation 6th 5-yr plan
Council (GCC)
U.S. trade in
U.S. -Saudi Arabia $2b Pacific now starts
arms deal to surpass Atlantic
Jordan says Syria is
involving Middle East
in East-West rivalry PRC has $6. lb surplus
with developing Space Shuttle
countries
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Israel-Syria almost almost 20 million
go to war
Habib shuttle
diplomacy Pope shot (wounded)
Israel bombs Iraqi PRC condemns Vatican
nuclear plant interference for
naming Chinese Arch-
U.S. -Egypt reach $2b bishop
accord for two nuke Haig reaffirms U.S.
power plants arms sales to PRC as
Hu Yaobang becomes strategic imperative
60% of Saudi work CCP Chairman
force are foreign U.S. reports joint
Deng heads Military PRC-U.S. tracking
Commission post in Xinjiang
20 changes in Iraqi since 1979; PRC
government since denies it
1932 Independence PRC-India agree to
discuss border
Mao portrayed as
bri 11 iant leader who
made "grave errors"
Prince Fahd 8-point
peace plan; Israel PRC reverts to Three U.S. neutron bomb
rejects it Worlds rhetoric after
hiatus of several
production
60% of Saudi workers years
are foreign nationals
Sadat cracks down on
Islamic extremists
U.S. -Israel joint PRC proposes PRC-ROC
security, strategic reunification; ROC
planning agreement rejects it
Sadat expels 1,000 PRC launches three
Soviets including satellites on same
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1981 PRC offers sea, air




Mubarak arrests U.S. launches
Islamic extremists Trident sub
Polish Martial Law
Israel annexes Golan
Heights PRC- Japan $1.38b
industrial aid accord
Saudi Arabia/Bahrain
say Iran is exporting
terrorism; siqn pact
1982 France pledges to Emergence of PRC's
rebuild Iraqi reactor independent foreign
policy
Egypt requests USSR
industrial aid PRC-Poland agreement
to increase trade 25%
U.S. arms sales to
Jordan increased PRC proposal for arms
control at UN meeting Unrest in Poland
USSR desires closer
ties with PRC
Sinai returned to PRC approves govt.
Egypt by Israel personnel reduction
from 600,000 to
Israel acknowledges 200,000 FalkTands war
supplying arms to
Iran U.S. -PRC discussions
about developing PRC
Israel into Lebanon nuclear industry
PRC promises PLO emergency aid to Shultz is Secretary
offset Lebanese osses of State
PRC-U.S. 5-yr textile Japanese 60% defense
agreement spending increase
through 1987
PRC-Oman establi ;h relations
PLO expelled from S.
Lebanon and Beirut Reagan urges self-
12th Party Congress; rule for West Bank
U.S. Marines enter new CCP constitution and a freeze on
Beirut Israeli settlements
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1982 Arab League summit Deng urges indepen-
cont peace proposals for dent foreign policy,
M.E. accepted by U.S. pragmatic ideology;
rejected by Israel right to strike
removed; Post of CCP
Chairman abolished; U.S. suspects PRC of
Civilian massacres Central Advisory helping Pakistani









Zaire-Israel renew Brezhnev dies;
relations Andropov to power
Zhao Ziyang in Egypt: accepts
Israel's right tt3 exist; supports U.S. wants Int'l
Arab League plan Conference on global
monetary system,
debt, unemployment
1983 Zhao Ziyang on 30 day
visit to Africa;
Advanced USSR arms cancels Zaire's $100m
in Syria debt to PRC
Ford and Carter both PRC press discusses
denounce Israeli hi-tech revolution
settlement policy sweeping the world
Israel-Zaire 5-yr Soviet satellite




IMF $5. 4b loan to
Mubarak sees Reagan Brazil, largest ever
in Washington
Population approxi- UN says 20,000
France sells Mirage mately 1 billion executions in Iran
fighters to Iraq since 1979
Reagan "Evil Empire"
Jordan-PLO do not speech
agree on Reagan's
peace plan S.D.I, research
begins in U.S.
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1983 U.S. Embassy in USSR nuke sub sinks
cont Beirut is bombed
USSR shoots down KAL
U.S. Navy shells airliner
Druze positions PRC visited by U.S.
SECDEF Weinberger
USMC baracks bombed
in Beirut U.S. -Grenada action
PLO-Egypt restore Nuclear Winter
relations concept
1984 PRC endorses idea of a Middle
East peace conference Japanese company
repairs Iranian mis-
PRC-U.S. increase sile parts, via Hong
trade agreements Kong and Singapore
France agrees to sell
$4b of air defense Zhao Ziyang visits
items to Saudis U.S.
U.S. Navy shells PRC Defense Minister
Lebanon visits U.S.
Pakistan scientist Deng and Brzezinski





Japan endorses sale in USSR




PRC launches its 1st
U.K. bans arms permanent satellite
shipments to Iran
and Iraq Reagan visits PRC;
nuclear cooperation
agreement signed
Arafat makes 3rd trip to Beijing
PRC supports global




Pakistan bans bank coexistence of capi-
interest payments, talism and socialism
including foreign Bulgaria and USSR
banks, as violation implicated in Papal
of Moslem law assassination attempt
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Jordanian company contracts to
make four nuclear plants in PRC
for $7 billion
PRC-United Arab Emirates & Abu
Dhabi establish relations
I
PRC trade delegations visit
Bahrain, Abu Dhabi , Kuwait,
and Oman
I
U.A.E. proposes an Arab-PRC
Chamber of Commerce (w/22 Arab
countries), also Arab-PRC banks
I




















PRC trade delegation to Jordan




establishment of PRC-Saudi Arabia
relations
New Zealand refuses
port visit for U.S.
military ship
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1985
cont Muslim PRC delegation to Qatar
asks for PRC-Qatar relations
PRC announces major
Israel has 260% teacher training and
inflation rate educational reform
PRC military regions
drop to 7 from 11
Kuwait Oil and Finance Minister
in PRC; Sino-Kuwaiti investment
committee forms to help Gulf
invest in PRC
U.S. allows sale of
reactors and non-
military technology
to PRC1st Western hostage
seized in Lebanon









PRC arms sales 1981-
1985 total $5. 4b;
(4.2b to Middle East)
First Arab-PRC top level investment
conference in PRC Ningxia province
PRC again supports international
peace conference for Middle East
Jordan, Syria want






















Unrest in S. Africa
Gramm-Rudman billui iiiiii r\uu ii u i i i
USSR-Japan agree to
resume World War II
Peace Treaty talks

























PRC eases travel and
residence controls
for foreigners in PRC









Hu Yaobang 1st CCP
leader to visit W.
Europe (U.K. , France,
Germany, Italy),
since 1949
Zhao Ziyang visits Turkey
Israel-Soviet reps




1st Israeli PM visit




USSR First and Lead
By Example themes at
24th CPSU Congress
1st conviction of an
American spying for
PRC in U.S.









by Japan in Korea
and China
U.S. sanctions





Central Committee total U.S. IQ
reaffirms policy of
economic reforms London Sunday Times
prints Vanunu story









1987 PRC negotiates to launch
Iranian satellittJ
Waite is kidnapped Hu Yaobang forced to
resign U.S. -Mongolia begin
relations
CCP decrying "bour-
geois liberalism" U.S., Japan, Canada
plan joint space
station in the 1990s
Israel investigates Li Peng says PRC
Pollard scandal will not retreat from
partial economic
Zia says Pakistan is reform measures
able to build A-bomb
More expenditures
Israel-USSR agree to for arms in 1987
exchange consular than any other year
delegations Zhao denounces West-
ern influence, says
in history
Kuwait proposes U.S. reforms continue Turkey requests EC
and USSR flags for membership
some of its tankers PRC-Portugal agree on
Macao return in 1999
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1987 USSR permits limited
cont Peres proposes Int'l private ownership
Middle East peace PRC GDP increased
conference, Shamir 96% from 1979
denounces proposal Toshiba forbidden by
PRC family incomes Japan to sell sensi-
Egypt breaks rela- increased 56% from tive items to USSR
tions with Iran 1981
USS STARK hit by two
Iran deploys PRC Silkworm missiles missiles in the Gulf
11 Kuwaiti Oil USSR stops jamming
tankers reflagged VOA
under U.S. in PRC warns India of
Persian Gulf "unpleasant event", Piper Cub in Red
says India nibbles at Square
PRC territory
PRC denies border Citicorp expects to
clashes with India; lose most of $14. 7b
PRC increases troops Third World loans
on Indian border
USSR sends 3 Mine-





aspects of CCP is
widely reprinted
Israeli Coimunis t Party chief in
PRC; is told "no relations with
Israel until it c:eases aggressive
foreign policy"
USSR delegation in PRC shoots down




not to deploy new
Iranian pilgrims IBM
riot in Mecca 1st PRC permanent
outposts in Spratly U.S. cancels support
At least 75 Israeli Islands for Israel's 1 avi
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1987 International Treaty
cont about CFCs to
Pakistan-India clash protect Ozone
in Kashmir
I
PRC- Israel begin annual foreign
minister talks on regional themes
during UN sessions in NYC
Five Israeli scientists reportedly
visit Beijing to discuss upgrading
PRC missile technology
Mubarak, unopposed,
reelected for 6 yrs U.S. withholds sale
to PRC of high-tech Wall Street plummet
items due to Silkworm
70 Naval ships from sales to Iran
U.S., USSR, U.K.,
France, Italy, Neth- 13th Party Congress;
erlands, Belgium in Deng retires as CCP
Persian Gulf General Secretary; Japan is clearly now
Zhao Ziyang elected preponderant economic
General Secretary, force in the world
calls for civil ser-
vice exams and more
foreign investment
Li Peng appointed as
Premier
U.S. -USSR INF treaty
Intifada begins in
the West Bank
1988 U.S. exempts Pakistan
from nonproliferation
laws PRC averages 10%
annual growth during
Israel announces use preceding decade
of force and beatings
in West Bank PRC navy keeps
steady presence in Noriega indicted
U.S. LtCol kidnapped Spratly Islands
in Lebanon Armenian unrest
Shultz peace plan Unrest in Tibet
PRC sells medium range missiles
to Saudi Arabia; PRC technicians
accompany missiles
UN condemns U.S. plan
PRC begins long-term to close NYC office
Shamir in Washington leases near Shanghai of PLO
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purchase of PRC bal- PRC-Vietnam fight in
listic missiles Spratly Islands
Vanunu convicted in Li Peng opens Nat'l
Jerusalem People's Congress;
calls for more
Arafat in Syria; 1st economic reform, 1st
time since 1983 debates occur
USS ROBERTS strikes
Pakistan tests new medium range mine in Persian Gulf
missile built wi\ :h PRC assistance
U.K., Germany, Italy
Israel expels Pales- Spain $70b agreement
tinian-American; U.S. to build European
strongly objects PRC family incomes
doubled since 1978
fighter aircraft
EEC votes to remove
restrictions on all
Iran boycotts Hajj in capital movement by
1988 and 1989 rather 1992
than accept Saudi
quota of 45,000 (re- Taiwan's total ex- CPSU declares
duced from 150,000) ports now $60. 6b support for
Perestroika
Israel completes USS VINCENNES shoots





Jordan releases $8. 8b; PRC-Japan
claim to West Bank total trade $17. 6b Developing nations
spent 23% more for
Iraq-Iran cease fire arms 1978-88 than




Israel 8th nation to
orbit a satellite PRC announces steps
to control inflation
Iraq largest Third of 20-50% Gorbachev becomes
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1988 Saudi Arabia second Brazilian plan to
cont largest arms buyer
at $37b; Syria is
halt deforrestation
fourth USSR admits having
PRC nuclear test deficit budgets
indicates neutron
bomb capability Bush elected; Baker
Benazir Bhutto 1st is Secretary of State
woman leader of an





PLO-U.S. begin talks debt is $120b,
Mexico's debt is
Kenya- Israel renew $107b, Argentina's
relations Rajiv Gandhi visits
PRC
is $60b.
PRC begins build ng Algerian reactor
Israel forms 2nd
National Unity govt; PRC students/workers
Religious Parties demonstrate against
increase their sway Africans studying
in China
1989 U.S. Navy jets down
Central African 2 Libyan fighters
Republic-Israel
renew relations Europe-U.S. trade
dispute over food
PRC continues to nurture military products
ties with Pakistiin, Iran, Saudis
Khomeini calls for
Rushdie execution
New Soviet ideas for Japanese Emperor
UN International PRC-Indonesia confer buried; Bush in
peace Conference on about renewing ties Japan
Middle East




Cooperation Council Milken's "junk bonds"
impacting on U.S.
Shamir tries to hold financial world
coalition together
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1989 PRC Vice Premier visits Iran, Iraq,
cont Turkey, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi
1
Unrest in Tibet;
Mubarak in Europe; violence USSR nuke sub burns
seeks economic aid, and sinks near Norway







Saudi Arabia-PRC establish formal
trade relations
Students begin to Hungary dismantles






Sino-Soviet summit India test fires its
1st IBM
U.S. urges Israel to Student and worker
renounce occupied pro-democracy
territories, start demonstrations in
Palestinian dialogue Beijing and other Speaker Wright
cities continue; resigns from House
Khomeini dies Tienanmen massacre;
Zhao Ziyang purged Polish elections
Fang Lizhi finds International
shelter in U.S. sanctions against
Embassy PRC for Tiananmen
PRC asks businesses
to return; Deng
Xiaoping names Jiang Gorbachev warns of
Zemin as CCP General enormous danger to
Secretary USSR from ethnic
unrest, nationalism
Scowcroft's secret
visit to PRC S.Africa tests new
rocket developed
from Israeli missile
Hong Kong bankers U.S. DOD fails to
becoming primary approve export of
catalyst for busi- supercomputers to
West Bank schools ness deals in PRC Israel
closed 110 days in
1989 by Israel Solidarity heads new
Polish government
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1989 PRC cautions East
cont Europe against U.S. limits number
political changes of Soviet jews able
to enter U.S.
Hungary allows East
Germans to go West
PRC Foreign Minister visits Jordan,
Syria, Egypt, Tunisia and Iran India now world's
largest importer
Israel-Hungary renew of military goods







USSR abstains from economic contacts India builds its 1st
annual Arab UN gradually being submarine
initiative to unseat renewed
Israel Nobel Peace Prize
goes to Dalai Lama
Almost all hospii als, refineries.
power stations and homes in Kuwait
are built by PRC companies Hungarian CP becomes
Socialist, renounces
Nixon visits PRC Marxism
Elections in Jordan;
1st to be held in PRC official foreign San Francisco quake
22 years debt is S44b
USSR calls for NATO,
PRC purchase of 3 Warsaw Pact gradual
U.S. satellites is dissolutions
Ethiopia-Israel renew approved by White
full relations House
E. Germans have exit
visas, Berlin Wall
Peres visits Poland opened, hints of
German reunification
PRC Premier visits Pakistan
1
1
PRC-Iran, in Teheran, agree on
economic, technical, industrial
and scientific cooperation
USSR pledges not to
N.Yemen -S.Yemen force Warsaw Pact
agree to unite PRC exports total
S52.5b in 1989 (S12b
cohesion
Baker Peace Plan for go to U.S.) U.S. -USSR summit at
Middle East Malta
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Saudi Arabia wants to
purchase submarines
67 Japanese banks




















1990 Ethiopia denies plans
to divert Nile with
Israeli assistance
U.S. total aid to
Israel $6b per year
ROC building its own
warships
PRC requests foreign
aid to combat its
pollution crisis
Qin Jiwei visits Pakistan, Bangla-




Turkey stops flow of
Euphrates into Syria
and Iraq for 30 days
Shamir fires Cabinet













contact in 30 years
Asian 1989 economic
growth is 5.4% (9.3%
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grows in Israel Total world military
expense in 1990 is
PRC Foreign Minister visits Iraq, $8B0b, 5% less than
Yemens, Bahrain, Qatar peak year of 1987
Bahrain-Hungary begin
full relations
PRC forms new Hong
IMF urges economic Kong constitution
reform in Egypt
Ethnic unrest in
Lebanon's Bekaa Val- Xinjiang
ley now provides 20%
of world's hashish PRC renews Fulbright U.S. executive order
program with U.S. allows PRC students
to remain in U.S.
Jewish settlement PRC commercial launch
tried in Christian of U.S. satellite;
Quarter of Old PRC's 27th satellite Mongolia drops
Jerusalem "Communist" from
Li Peng to Moscow its constitution
Li Peng visits P,ikistan 2 U.S. hostages
freed in Lebanon
Peres unable to form Beijing finds $70b
Labor government; of govt guaranteed
Brooklyn Rebbe sways foreign loans in PRC
Knesset for Likud;
Shamir creating West U.S. Senate says
Bank settlements Jerusalem is capital
of Israel
PRC discussing sale of new medium




defects in U.S.; 450 of 600 million
reveals PRC plan to telephones in world
influence U.S. via found in only nine
release of Tienanmen countries
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1990 Israel launches 2nd
cont sate 11 ite with mil i-
tary characteristics PRC reemphasizing
birth control; 1.4b
Iraq has nuclear population expected
weapon "trigger" by year 2000 {300%
increase since 1949);
U.S. helps Arabs at l.Ib by 2000 was PRC
UN oppose USSR Jew- goal in 1980s; 63% U.S. consumes 40% of
ish immigration to of population under all worldwide goods
Israel age 30
UAE urges Japan to
promote peace in
Middle East U.S. -Asia trade now
$308b/year
Mubarak visits Bi^ijing; Deng voices
concern about Japanese military
growth
UN says world popu-
Egypt-USSR condemn Yang Shangkun visits lation now 5.3b;
Soviet Jews' West Latin America will be 6.25b by
Bank settlements in 2000, between lib
Israel 5% of PRC population
now migrant laborers
and 15b by 2099
IMF says Eastern
Taiwan offers reuni- Europe needs will





PRC official to seek
haven outside PRC Japan's defense bud-
Mid East arms ex- get is 3rd largest
penditures increase PRC ends 20 mth in world





USSR delegation to Bush renews MFN trade
Beijing status for PRC
Pakistan machine*> 6 nuclear war-
heads with PRC tiichnical assistance
Israel says no UN 50 Xinjiang Mosques U.S. vetoes UN
observers allowed closed after ethnic measure to place
in West Bank unrest observers in West
Bank
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1990 Pakistan hires women 43 nations now have
cont pilots for commercial submarines; over 400
aviation ROC hints at nuclear subs are not U.S. or
capability USSR (will be 800 by
Arab summit condemns end of 1990s)
Soviet Jewish im-
migration to Israel
Beijing University U.S. -USSR Summit in
students demonstrate D.C.; both caution
on Tienanmen anni- Israel against West
versary Bank settlement of
Saudi Arabia now Soviet Jews
world's largest PRC troops beat
arms importer students and foreign
reporters in Beijing
Saudi Arabia has
opened equivalent of Television reaches
1 primary school per 73% of PRC population Quayle meets Chai
day from 1970-1990 Ling, prominent PRC
"Goddess of Democra- dissident, in White
Peres unable to form cy" ship unable to House
Labor Govt; New York broadcast
Rabbi credited with Moscow opens com-
influencing outcome PRC plans 4 futures modities exchange
markets for agricul- for building items
tural goods; Chicago and hi-tech goods
Kuwait projects $5b Board of Trade helps
deficit budget to establish them
Japan plans 5-yr 25%
increase in defense
Shamir forms Likud spending
Government
Russian Federation
PRC has about 20 000 workers declares State
in Kuwait Sovereignty
PRC celebrating 1^,000 years of Hungarian Stock
Silk Road Market reopens
PLO-U.S. talks are
suspended by U.S. Both Germanys use
Fang Lizhi and wife single currency
Israel pledges no leave U.S. Embassy
Soviet Jews will for Cambridge Univ. USSR proposes UN
occupy West Bank Trusteeship for
Kuriles
Assad in Egypt; says PRC-Indonesia agree
Syria ready to join to renew relations Big Seven Summit;
peace process Japan "allowed" to
resume PRC aid;
PRC launches Pak stani satellite; USSR as receiver of
launch fee far biilow Western rates aid is discussed
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1990 PRC bids competitively to launch
cont Arabsat communications satellite
Ukraine declares
Mid-level officials State Sovereignty
Iraq-Kuwait feud say astronauts being
over oil
,
exchange trained in PRC Gorbachev OKs NATO
military threats; membership for
Saudis and UAE aid PRC mayors visit reunified Germany
Kuwait, U.S. aids U.S., urge renewal
UAE of business ties Yeltsin plans end of
state ownership and
PRC strengthens security ties with central planning in
Saudis; still considers other arms Russian Federation
sales in the MidiHe East by 1992
Iranian economy grows E. Germany will not
10% in 1990; public PRC outfits 3rd ship join Warsaw Pact
sector is being to monitor space maneuvers
privatized flights
Zhu Rongji visits
Saudi Arabian envoy meets Li Peng U.S.
in Beijing
Japan completes
Israel Supreme Court Low morale within payment of all its
forbids Sharon's PLA debts to World Bank
emergency powers to
make housing for Zhao Ziyang rumored
Soviet immigrants to be back in govt U.S. defense spending
6% less than 1989,
West Bank schools PRC planning to end still 30% larger than
closed 140 days in free urban housing; 1980
1990 by Israel shareholding of state
industry expected USSR defense spending
10% less than 1989,
PRC Foreign Minister visits Saudi still 38% larger than
Arabia; PRC-Saudis begin relations; 1980
ROC cuts formal ties with Saudis
though still receives 30% of oil 60% of world's arms




Iraq invades Kuwait UNSC condemns Iraq;
Li Peng visits U.S. & USSR sponsor
Turkey closes Iraqi Indonesia, Singapore arms embargo against
oil pipeline; U.S. Iraq, PRC concurs
troops to Arabia PRC agrees to stop
arms aid to Pol Pot




Bhutto ousted firms to sue PRC
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PRC wants to open a
stock market
PRC-ROC trade $11. 7b
in last decade; 46%
growth per yr; ROC
has $7. 4b deficit
PRC does not block UNSC decision
allowing general embargo of Iraq
Iraq-Iran make peace
Thousands of foreign
workers in Iraq and







PRC discusses possible sale
of nuclear attack submarine to
Pakistan
1
Iran Defense Minister visits PRC





PRC $20b in 1990
(almost 30% of
national budget)
















Iraq has F.A.E. bomb; PRC sold the







PRC troops have 1st
nuclear war exercise
PRC supports Taiwan
















(over $21b to Saudis)
Japan considers
sending non-combat
troops to Mid East,
many others object
Kissinger in Beijing











Hussein he faces a
likely UN attack if
he does not withdraw
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1990 U.S. suspends aid to Developing nations
cont Pakistan due to its PRC buying arms from account for 85% of
A-Bomb research France arms spending in
world markets
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen visits
Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq: Baker visits Middle
tells Saddam Hussein he lacks PRC East, also meets
and Third Uorld support with Qian Qichen
Kahane shot in NYC U.S. begins exit
by Arab-American
PRC hosts 5 U.S.
from Philippine bases
Israel allows one UN Congressmen to help U.S. -Singapore
fact finder to visit promote relations military pact
U.S. doubling troops EEC removes most Japan's 125th emperor
in Persian Gulf sanctions against
PRC from Tiananmen Cuba hints at better
200,000 Soviet Jews relations with U.S.
emigrate to Israel, Stock markets open
1 million expected in Shenzhen and Bush-Gorbachev summit
by 1995 Shanghai
Paris Charter
UNSC demands tha Iraq withdraw




Kuwait has provided approximately
$30b in loans to PRC since 1982
UNSC condemns treat- Qian Qichen meets Thatcher resigns
ment of Palestinians with Pres. Bush
by Israel Food donated to USSR
from around the world
GCC condemns Iraq, Taiwan plans formal
wants Iran's future cessation of "war" Political Turmoil in
aid to reduce out- with PRC India
side influence in
Gulf 8th 5-vr Dlan Shevardnadze resiqns
1991 Kuwaiti Emir visits Beijing; PRC




Gulf War; Iraq is Jail sentences for
bombed; Israel and Tiananmen activists USSR troops enter
Saudi Arabia hit by Lithuania
Scuds PRC has $910m trade
surplus for January; East Europe is an
Iraqi aircraft flee exports up 40.8% and environmental
to Iran; severe oil imports up 19.8% disaster
damage to Kuwaiti from JAN '90
wells and Gulf USSR peace proposal
for Gulf War
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1991
cont
Iraqis confer with PRC in Beijing
about Soviet peace proposal
Iraq army decimated,





PLA Generals review Middle East war;
debate merits of modernization
Civil war in Iraq
U.S. urges Israel to
trade land for peace













China discusses possible missile sale
with Pakistan; promises U.S. /UN that
it will be prudent
U.S. /UN establishing
a permanent military
presence in the Gulf
PRC uses de facto
influence over Hong
Kong's government
Pakistan's new Prime Minister visits
Beijing; Pakistan bank will open a
Shanghai branch, 102 new joint pro-









China is reportedly helping Algeri,
develop nuclear weapons
Israel insists USSR
renew ties before it
offers a peace plan
PRC's first wheat
futures contract
PRC losing more than $2b in Gulf
contracts because it did not openly














U.S. and others write
off half of Poland's
$31b foreign debt










going to Persian Gulf
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1991
cont
Israel's 2ncl test of
U.S. financed (72%)
Arrow missile
PRC NPC member sa^'S
reforms will stay
no matter who is in
power
Israeli diplomat visits PRC; later




reach 1 million (25%
of Israeli labor








ted with Zhao Ziyang
partially restored
PRC delivering missiles and parts










U.S. gives Israel 10
advanced jets
Japan urges Israel
to assist peace pro-






from 50% to 20%;
other adjustments
also made







Israel opens Sciences and Humanities
liaison office in Beijing
West Bank schools
closed 100 days in
1991 by Israel
Saudi Arabia wants
to buy 50% of Nippon






Baker's 4th visit to
Middle East
30% of world's civil
air traffic goes to
Asia/Pacific region















USSR needs $250b aid
to keep reform going
next 5-6 years
East-west tensions
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1991
cont
U.S. trying to halt delivery of PRC











after 10 mth hiatus;
















PRC wants to join
MTCR {Int'l Accord
to limit spread of
missile technology)
PRC offers to supply 300m reactor
to Pakistan
I
PRC helping to develop coal mines
in Pakistan; says "vast possibilities
exist for additional cooperation"
Israeli mayors pro-
test lack of funds
for Soviet immigrants
Israel wants $10b
U.S. loan for Soviet
immigrant housing
Beirut govt, controls
S. Lebanon for 1st
time since civil war
started in 1975
Pakistan law & order
crisis; Sharif does





(and USSR) to its
July meeting
Avon cosmetics 1st
company to sell di-
rect to PRC consu-
mers: phenomenal












U.S. exports to Asia
grow 150% in last 5
years
Bush renews MFN trade
status for PRC
World military spend-
ing declining; 9 yrs
at present rate to
reach 1980 level, 18















I YEAR MIDDLE EAST CHINA U.S./OTHER
1991
cont
Li Peng, Qian Qichen, Li Lanqing
visit Egypt y Jordan , Iran, Saudi
Arabia, Syria and Kuwait; Arms
control part of agenda
PRC to attend UNSC Paris meeting
for Middle East arms control
Iran wants Iraq to
pay reparations; has
impounded Iraqi air-





for new Panchen Lama
Severe drought in
Guangdong and Fujian
100 million dogs in
PRC, rabies problem;
police squads beat
and kill dogs in
streets and homes
UNSC tells Iraq to comply with
nuclear inspections
Shamir says Saddam






again in Iraq over
nuclear inspections








PRC proposes broad arms control for
entire Middle East: eliminate all
CBN weapons in the region, plus gen
eral arms reduction
Israel asks 40% mil-
itary aid increase
from U.S. (from $1.8b
to $2. 5b per year)
Israel still builds







U.K. agrees to leave
$3. 2b reserves and a
debt less than $650m
France gives PRC







new party, try to
end CPSU monopoly
SIPRI says process







UN asks Germany to
play bigger inter-
national role
NATO warns USSR not







John Major agrees to
visit Beijing
India slashes red












MTCR regulations PRC sympathetic to
CPSU hardliners
CCP Officials meet Israeli Foreign
Minister
I





dates lose in 1st
Hong Kong elections
UNSC Permanent Member nations all
agree to arms export limitations;







All Kuwait oil well
fires extinguished
PRC announces plan





Yang Shangkun in Pakistan and Iran
Egyptian diplomat new UN Secretary-
General (Bout rOS Bout rOS Ghali)
I
Israeli delegation visits PRC
Mid East peace talks
continue in D.C.
Li Peng to India;
1st visit by PRC
leader since 1960
UN repeals Zionism/Racism; PRC,
Kuwait y Oman, Egypt, Bahrain are







grows 17.5% in 1991
(total $135. 7b); $8b
is trade surplus












German firms at rate
of 10 per day
Bolshevik anniversary
ignored















YEAR MIDDLE EAST CHINA U.S ./OTHER
1991 U.S. threatens use 1st PRC nuclear Russia wants to join
cont of force again in plant begins oper- NATO
Iraq ation, at Qinshan
140,000 Soviet Jews PRC foreign reserves Vatican-Orthodox
emigrate to Israel now $40b; PRC 1991 dispute over East
in 1991 (400,000 trade surplus with Europe
were expected) U.S. $13b
U.S.y U.K., Russia, PRC, France
discuss arms saTes to Middle East Gorbachev resigns
Muslim fundamental- C.I.S. formed
ists doing well in PRC will sign Non-
1st free Algerian proliferation Treaty
elections
1992 U.S. joins UN con- PLA is modernizing Nixon calls for aid
demnation of Israeli to former USSR
West Bank policies U.S. -PRC agree on
copyright protection Bush in Japan with
U.S. CEOs; urges
Marshall law in Deng tours Guangdong opening of Japanese
Algeria market
Israel -PRC estab ish diplomatic U.S. stops production
relations of nuclear bombs
U.S. agrees to $10b PRC is world's 4th N. Korea developing
loan guarantees if largest ship builder long range missile
Israel freezes West
Bank settlements; PRC world's largest Organized East Asian
Israel refuses energy developer;
country unable to
crime in U.S.
Israel-India begin make enough energy France will sign Non-
diplomatic relations for its needs proliferation Treaty
Iran developing ties Taiwan wants to buy ASEAN agrees to make
with central Asian 50 Mirage fighters Free-Trade zone
Muslim Republics from France
Japan wants permanent
Li Peng visits Ul 1 and 4 European UNSC seat
countries; meets with Bush
1
U.S. ends high-tech
PRC has delivered chemicals to sanctions against PRC
Syria that are needed for solid-
fuel missiles UN sponsoring 8 peace
keeping missions
Rushdie and Free Foreign investment
Thought receiving in PRC increases Japan has 2% of
support in Cairo 71% in 1991 world's population,
wi 11 consume 20% of
Israeli coalition PRC economists cri- world's uranium by
govt falls ticize hard-liners year 2000
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YEAR MIDDLE EAST CHINA U.S./OTHER
1992
cont Israeli embassy in
Buenos Ares bombed
Israel Prime Minis-














U.S. accuses Israel of illegal
arms technology transfers to PRC
Sharon says Jews
will live in all
areas of Jerusalem
PLA has 50% budget
increase from 1989
levels
Saudi Arabia also suspected of
arms technology transfers to PRC










Butros Butros Ghali in Beijing:













Fang Lizhi says PRC
leaders no longer
believe in Marxism





















troops in Europe to
100,000; 23,000 now
stationed in Middle
East (most are Navy)
L.A. riots
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I YEAR MIDDLE EAST CHINA U.S ./OTHER
1992
cont





U.S. $1.8b arms sale
to Saudi Arabia
Israel and Hezbollah

















PRC agrees to MTCR
PRC explodes nuclear
device: 70 times more
powerful than Hiro-
shima bomb, 6 times
larger than U.S. &
USSR test limit
Indian President
in PRC; first ever





maybe also the new
aircraft carrier
ROK firms allowed













Danes vote against EC
Earth Summit in Rio:
largest gathering of
Heads of State ever;





Yeltsin in U.S.; Bush




U.S. troops may go
to Yugoslavia with
UN group
III. DETERMINANTS OF PRC AND MIDDLE EAST FOREIGN POLICIES
SINCE 1949
From the perspective of North America and the industrial
West, components of Middle Eastern and Chinese foreign
policies are generally unfamiliar. Only Israel has the
pluralistic, structured (though complex) , and legally format-
ted input from bureaucratic and other political sources,
public and private, that we have come to associate as part of
governmental decision making processes. By contrast, state
machineries elsewhere in the Middle East and China seem much
more opaque; the forces, however many or few, that ultimately
influence policy making there are much less amenable to
political analysis as it has developed and been construed in
the West
.
Although our unfamiliarity with these other political
systems seems to reside with novel factors pertaining primari-
ly to personality and cultural precedent, becoming familiar
with those two factors - within different societal settings -
requires a willingness to consider a perhaps unique spectrum
of variables. Personality and cultural precedent are complex
issues, and their components, therefore, are at least several.
The trick, or solution, is to locate the appropriate variables
and the relationships that hold between them.
The search to locate these factors has varied. In China's
case, discussion has been directed to whether or not bureau-
cratic issues, power struggles, a core of rational decision
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makers, or some set of variations including each of these
should receive the lion's share of analysis. For the Middle
East, typical choices of factors have included institutional-
ized legitimacy, national consciousness, and theocratic
propensities as the suitable focus for coming to grips with
essentials of government in that region. These and other
factors, plus the modus operandi of the questions themselves,
will be considered in our look at determinants of Chinese and
Middle Eastern foreign policies.
Recommendations or preferences for any one governmental
framework will not be made (i.e.: Chinese vs. Middle Eastern,
Authoritarian vs. Pluralistic, Western vs. Eastern) . Nor will
relative merits merely be compared: that is, whether or not
facets of any national level polities and their international
ramifications, anywhere on the globe, may be said to seek
similar results regardless of their local idiosyncracies . The
intent is simply to grasp, as much as possible, the aspects
and intent of Chinese and Middle Eastern polities: why their
priorities are as they are, why they have the perceptions that
they do and what those perceptions are. Once this is done,
then theoretical and pragmatic comparisons can be attempted,
relative merits weighed, resources adjudged, and so on.
History, politics, and policy - in one sense - are a
matter of progression; after-the-fact hindsight allows,
usually, for more thorough understandings of events than are
perhaps possible during their occurrence. This detached
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viewing also allows the luxury of suggesting how events and/or
policies might have been pursued differently, for increased
advantage of all concerned. We can certainly wonder, for
example, what our policies and actions regarding China, and
the Middle East, might have been - 45 or 50 years ago - if we
had known then what we, as a people, are beginning to under-
stand now. At the risk of sounding overly simplistic, I
maintain that the possibility exists - always - that our world
views might well experience modifications and thereby become
more responsible and effective, prior to our generation of
policies and directives, merely through our becoming more
aware of what the other guy is thinking and why he is thinking
that way. Structures and positions of governments should be
studied, as much as possible, on their own merits - rather
than as functions or extensions of our perceived requirements
or of our own world views.
A. PRC
China's contemporary political processes are now largely
referenced into two periods flanking either side of Mao
Zedong's death. This categorization is meant to coincide with
the two respective priorities that have dominated China's
political world since 1949, namely those of class struggle or
ideological primacy and the ensuing more recent appearance of
pragmatic reforms. Neither of these categories dominated
their respective periods completely, but from 1949 until his
death in 1976 Mao kept the emphasis of government on ideology
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and social revolution, with Deng Xiaoping focusing ever since
on more stable and pragmatic economic reform measures. Both
Mao and Deng regarded their efforts as absolutely necessary
for China's modernization and reform, although they personally
differed on how best to achieve that aim. Correlations occur
between the two periods, as when economic retrenchment
occurred for a few years following the Great Leap Forward
(GLF) , and when ideological primacy resurfaced after the
Tienanmen massacre. These permutations happened if for no
other reason than that both Mao and Deng operated through
similar bureaucratic layers. Mao and Deng also, along with
Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi and several others, constituted the
bedrock of Communist China's leadership elite from the outset;
they shared, in various capacities and at differing times, the
leadership decisions and elements of administrative responsi-
bilities. This composite begins to account for the swings and
turbulence evident in the People's Republic of China's initial
history. A paradoxical cauldron of geography, personalities,
catalytic patriarchy, and desires to transition from Confucian
to institutionalized (or modernized) values further identifies
this period. To get a better feel for China, we will start
with some geographic and demographic groundwork:
China, when compared to the coterminus U.S., is only
slightly larger in area although contains a population four
times as large (exceeding, at present, one billion) . It would
take a combination of the peoples of Europe, plus all of North
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and South America, to gather approximately the same number of
persons. Further, average projections indicate, by the year
2050, a resident PRC population of 1.5 billion; in the absence
of China's birth control program and based on 1984 fertility
rates, this figure grows to 2.1 billion by the year 2080.^^
In 1750 China had a population of about 200 million, which had
already more than doubled from a level of 60 million at the
beginning of the 15th century. It only took 100 years for
another doubling, from 200 to 400 million, in 1850. Another
hundred years brought the numbers to 540 million, with almost
another doubling after that in less than 50 years, giving
China her current host of just over one billion. In 1949, and
previously during the Qing, perhaps 80% or more of all Chinese
lived in the countryside, engaged in agriculture. That figure
is now closer to 70%, which still makes China overwhelmingly
rural. However, the remaining 25-30% constitute an urban
group which is itself at least as large as all North Americans
put together. One obvious concern facing China, regarding her
people, is feeding them; she is doing this by having at her
disposal only one half of America's total arable acreage,
which allows about 10% of her land for cultivation.
Another way to grasp the physical dimension of China's
population is to consider that each of China's approximately
3 provinces is roughly equivalent to a European country, with
some of those provinces having populations of 100 million.
Yet from still another perspective, if the ratio of people to
tillable land in the U.S. was the same as it is in China, the
U.S. would now have between 2-3 billion people instead of only
250 million. ^^
China's geography includes not only the world's highest
peaks which are still pushing upward at an annual rate of 6",
but also many other extensive mountain ranges and deserts
(including Asia's lowest point below sea level), that alto-
gether cover over two thirds of her territory. The Taklimakan
desert is considered by many to be the harshest desert in the
world; it regularly and literally devoured ancient caravans
and continues to extract annual tolls on travellers today.
China shares 4,000 miles of border with the former Soviet
Union (excluding Mongolia), another 3,000 miles with India
(along the "roof of the world"), and has over 5,000 miles of
coastline (not including the islands of Hainan or Taiwan, or
the extensive major rivers and canals) . Several minority
groups, including 20 million Muslims, figure prominently in
China's overall political equations and may still be the local
majorities in the large western provinces, also in the north
and south, though account for no more than roughly 6% of the
total population. Two major world-class river systems,
flowing east, dominate the interior and contribute to exten-
sive networks of lakes, canals and coastal irrigation works
(the "inland sea"), that have been developed by residents and
public works projects over several centuries. Other major
rivers add further to this elaborate system. This network of
89
natural and man-made waterways is essential for transportation
and food production; it has been a mainstay both for liveli-
hood as well as a source of serious calamity (vast periodic
flooding and drought). Massive flooding has just recently
occurred, described as the worst within 100 years, and was
responsible for the ruination of 25% of China's 1991 harvests.
Not only is China's geography more apparent or stark, in
a visual sense, than ours, but the relation it has to its
people is more pronounced and concentrated than that of
probably any other land mass anywhere else on the globe. For
whereas our own history in North America encompasses, roughly,
an extensive millenial westward migration from the Middle East
and Persia through to and including Greece, Rome, Europe and
finally into the New World (with spin-offs here and there on
varying continents), China also contains a similar 4,000 year
span of civilization that is at least as dynamic in scope but
which could be squeezed into a geography smaller than our
thirteen original states. Its historical development, due
largely to its landlocked orientation, has been a growth of
implosion and readjustment unlike the steady expansions
experienced by Mediterranean and European cultures.
These basic comparisons give rise to a sense of diversity
within homogeneity, of a place with special or unique under-
standing for units of measurement and the passage of time. A
typical story, making use of this sense of time, is told of
Zhou Enlai who spent a work-study summer in France in 1920
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(Deng Xiaoping was also with him, as were other future CCP
leaders) : in response to a question posed to him by a diplomat
in Bandung about the efficacy of the French Revolution, Zhou
Enlai said (partly in jest and partly in earnest): "It's too
early to tell". Similarly, on another occasion, and more
seriously than not, Zhou recounted to a visitor in 1960 that
the PRC had only taken the first step on a journey of 10,000
miles. China, in having been "itself for so long", and in one
place, simultaneously balances new and old in ways that we may
not readily recognize or be able to appreciate.^'* So while
the Middle Kingdom has developed unique approaches to tempos
and culture, yet its people pursue universally recognizable
wants and desires.
1. Before Deng Xiaoping
The People's Republic of China did not appear over-
night. Mao Zedong's forces passed through Beijing almost one
year before the PRC was proclaimed. Nor was it territorily
complete in October 1949; Tibet, though shortly thereafter
"liberated", was not formally conjoined as an autonomous
region until 15 years later, with other additions, reunifica-
tions, and clarifications still yet to occur (Macao, Hong
Kong, Taiwan)
. China also continues to revise itself govern-
mentally as well as teritorially
.
Ostensibly China is a socialist state, the last major
communist government left on the globe (aside from Cuba and
North Korea) , and technically could be described as such: its
91
Ministries, Constitution, Politburo and National People's
Congress, the relationships between cadres and people, the
place of the military, and so on. However, if I may, to be
more accurate or realistic and to provide a better feel for
the climate of the new People's Republic, all of China and its
government is not only this array of Party Apparatus and
governmental machinery, but also an evolving concatenation of
paradoxes that are rife with tradition in an increasingly
modern world. These paradoxes are routinely bandaged with
novel resolutions regularly produced to heal emerging dilem-
mas, whether at national, provincial or local levels.
Moreover, the Party leadership collectively entertains a
vision of future growth for China and the eventual resumption
of its historical prominence within the circle of nations;
because of the variety, quantity and speed of all that is
happening within China, this vision is regularly revised and
will continue to be so revised until well into the next
century.
It is very difficult, therefore, and perhaps impossi-
ble, to provide a pervasive, intelligible, and certain
definition or description, politically or culturally, of China
and its people and government at this present point in time.
Essentially China is in a period of indigenous transition, and
has been so (depending on who is providing the referential
source on this particular subject), for at least 50 years and
possibly for as long as 200 years. '^ I personally regard the
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transitional duration to be the latter period, and expect it
to continue for at least another 50 to 100 years - perhaps
even longer. The paragraphs that follow will attempt to
provide a feel for this sense of transition now prevalent in
China
.
When Mao Zedong's Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
acquired the reigns of government, the leadership faced a
number of tasks. In addition to the immediate matters of
consolidating power and establishing a new state administra-
tion, the CCP's intended purpose was to usher China into the
2 0th century. As such, there was much more to do than simply
establish a new government, fill vacant posts, and publish a
timetable. There was education to be provided and revamped,
land reform for the agricultural countryside, inflation to
control, wounds from major conflicts to heal, domestic
practices to combat, industry to encourage, and basically an
entire social and national infrastructure, in every respect,
that needed some sort of attention.
No doubt the most prevalent aspect of the social
landscape was its Confucian heritage, a system that had been
finely tuned through a score of centuries since its inception
around the year 500 B.C.E. Confucianism itself, as it came to
be embodied, fostered at least one paradox of its own, namely
a silent conflict between egalitarianism on the one hand and
the status quo - or respect for authority and its Chinese
stratification - on the other. All good citizens were
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expected "to shape their behavior and perform their duties in
a manner commensurate with their status": i.e. maintain the
status quo.^^ Then again, within the teachings of Confucious
were mandates to a lack of all class distinction, that
instruction and education should be pursued without reference
to any inbred inequities.
Another way of stating the above paradox is to
contrast family with the central government. All Chinese were
bound by filial piety to their families, then beyond that to
their clan, village, and so on. Yet all power emanated from
above, from the center, and hence a subtle contrasting tug of
allegiance ensued between the two. The Chinese version of
Confucianism that came to be officially adopted in the body
politic encouraged all citizens not only to submit to authori-
ty in accordance with their station in life, but also to do
everything possible during the course of their lives to ensure
that society's stratification and stas quo were maintained.
The idea of plurality or of a loyal opposition simply had no
place in Chinese thought or practice. Authority at one level
always demurred, at least in form, to the next higher level,
and always to the center; if a family or region had specific
identifiable interests, then those interests were pursued only
insofar as deference to the center could be maintained.^''
Periods of Warlordism and strife between dynasties have
appeared, when regions pursued their own interests at the
expense of the center, but these periods are the exception
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rather than the norm. Preferences for order over chaos have
long been a primary and deep seated aspect of the Chinese
people
.
A central tenet of Confucianism stipulated that the
ruler of society, and all who would participate in the ruling
process, were deemed to be best equipped for governing only
after having thoroughly studied the past. Hence education
came to have a dynamically central place in the scheme of
things. It wasn't long before an elaborate examination system
became the method for identifying qualified civil servants as
well as becoming the main route for upward mobility; civil
officials in government were literally members of China's
intelligentsia. In time, it also became possible for a
limited number of persons to finance their way into this
governmental bureaucracy through purchasing degrees rather
than competing in the grueling examination process - provided
their family had enough money. The exam system itself was an
incredible journey through a maze of annual and tri-annual
testings, often requiring 25-30 years - or more - to entirely
complete, if successful: this process wasn't for everyone.^®
Grades were determined on sliding scales, limiting those who
passed to only 50 or 100 per province (i.e. : a maximum of only
one percent of those who were tested)
.
Originally the subjects covered by the exams were a
wide spectrum, including history, mathematics, law, and the
Confucian corpus. The Ming dynasty (1400s), revised the exams
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so that they focused around the Confucian classics, which is
said to have contributed to the stultification of thought and
research in general . As the rewards of government service
were great, and successful candidates were able to raise the
living standards and status of entire family groups, it has
been suggested, therefore, that the country's landed or
bureaucratic elite eventually came to focus entirely or
primarily around the Confucian classics, which in turn drew
attention away from other sciences, etc. This supposed
conjunction, however, between a predisposition for the
Confucian corpus and a corresponding lack of interest or
expertise in other more practical or scientific avenues, is
not universally shared. ^^ But regardless of the causal
factors involved, although China was once far in advance of
pre-Renaissance Europe on a host of subjects (medicine,
warfare, astronomy, navigation, chemistry, and so on) , the
West eventually performed an end run around the East, so to
speak, and met China from a position of strength in the 1800s
and beyond. ^° This was much to the embarrassment of China,
and still is. Many Imperial civil servants, the liberal
intelligentsia, attempted to institute reform measures to
counteract China's lethargy; one such reform, which the
conservative and weak Qing could no longer refuse, abolished
the examination system in 1905, in an attempt to totally
revamp the education system.
96
Another aspect of the examination milieu and of
Confucianism in general was "Practice what you Preach":
ethical precepts and leadership by example were deemed to be
essential to any good ruler. The Chinese emperor, residing at
the apex of this studied bureaucracy, therefore led by precept
as well as by fiat. The moral example of his life was an
important aspect of ruling. Ethical precepts, the power of
personality, personal allegiances and maintenance of order,
authority from above, and the status quo were all part of the
experience of being ruled by the Son of Heaven. Corresponding
ethical requirements and expectations were found within every
strata of Chinese society. In that setting, who you knew (and
who knew you), or guanxi , was just as important and more
prominent than your position or what you knew.
Other aspects of Confucianism which infused Chinese
life were: paternal rule, a meritocracy by skill and also by
status and wealth, family oriented allegiances (extending into
the clan and region)
,
and an inherent optimism into the
educability of man - therefore the goodness or malleability of
man - regardless of how easy or difficult it might be for
someone to find the time or resources to become educated.
Statesmanship was seen as service to the Emperor, and conduct
was always in accordance with your status; vertical relation-
ships held throughout all of society. Within the family, for
example, there were not simply brothers and sisters and
cousins, but - with specific Chinese characters to represent
97
each of the following - there were older brothers or sisters,
younger brothers or sisters, and differentiations between
paternal and maternal relatives.
Education, while prized by all and recognized as a
worthy achievement and an avenue for mobility or advancement,
was not equally available to anyone who might desire to pursue
it. Preparation for the civil service examination cycle
required such an inordinate amount of study that it simply
wasn't possible for peasants to spend their first three or
four decades away from their livelihoods so that they could
study. There was, therefore, a very distinguishable gap, not
easily bridged, between classical literacy found in the landed
bureaucracy and governing strata, and utilitarian literacy
(the ability to get by with knowing only 1,000 to 2,000 basic
characters) . The distance between the landed intelligentsia,
who had the resources for study, and the vast majority of
peasants, was very real.
Additionally, the Chinese language was itself an
exacerbating factor in the matter of literacy; almost each
ideogram in the language incorporated a host of meanings which
were delineated by tonal inflection, sentence position, and
various paired conjunctions of characters. The net result was
to make literacy not simply a matter of being able to read but
rather something more closely approximating an art form.
Calligraphy is a related offshoot of this state of affairs.
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and helps to indicate the centrality of language and verbal
meaning for Chinese life.
One comparatively simple issue related to language
that directly affected the CCP was semantic in scope. The CCP
had to find translations for European Marxist terminology so
that the terminology would fit China's circumstances and be
properly understood via Chinese ideograms. China's predomi-
nantly rural orientation, nascent industrialization, and
slippery semantics did not afford easy solutions to this
requirement. Consequently, the Marxist/Leninist "proletarian"
became the Chinese "propertyless class person", who could
either be urban (European) or rural (Chinese) . Similarly,
"feudal" became related to the fragmentation of sovereignty or
to the period of Chinese history before the first unification
(before 221 B.C.E.). Had the term "feudal" referred to
landlord relationships, which would more closely approximate
the European semantics, then all of China's 2,000 year history
would have applied and the Marxist sense would have been lost,
not to mention the attendant embarassment inherent to China
and the CCP by such a usage. This incorporation and adjust-
ment of European experience to fit Chinese needs is partially
a factor of what is now referred to as Socialism with Chinese
Characteristics, although economic and nationalistic senses
are the primary intended reference points.
The above elements related to Confucianism and other
aspects of Chinese life are very sketchy and brief, but
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offered to suggest the variegated and traditional senses of
life with which Chinese society had become imbued. Therefore,
the CCP's task to reform society, without passing judgment on
the manner in which it tried to do so, was at least awkward
and also immense due to population size (already 3 times as
large as North America in 1949, or 25% of the world's total),
the ingrained nature of Chinese traditions, and also due to
the geographical diversity within which it was located.
The reforms, of course, were designed for the purpose
of enhancing China's modernization process and reinstating
China into international life on a par with other countries.
Questions had already been asked (and are still being asked)
,
of why China, with its glorious history and enviable record of
achievement, had become complacent without realizing its
complacency, and consequently upstaged by the West. No ready
answers have yet been provided, but apparently it seems that
aspects of Confucian stratification and conservative elitism,
the preponderance of abundant human labor for any task then
imaginable, plus the basis of existing economics in the landed
gentry and "squeeze" extracted by officials from taxation or
government monopolies (canal trade, the salt market, interac-
tion with foreigners), all combined to make the need for a
Chinese Renaissance, or modernization, unnecessary. Capital
development that usually heralded industrial growth simply did
not appear as it had elsewhere (Europe, Japan)
.
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To be sure, China was not just a sleeping giant; in
the 1840s it had been observed that more tonnage passed
through Shanghai than through London, and in 17 5 there were
more printed books in China than in all of Europe. But those
observations just make the question of China's relative
industrial quiescence that much more enigmatic. The requisite
catalysts for industrialization - of the capitalistic variety
that had emerged elsewhere - had not (yet) materialized.
There were, in fact, severe pockets of resistance to modern-
ization. Circumstances are recorded of peasant displeasure,
often violent, at attempts to modernize the countryside,
because the peasants felt the considerable hardship of extra
and arbitrary taxation that modernization required long before
any benefits accrued to them from the modernization itself.
Some local persons of authority, in isolated instances, were
also actively opposed to modernization. One such incident has
a railroad line being ripped out after its construction,
possibly due to the fact that its presence may have hurt
regular income to the hierarchy from an established canal or
other transport artery, or perhaps because it circumvented the
vertical authority then in place between the local official
and his provincial authority, with the wrong person (foreign-
er?) having made the decision to construct it and thereby
cause loss of face either to the local official, to the higher
provincial authority, or to both.^^
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Regardless of the reason for the disparity between
China and the West's rate of industrialization, this gap
became readily apparent through gunboat diplomacy; many
responsible Chinese voices had, as a result, long been in
favor of reform measures covering the entire gamut from
education to parliaments, including armaments, but societal
inertia and Qing reluctance kept those voices in abeyance.
The infamous Marble Boat, built at the behest of the Empress
Dowager with funds already earmarked for a blue water fleet to
buffer Japan, is the most glaring example of reforms and good
intentions gone awry. The Marble Boat is indicative of an
Imperial court that was unfortunately incapable of directing
proper attention or resources even to the one goal it desired
above all others: maintenance of the Manchu dynasty and
empire
.
Although, in the 1950s, it was apparent to the
Communists that wide reforms to engender modernization and
industrialization were in fact necessary, it was not clear to
them how to enact such reforms on a national level; both urban
as well as rural facets were part of the whole, and the CCP
was by this time familiar only with the countryside. The
Soviet Union provided, at first, a convenient model for PRC
policies and expectations; this seemed only natural as the
Party had already been looking at Marxism-Leninism and the
Soviet Revolution, plus many of the CCP members had studied in
Moscow. After a decade, however, it became fairly apparent
102
that the Soviet model, centered on an industrialized base, was
not appropriate for the agrarian PRC . The CCP, therefore,
literally had to work out its policies via hard experience
during the course of actually governing China. Mistakes would
be made
.
The initial strength which Mao and the CCP found
within the peasants of the rural countryside was due partly to
China's make-up, but more a result of being forced to leave
cosmopolitan centers in the south and east by the Nationalists
(KMT) and Japanese, both of whom wanted China for themselves.
After surviving the 12 -month watershed Long March into
northern Shaanxi and finally into Yanan, the CCP proceeded to
consolidate their position in north central China. From there
they coordinated their fight against the Japanese (in concert
with the KMT, at the behest of the Comintern, and after
persuading Chiang Kaishek to do so through kidnapping him in
1936), and also prepared for the inevitable resumption of
conflict with the KMT after Japan was removed from China. It
is this formative period which led, or at least encouraged,
Mao to propound and maintain his doctrine of self-sufficiency.
The ramifications of this insight were related to the
historical sense felt by China as being the Middle Kingdom, or
the Center, with little need and even less regard for others,
except insofar as others might be useful for trade, or for
keeping minority groups quiet near the frontiers, etc.. In
that sense, Mao could argue that autarky was entirely accept-
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able, not to mention that he also had to be concerned with
maintaining the CCP's revolutionary spirit and wished to avoid
any influx of non-communist ideas through contact with
foreigners. However, the extremes associated with the autarky
that ensued, in trying to make each province self sufficient,
led to excesses that later required adjustment. Those
difficulties are still being dealt with today as the Chinese
leadership decides how best to solve matters related to
distribution of resources and the problems of maintaining,
consolidating, improving, or shutting down, state owned
industries that are now either poorly located, inefficiently
managed, or both.
The primary factor that led Mao and the CCP to
emphasize provincial autarky was directly related to security
concerns. China had, by this time, experienced severe
conflict for several years. World War II was only a facet of
the prolonged strife that had plagued China for almost a
decade. No sooner had the CCP dealt with the KMT than Russia
was found to be a fairly dubious neighbor alongside, and
inside, Manchuria, plus the United States soon entered the
Korean conflict with troops advancing as far as the Yalu
River. ^^ China's involvement in Korea, and her subsequent
hot-and-cold relations with the U.S. were contributing factors
in the leadership's mindset that led to their requiring
strategic industries to be literally moved into the interior,
each in a separate location. This was an immense project
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which utilized the abundant human physical labor in the
countryside. Even while this movement was taking place, the
country managed to maintain, during its first decade, an
average annual growth rate of approximately 5% (or an average
of 8.2% if taken within the period through 1975)." Mao's
doctrine of "Self-sufficiency" became the CCP's doctrine,
applied at both the provincial and national levels.
All things considered, the CCP had set for itself a
monumental task. China was not only to be modernized, but
hard traditions were to be eroded, if not eradicated, as part
of the process or else it was felt that modernization would
not hold. Participation by the peasantry within the process,
and a transfer of peasant allegiance from family and clan to
the new government and Party, required a severe whittling away
of ingrained traditional relationships that had been in place
for centuries. Consequently the Party essentially declared
war on Confucianism and other cultural traditions. The Party
knew that China had so far failed to generate the kind of
modernization that was then apparent in Europe and even Japan,
and therefore that widespread reform in China was required.
A combination of May Fourth reformers, returned students from
Europe and Japan and other seminal Chinese figures, all full
of Marxism-Leninism and nationalism, impressed by the Russian
revolution, and especially desirous to speed China's reforms,
comnbined to form the CCP, and the events leading to the
formation of the PRC began.
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Traditional Chinese values were already weakened due
to reform measures that had been attempted from the late Qing
era and during the early Republic. Additionally, pressures on
family and other Chinese institutions had been severe since
the 1920s due to the tremendous disruption and dislocations
from prolonged conflict. China had, roughly since 1921, been
engaged in continuous struggle: a combination of civil strife
between CCP and KMT, plus the war against the Japanese.
The CCP in its first decades was actually channeling
existing tides of discontent, in which the Chinese people were
looking for relief, respite, and hoped-for opportunities to
get on with their lives. But the Party had a larger agenda
beyond mere relief and respite and was doing its best to
literally revolutionize an entire society. Hence, through
Mao's leadership, there came to be no sacred cows, and almost
everything - except for revolution itself - was eventually
called into question and subject to calls for exorcism.
Children were not discouraged from denouncing their parents,
attempts were made to bring peasants directly into the
education process (previously associated only with the wealthy
or well-connected civil servants) , clan loyalties and ancestor
worship were discouraged, the marriage and agrarian laws (the
first major reform measures) did in fact weaken Confucian
networks
.
On the domestic front, the first major societal
actions of the CCP were the Marriage Law and Agrarian Reform
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Law in 1950. These two were nothing short of revolutionary,
regardless of who might have pronounced them. The intent of
the Marriage Law was to hasten the emancipation of women which
had already begun at the turn of the century, to underscore
the end to foot-binding which occurred shortly before in the
1920s, and - if at all possible - to reorient domestic
relationships and allegiance patterns by giving the woman
equal marital rights, equal access to divorce, equal expecta-
tion to marital fidelity as had been enjoyed by men, and
property rights. The new law was therefore designed to
encroach on the "three bonds" of traditional Confucianism and
to weaken the clan and entire filial network. The marriage
law did in fact have its desired effect, although other reform
measures soon to follow changed even more drastically the
overall relations between China's peasants and their families
and the land itself.
Agrarian reform also began simultaneously with the
marriage law and with much the same effect, namely to remove
the peasant from servitude and loyalty to the landlord, to
give him incentive by having land of his own, to foster
egalitarianism throughout the countryside by removing feudal
relationships, and - at first - to tie the peasant to the
Party by making him part of the process which removed and/or
ruined the landlords (often by killing them). "Feudal", in
this case, does mean the landlord-peasant relationship. No
sooner, however, had the 1950 land reform been concluded
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(1952), than reorganization of peasants into mutual aid teams
began, then cooperatives (where land was still privately-
owned)
,
and finally into the collectives. By 1957 almost all
the peasants were collectivized, which reflected a tremendous
amount of enthusiasm by Party members and also a willingness
among the peasants to participate in the CCP reform measures.
The CCP, based on its own agenda - again without
passing judgment on that agenda or its methodology - was
meeting with more than a few initial successes. The face of
China had literally been transformed. However, the CCP was
trying to do everything at once, or rather Mao's leadership
was pushing the Party to pursue all, and more, of these
attempts in short order. In the space of only a few years the
CCP had taken control of a national government, reorganized
the countryside, initiated a wide array of deep attacks on
pervasive Confucian truisms, fought a war in Korea, sparred
with the U.S. over the Taiwan Straits, decided to make an atom
bomb, started compulsory military service and training,
pursued self-sufficiency, collared wartime inflation, and
started a full-scale ambivalence regarding the place of
scholars and higher education. Success was achieved in
weaning traditional allegiance away from the bedrock familial
unit, although the force of that allegiance was basically
unchanged even if the substance was changed; allegiance and
expectations were now essentially redirected toward the Party,
rather than transformed into something else. It's as though
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the result, at a societal level, was to create a new and much
larger (national) family.
Quite possibly the major achievement of the CCP was in
the arena of national government; everyone in China, with few
exceptions, was now for the first time in direct and constant
contact with the Center. Previously all contact between
peasants and the Imperial center had been indirect through
provincial officials; the bureaucratic gentry ensured that
directives from above for transport or labor or rice or taxes
were met, and then did more or less as they pleased with any
remaining squeeze. In the PRC, local officials in the form of
cadres likewise were found between peasants and Center, but
peasants also belonged to organizations that interacted
extensively with those and other cadres, or by extension the
center, on subjects of mutual and national import. These
local organizations ranged from work units or collectives to
youth organizations, the military, and others. For the very
first time in millenia, China's peasants were essentially as
much a part of the Center's feedback loop as were the local
officials. Albeit the layers of bureaucracy were still in
place, and contact between peasant and central government
passed through several human strainers, yet there was nonethe-
less a sense of national consciousness - a sense of participa-
tion in the national group - which was forming in the minds of
all concerned. From another viewpoint, this new circumstance
was also a genuinely totalitarian state. There was now more
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(or less) to living in China beyond the racial sense of being
Chinese, and fulfilling occasional dictates from an unseen
higher authority at the center.
Flushed with this initial success, the CCP under Mao's
guidance proceeded to push with more and faster reforms. For
better or for worse, Mao was obsessed with the idea of
egalitarianism and of making that idea a reality throughout
all of China. Hence the 1955 collectivization proceeded at a
rapid pace, followed by the Great Leap Forward (GLF) in 1957.
Support for this rapid pace was not automatic within Party
ranks, but Party discipline held and the CCP dutifully
supported the Great Helmsman's projects. (Similarly, the
principle of the "democratic mass line" was utilized among the
people to generate party support and common responses to
problems or issues that might arise during the course of
carrying out party mandated activities).
There was danger in attempting to do too much too
quickly, and that point was in fact reached. Prior to the
GLF, Mao announced the Hundred Flowers campaign in 1956 with
the intent of enlisting the support of China's educated non-
communist elite. China's intellectuals took Mao at his word
and began a period of immense criticism, primarily against the
domination of a single political entity: the CCP. Both the
Party and non-communist elite had the best interests of China
at heart, but they did not agree with each other. Mao was
already leading the Party away from Soviet models, but this
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criticism from China's own intellectuals was too much for him.
Technically, while the traditional role of civil servant was
to lead by example, using a combination of classical learning
and ethical precepts, his calling attention to the ruler of
inadequacies or items that needed correction was a procedure
that bordered a fine line between duty and treason. The
intelligentsia that responded within the Hundred Flowers
framework were obviously, in Mao's opinion, going far beyond
duty. Accordingly, the campaign was terminated, (hundreds and
thousands of) arrests were made, and Chinese education began
to experience reforms of its own.
As one of the Communist's intentions had been to
render education equally accessible to all Chinese, and the
peasants simply could not be inserted into traditional higher
education, the educational structure was therefore brought to
the peasant's level with the net result of diluting China's
entire educational infrastructure. Education was conjoined
with manual labor, requirements for mandated schooling were
reduced, and seats for higher education were awarded based on
class background rather than (solely) on intellectual attain-
ment. Another practical paradox ensued with these particular
reforms: education may indeed have been leveled across the
population spectrum, but the educational resource base
required for modernization was severely weakened.
Mao's leadership of the CCP was not a given. He was
involved in an ongoing struggle for primacy over the Party
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which was not initially resolved until after the Long March.
Subsequently, there was ongoing discussion within the Party
over whether to focus on ideological reforms (Mao) , or a less
intense procedure with fewer state controls (Liu Shaoqi, Deng
Xiaoping)
. Up until the GLF was announced, all Party members
were behind Mao, despite what may have been their misgivings.
Following the GLF, however, when it became apparent that the
GLF had been a disaster rather than the glowing success
reported by CCP cadres, Mao's leadership again came under
question
.
At the Lushan meeting of the Central Committee in
1959, Peng Dehuai was highly critical of what was then
unfolding as the GLF debacle. Peng's critique, presented
within a recurrent forum held for discussion among the Party's
hierarchy for thrashing out policy matters, was taken by Mao
as a personal attack. Peng was removed from his post, Lin
Biao became Defense Minister, Liu Shaoqi succeeded Mao as
Chairman, and the stage was set for factionalism that has
plagued the CCP ever since. Lin Biao produced the "Little Red
Book", steered the PLA away from the professionalism and
modernization of Peng, and Mao sought a manner in which to
reassert the primacy of social egalitarianism.
To backtrack somewhat and review the State and Party
organizations up until this point: Party and State had been
established as two separate organizations in the PRC . On the
state side, the primary or most visible organ between hierar-
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chy and general population was the National People's Congress
(NPC) . The NFC, elected every 5 years, elects a Standing
Committee with Chairman and several Vice-Chairmen who function
as a full-time outlet of the NPC. Members of the Standing
Committee also appoint the judges to the Supreme People's
Court. The NPC additionally elects members of the State
Council and can also, theoretically, approve or disapprove
national budgets. The State Council presides over the several
Ministries of Government, has a Premier and several Vice-
Premiers, and is described as the most important organ of
national government. Zhou Enlai became the first state
Premier and kept that post until he died. Membership of the
NPC is based upon one representative for a certain number of
Chinese (400,000 in 1978), and includes representatives who
are members of the Party, PLA, workers, peasants, national
minorities, and others, including a few overseas Chinese.
Prior to the establishment of the NPC, the Chinese People's
Political Consultative Congress (CPPCC) was established as an
interim coalition government, comprised of CCP members as well
as representatives from other non-CCP parties. The CPPCC
still exists, but has little functional value.
On the Party side, and similarly to the NPC, the CCP
begins with the National Party Congress, composed of represen-
tatives from lower level Provincial and Local Party Congress-
es. The National Party Congress, like the NPC, is directed to
convene every 5 years, and elects a Central Committee. The
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Central Committee in turn elects, while in plenary session,
the Politburo as well as the Standing Committee of the
Politburo, also the Chairman and Vice-Chairmen of the CCP.
The Chairman of the CCP is also head of the PLA; Mao held the
chairmanship of the CCP from the Long March until 1976. He
was also Chairman of the PRC until Liu Shaoqi took the post in
1959.
Technically the above frameworks of Party and State
are neatly laid out, each with its areas of responsibility.
But they hardly function in the sense that our Congress or the
British Parliament function; the NPC and Party Congress are
largely rubber stamp edifices, with each fully aware of which
way the wind is blowing whenever they convene. Form without
substance, and another paradox: deliberative government
machinery within an authoritarian framework. Authority is
still from above.
Both Party and State have written constitutions. The
first PRC constitution was adopted in 1954 and the first CCP
constitution was adopted in 1945; significant documentary
revisions for each have followed with dependable frequency.
Despite the written provisions delineating responsibilities
and avenues of decision making within the PRC and CCP, the
actual weight or authoritative standing of any one member of
the CCP or NPC has much more to do with his faction and
patron, or his guanxi (connections), than with his job
description. It is very important for any one Chinese to not
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only know who someone is when dealing with that individual,
but also who that person works for, who he knows, who his
patron is, who is above him, who works beneath him; with that
knowledge then it becomes possible to deal with the other
person.
From its inception in 1921 to the aftermath of the
GLF, CCP membership had risen from less than a hundred to
about 17,000,000. During this time the CCP had encroached on
the day-to-day administrative and managerial responsibilities
of the State Council and its Ministries. This was Mao's way
of ensuring Party ideological control over administrative
state machinery. ^^ After factionalism had broken out at the
Lushan meeting, and Liu Shaoqi was head of State, Mao per-
ceived additional need for the resurgence of ideological
purity, and so the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
(GPCR) was conceived in 1964.
Beyond ensuring ideological purity, the GPCR was also
a vehicle for Mao to regain undisputed control over Party and
hence the State. CCP factionalism had reached the point where
Mao was less and less the controlling figure. In an over-
simplified manner of speaking, the GPCR was a glorified power
struggle
.
The horrendous excesses of the GPCR are well document-
ed, with more information becoming available on a continuous
basis. It is not necessary to recount its progression here.
Suffice it to say that Zhou survived, Liu and Deng were
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purged, Peng Zhen (Mayor of Beijing) was the first high-
ranking CCP member to be relieved of his post, thousands and
thousands were injured or lost their jobs or worse, education
suffered, universities were closed, the Gang of Four were
making their play for power, and it became necessairy for
regular units of the FLA to restore order after competing Red
Guard factions began violent conflicts with each other. The
worst turmoil was over by the end of 1967, but the entire
experience was not entirely put to rest until the death of Mao
in 1976 and the arrest of the Gang of Four shortly thereafter.
Aside from this blatant disruption, much continued to
occur in and around China. Domestically, pinyin romanization
was well underway, and Mao finally got around to supporting
family planning again in 1972; the birth rate had climbed to
2.8% by 1965 from 1.6% in 1949, and the attendant population
growth clobbered China with a population increase from 540
million in 1949 to well over 900 million at Mao's death in
1976. CCP membership had also risen to over 30 million (still
about 4% of the population) . University entrance exams were
abolished; one of the legacies of the GPCR. China's GNP had
continued to increase an average of 8.2% per year, from a
total of $67 billion ($67b) in 1952 to $210b by 1976; this was
comparable to achieving an industrial base equivalent in scale
to that of the USSR or Japan in the 1960s. ^^ China had also
detonated her first nuclear device in 1964, her first hydrogen
device in 1967, launched her first satellite in 1970, and
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constructed her first nuclear submarine in 1971. Further,
still on the domestic scene, Lin Biao was killed in an
aircraft crash near the Mongolian border after having been
suspected of planning a coup detat, Zhou survived the rad-
icals' anti-Confucious campaign of 1972, and Deng Xiaoping was
reinstated only to be purged a second time as a result of the
April 5th Incident in 1976.
Internationally, China was almost as busy as she was
at home. After the initial PRC-USSR friendship, China had
long ago experienced the abrupt Sino-Soviet split (1960) after
Mao and Khrushchev disagreed over the proper pace and emphasis
of communist revolution. In 1962 China fought briefly with
India over a border disagreement. China and the Soviets also
skirmished over their border, at the Ussuri River, and nearly
went to war in 1969. The UN admitted China in 1971, and in
that same year the U.S. and PRC began talks for normalizing
relations. Deng started his many travels abroad with visits
to the UN and France, and China began her first purchases of
western wheat and technology in the early 1970s - the first
sign of Deng's later Open Door policy.
One final topic before moving into the post-Mao era of
Four Modernizations and Reforms concerns security and the PLA.
This particular subject is difficult because it is intertwined
with paradoxical issues of its own related to authority,
professionalization vs. politicization, modern conflict vs.
people's war, expenditures vs. budgetary and earned income,
117
and its relations to Party and State. Positing the PLA's
particular relationship to Party, at any one moment, not to
mention its purpose, involves more than a fair amount of gray.
As China is going through a transitionary period, so also is
the PLA experiencing a transition regarding its relation to
Party and State; in effect this subject is a transition within
a transition. An entire literature exists on the PLA, and we
will not treat it at length here.^^ We will, however, touch
on the special relationship that PLA and CCP have experienced,
so as to better appreciate some of the mechanics, options and
perceptions resident within CCP leadership. This subject will
reappear with the reforms under Deng, the interaction between
PRC and the Middle East, the existence of policies between
China and the Levant, and again with the implications for U.S.
policy. The subject is_ important, even if it is treated here
with respectful distance.
From its inception in 1921 until the establishment of
the PRC 28 years later, the Party's survival was closely tied
to the health of the PLA and the PLA's own survival against
the KMT and Japanese. There were rare times when PLA and CCP
were basically indistinguishable (e.g.: the Long March).
There have also been times, since 1949, when the sense of PRC
statehood has not seemed to require military muscle to make it
a reality. Primarily, however, there exists between PLA and
the Party and State an uneasy middle ground, occupied more on
some occasions by uniforms and on others by government
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workers, cadres, or even businessmen. To be sure, the CCP
would not exist were it not for the PLA's efforts during the
civil war years, and perhaps also during the turmoil of the
GPCR. It is also true that PLA personnel often occupied
significant positions within the CCP and NPC . But to posit
from these observations a specific and identifiable structure,
role or relation of the PLA vis-a-vis the CCP is, at least for
the time being, to posit too much. At most we will say that
the CCP drives the PLA; despite the need for muscle to flesh
out the Party's existence, it is not the case that the PLA
drives the CCP. If the CCP survives for another 50 years (and
it should, with reference only to current states of affairs in
China today) , there will no doubt be a close relationship
between it and the PLA. What that relationship might entail,
or to what extent, if any, the CCP might have to change its
composition or way of doing business, is hard to say.
That is, some would view the PLA as an arm of the
State, whereas others might see it primarily as a military
which has had to deal with more than its fair share of
governmental caprice, now doing this (espousing the Little Red
Book) , now doing that (coalescing and modernizing) , now doing
something else (growing its own food, making and selling its
own weapons)
. Permutations from these musings include the CCP
as dependent on the PLA, either as currently construed, or as
construed by external (PLA) dictate. As both the PRC and the
PLA are still in transition, pendulums will continue to swing
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and at this point the PLA will be modernizing, at that point
it will be acting on behalf of the PRC domestically or
internationally, and at still yet another point it will be
looking out for its own best interests.
As Mao's CCP looked at the PRC, it wanted to see a
country on a par of dialogue - equally, at least - with all
its neighbors, near and far. It also wanted to see a people
interacting among themselves, each contributing to the State
and each able to contribute in a manner best suited to his/her
own talents (egalitarianism of employment and education)
.
Finally Mao's CCP wanted to see the PRC as free at least from
strife, if not also from want. This last intent was mitigated
against heavily due to the authoritarian vertical structure of
control inherent to China, and due to the CCP's strenuous and
severe measures designed to offset that inherency (not unlike
a vicious cycle) so as to institute measures of equality.
There were constants (the nuclear program, coordinated
attempts to join the UN) , in the midst of caprice (GLF, GPCR) .
The simultaneous direction of the growth and cohesion of
China, all of China, while concomitantly promoting CCP
revolutionary goals, presented Mao Zedong and the others
within his circle of leadership with dilemmas that have not
abated.
2. Four Modernizations and Reform
After the deaths of Zhou and Mao, a power struggle
ensued within the leadership, pitting the radicals (Gang of
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Four) against the others (the reformers: Chen Yung, Deng and
their groups) . Until the political climate was clear of Jiang
Qing and her remaining Gang of Four members, factionalism was
rife. Deng was purged a second time, in April, after a
spontaneous demonstration (the Qingming Festival); students,
angered at the lack of official notice of Zhou's death,
honored the deceased Premier in a fashion that was critical of
Jiang and supportive of the moderates. The net effect of the
"incident" was to infuriate the radicals and prompt them to
call for Deng's demotion. Deng was their obvious target, as
he had been Zhou's protege (notwithstanding that Li Peng was
one of Zhou's many wards) . Hence Deng, who was still some-
thing of a bargaining chip between the moderates (most
recently championed by Zhou) and the radicals (led by Jiang,
who prospered while Mao lived) , again dropped from sight. Hua
Guofeng, who was named the compromise Acting Premier when Zhou
died, became the Premier and first Vice-chairman of the
Central Committee, and therefore Mao's successor.
When Mao died, the moderates, led in this case by Hua,
took the political initiative and arrested the Gang of Four
before Jiang could further develop her power base. Hua then
went on to become head of the Party and State, as well as
Chairman of the Central Military Commission. From relative
obscurity as a second tier Provincial official, Hua managed to
benefit from the GPCR as many of his superiors, who were more
visible than he, suffered at the hands of Red Guards and were
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taken from their positions. Their sudden and joint departures
added room at the top, which was further enlarged when Zhou
and Mao died. Hua was in the right place at the right time,
and managed to be upwardly mobile. The need to placate
moderates and radicals with a compromise candidate, plus the
fact that Hua was relatively weak (20 years younger than his
new peers),' made him a safe choice for senior officials as
they waited for the dust of Mao's death to settle. As a
result, Hua's new positions at the top of CCP, PRC and CMC
gave him authority over those who, a short while before, had
all been senior to him.
A short while later Deng applied to reassume his posts
in the Party, and was reinstated after promising not to seek
Hua's position. Deng, of course, broke his promise and was
soon presenting proposals and garnering support that moved
backing away from Hua. Almost immediately the production
support system in agriculture began, and in less than a year
Deng represented China while travelling to Nepal, Burma and
Bangladesh. Hua was still the nominal head of State, but Deng
was pressing his own agenda: Mao was criticized, the Open Door
began, PRC-U.S. student exchanges resumed (after a 3 year
hiatus), Deng went to Japan and the U.S. (while Hua went to
North Korea), PRC-U.S. relations were normalized, the U.S.
gave MFN trade status to China, university entrance exams
returned, and finally in 1980 Zhao Ziyang became head of
State. Deng's agenda proceeded further with the announcement
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of coastal special economic zones, the Gang of Four went on
trial, and by 19 81 Hu Yaobang became Party Chairman, with Deng
replacing Hua on the Central Milita2ry Commission. Deng was
neither head of State nor head of Party, but it was clear that
he was the new and undisputed paramount ruler.
Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang were among the new faces in
the Party's hierarchy since 1976. Both of them were to prove
to be more than able supporters of reform programs; both were,
in fact, members of the radical reform wing. Hu Yaobang, as
a liberal reformer, not only targeted aspects of the economy
and country as a whole for reform measures, but also was
willing to practice reform within the Party: he was essential-
ly something of a radical in his own right and too irreverent
for his own good. Among his more egregious faults were
straightforward suggestions that senior CCP members should
retire, an unwillingness to promote children of senior
officials, plus a propensity to play down the PLA's civilian
role, none of which were popular decisions with elderly CCP
members. (These elderly CCP officials were basically a
generation older than both Hu and Zhao and very much familiar
with traditional ways of doing business; this Chinese propen-
sity has been the regular brunt of periodic campaigns against
"corruption" and nepotism) . When students staged an escalat-
ing series of visible demonstrations in 1986 with political
overtones, Hu was forced to retire. Zhao succeeded him as
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General Secretary of the CCP, and Li Peng appeared shortly
afterwards as head of State.
Li was a moderate reformer, i.e. a conservative or
hardliner; his entry onto the scene was part of a compromise
either engineered or approved by Deng to keep both moderates
and radicals placated. It should be mentioned again that all
CCP members were reformers, from day one, but their under-
standing of the proper scope and speed of reform led them into
recognizable argumentative factions, beginning with the
meeting at Lushan. While Mao lived, there were leftists (who
supported the GLF and GPCR) , and there were moderates (who
measured results by quantities of food and beneficial indus-
try, and might then also have been termed revisionists) . At
Mao's death, however, the leftists largely lost their voice,
and the moderates filled the vacuum. Hence the vast majority
now comprising the CCP are these former moderates, represent-
ing either radical or moderate reform wings. They are
variously referred to in the western press as go-for-it and
to-get-rich-is-glorious "reformers" on the one hand, or as
take-it-slow and keep-central-planning-uppermost "hardliners",
"conservatives", or "the old guard" on the other. The verbal
distinctions thus created suggest that one group is pro reform
and the other is not, which is not accurate. Both groups want
and seek reform of an economic nature, but some are willing to
trust market devices and others want to move slowly from
central directives .^^
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As evidenced, again, by Deng's maneuvering while Hua
was in the Politburo, and by his behind-the-scenes compromises
to place Zhao and Li in positions of power, Deng has taken it
on himself to perform the necessary role of CCP consensus
builder, a task formerly handled by Zhou. There has, however,
been a perceptible shift in how maintenance of CCP consensus
is performed.
Regarding Zhou, in addition to being Premier, he was
also the Party stalwart who faithfully occupied the number 2
position in the hierarchy from the outset (and who had more
time on the politburo than Mao) . Zhou was the quintessential
intermediary, the behind-the-scenes worker who performed
invaluable services in getting things done and keeping the
Party together throughout the United Front, GLF and GPCR.
Zhou was also, when required, the foreign trained intellectual
diplomat, who more often than not was China's astute "best
foot forward" in sensitive international situations. Examples
that come to mind are his representation of China at Bandung
in 1955 and Geneva in 1954; the latter is particularly
poignant, because it was there that U.S. Secretary of State
Dulles refused to shake Zhou's proffered hand. Zhou also
oversaw the events surrounding President Nixon's memorable
visit to China early in 1972 . All things considered, Zhou was
an intermediary par excellence, who performed frequently
within that quiet capacity, especially in his later years. He
finally came to be the power behind the throne during Mao's
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illness, and was more than a little influential in directing
the rapprochement between China and the U.S. When the
leftists mounted their anti-Confucian campaign in 1973, he
managed to deflect the criticism harmlessly onto the deceased
Lin Biao. China had profitted greatly from his talents
through the years
.
Deng, by contrast, performs the intermediary function
in a different fashion than Zhou. Before 1976 Zhou was
immersed between the two readily identifiable and almost
diametrically opposed factions to each other; he took it on
himself to keep them - and consequently China - together.
With Deng the division between factions is not so readily
apparent, as both want reform of more or less the same stripe
(i.e. economic); hence both are largely on the same side of
the fence. As such, Deng must sometimes assist - and some-
times hinder - to keep his reform agenda moving. Before
Tienanmen, he was something of a referee (after the Maoist and
holdover Gang of Four influence had dissipated) . After
Tienanmen, Deng has been more of a coach or catalyst for both
moderates and radicals. At first he rallied the senior
members and their extensive support networks to silence the
wellspring of voices that erupted in Tienanmen (among stu-
dents, workers, CCP members, even members of the PLA) , with
the purpose being to preserve unity. Secondly, now that
things are quiet, he is prodding and pulling the radicals to
get them going again, hoping no doubt to resume the function
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of referee. Deng's version of being the intermediary also
requires a certain ruthlessness , because he has proved to be
more than willing to withdraw his support from persons he
previously openly supported (and probably also encouraged: Hu
Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang)
.
The question that arises from these examples of Zhou
and Deng is: "Who will serve as intermediary, as catalyst and
referee, once Deng is no longer on the scene?" To facilitate
this issue, Deng has preferred to have others take, ostensi-
bly, the day to day leadership positions within the hierarchy.
Hence Zhao and Hu, now Li and Jiang, as heads of State and
Party. Deng has even resigned from the CMC with the probable
intent of allowing others the added exposure and experience to
generate or enhance their own guanxi with the PLA. He is
giving them the opportunity to improve their own personal
networks, their own lines of support, so as to better survive
the inevitable future positioning within the CCP as the
leadership decides how to pursue PRC modernization. As the
14th Party Congress approaches, Deng has also been reappearing
around the country, speaking out in favor of reform and doing
what he can to reassert liberal reform measures that have
lagged under the tutelage of Chen Yun since Tienanmen.
Regardless of which person or group will eventually
emerge to command the center, it seems clear that the process
of succession is devolving more and more into an increasing
number of voices. In 1976 the protagonists were squaring off
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before Mao's death, but were nonetheless readily identifiable
not only by faction but by leaders within those factions.
Currently the protagonists are again squaring off, but
delineating the participants is not so easy; the factions are
apparent enough, but their leadership remains, to the external
observer, somewhat obtuse.
Deng, apparently, has allowed for the possibility of
Jiang to assume the liberal leadership, if in fact Jiang has
been creating and solidifying a power base; common wisdom
posits, however, that he has not done this. Zhao Ziyang could
reassume leadership of the radical wing, although he will need
to distance himself from the extreme liberalism he evidenced
at Tienanmen; this state of affairs is also unlikely. Other
capable reformers standing by on the liberal side include Ye
Xuanping of Guangdong and the recently elevated former mayor
of Shanghai, Zhu Rongji. Zhu's ascendancy to the vice-
Premiership continues to demonstrate Shanghai's prominence in
national politics. Zhao is reportedly on the verge of formal
rehabilitation, and has been pictured in a photograph that is
making the rounds in CCP circles with Deng, Li Peng, Jiang
Zemin and Yang Shangkun. He has also contributed a 58 page
article to a official 3-volume compendium of Key Articles
Since the 13th Congress ; his article is in the first volume,
with liberal reformers outnumbering conservatives.^®
On the conservative side, Li Peng is the visible front
runner, but not a shoo-in; he is stained deeply by Tienanmen
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(which, I suspect, was intentional by Deng). Li continues to
be Deng's mouthpiece for the Party line, while others are
actually moving China forward. Other conservatives include a
few from the Long March generation (whose long term utility is
doubtful), and Yang Baibing. There could also be another
surprise compromise choice for succession to Deng, perhaps
from the second tier of provincial officials, which further
opens the list of hopefuls.
In the background of all these maneuvers is the PLA:
conceivably, in the absence of CCP consensus, the PLA could
back a candidate or even provide a candidate of their own.
Such dramatic insertion on its part does not ring true,
however, with its historical relation to the CCP; typically
the Party will thrash out their own leadership, whether or not
that might include someone from the PLA (e.g. Yang Baibing)
.
In the unlikely event of CCP stalemate, again, the PLA could
also, just as easily - depending on the state of the country-
side - choose to do nothing and force the Party apparatus to
reach a selection and also begin the process of establishing
a succession mechanism, thereby helping to preclude similar
dilemmas in the future. (In a round about fashion, Deng is
already doing precisely this by drawing more players into the
succession and deliberative process). Most likely the PLA
would prefer to take a passive role, as it is still smarting
from the Tienanmen debacle. Whether or not the PLA will
repair its relationship with the people likely depends on its
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professional development as well as its deportment during any
coming episodes of national import. Mending the citizen-PLA
relationship will take time, or an occasion of national
significance, or on evolving mechanisms of participation in
national government whereby the people might have a greater
sense of responsibility for the government, or all three.
Any thoughts on succession, or PLA-CCP and PLA-citizen
relationships are, at this point, almost entirely speculative
and not very profitable in and of themselves. But the element
that does seem preeminent, and that makes the entire subject
of China nothing short of fascinating, is the set of issues
enveloping China's unique sense of authority. The distinctive
conceptualization accorded by the Chinese to leadership, plus
how this concept might be evolving, or how their modernizing
lives might be evolving around the concept, has extraordinary
implications. Observations and prognostications regarding
likely transformations of this sense suggest potential
ramifications that could reverberate profoundly throughout
Chinese society.
From this perspective, the most important single
element now present in China, relative to modernization, has
to do with the concept and place of authority . Closely tied
to this concept are matters of leadership succession, legal
codes, criminal vs. civil law, citizen participation in
government, individual rights, authority from above vs.
authority from below, institutional legitimacy, accountabili-
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ty . As the sense of authority continues to transform, or as
life evolves around it, so will these integral facets of
Chinese society feel this transformation. In short, the very
fabric of Chinese society is almost certainly in the midst of
adjustment or transition; the repercussions can be expected to
be enormous as the country unfolds.
For this reason, what has been occurring in China is
far and away more significant than recent events in Eastern
Europe or even in the former Soviet Union. For especially in
Eastern Europe, and to a lesser degree in Moscow, an existing
idea - already alive, so to speak, but temporarily held in
abeyance - triumphed over another momentarily embodied idea.
But in China, a new idea (not yet formed) is evolving from
another, namely how to best or most profitably or most
equitably deal with authority and law and participatory
government and morality, all amidst 20% of the world's
population: the ramifications are simply enormous .
Many in the West would like to name this evolving
transformation, or aspects of it, "democracy"; only time will
tell what in fact might emerge, or when, from the current PRC
incubation. Very likely the Chinese will continue to call it
something along the line of "Socialism with Chinese Character-
istics", (if the CCP survives), regardless of the result's
actual character. Quite frankly, it matters little what the
Chinese or anyone else happen to call it, because the trans-
formation will still be occurring, and it will still be
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occurring in China; names in politics are indicative both of
honest intent and also of window dressing, as well as of the
thing in itself. These names must be taken with a large grain
of salt, no matter where or what they are, or who pronounces
them.
Deng himself has just stipulated that trying to label
a practice or policy as being socialist or capitalist is a
waste of time and misses the point: the "correct approach is
to judge whether something is helpful to developing the
productive forces... strengthening the nation and improving
living standards " .^^ He has also just mandated, through the
Politburo, that policies of reform will remain unchanged for
100 years, and he required conservatives to resign from posts
in the propaganda and culture offices. Clearly Deng wants
more economic development, plus continued hints or suggestions
to the general population of reform through further viewings
of programs similar to "The Yellow River Elegy"
.
The Four Modernizations (agriculture, science and
technology, economics, and defense, in that order), first
pronounced by Zhou, are alive and well. Deng is again pulling
out all the stops, especially with the 14th Party Congress
just over the horizon, for reform, reform, and more reform.
China's industrial growth has continued at a pace beyond the
capabilities of the energy producers to keep up. In Guang-
dong, the annual local GNP increased 13.5% in 1991, and
industrial output has grown by an incredible 272%, with 38% of
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all local industry in that area now in the private sector. -^°
Total GDP for China rose by 7% in 1991, which is an average to
slow year by current PRC standards. At these rates, electri-
city supplies would have to increase by 2 0-3 0% on average
throughout China to avoid present shortages. Ironically,
China's power program is one of the fastest growing in the
world but is still inadequate as presently configured.
China's power producing equipment must operate continuously at
full tilt, consequently wearing out faster, and requires an
even higher level of growth than otherwise mandated just to
keep a status quo. Normal energy loads elsewhere in the world
leave 15-25% of system reserve capacity dormant for periods of
peak loads: China's reserve is 0. Coal now accounts for 70%
of PRC ' s power generation. Plans are set to increase current
energy supply levels almost 50% by 1995. Even Guangdong
province, with 50% price increases for electricity, is having
difficulty keeping pace with demand, despite a more efficient-
ly managed energy program that can better fund its own
development. Projections for nuclear energy show only 2-3% of
China's energy requirements to originate from this source by
the year 2000.^^
The PLA is beginning to share in the fruits of the
Four Modernizations as well. The army has experienced
manpower cuts to bring it more in line with a modernized
force, also to reduce its budget, but still retains a not
insignificant roster of 3.1 million personnel. Rank distinc-
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tions have been reinstated, following their removal during
Mao's reign. Recent budget increases, as much as 50% over
1989 levels, are further assisting the modernizing process.
Possibly Deng promised this added budgetary consideration as
part of the maneuvering just prior to Tienanmen: the PLA's
initial Four Modernization budget allocation was not to their
liking, as they were then assigned the last of four economic
priorities. For whatever reason, the added allocations are
not mandated by imminent security threats to China's borders.
Observations of the U.S. and allied military perfor-
mance during the Gulf War caused much discussion among the
PLA: they were impressed by the employment of technology and
are probably directing recent budgetary largesse to that
purpose. Funds are also probably being directed to the
acquisition and improvement of projectible sea power, a blue
water Navy. If and when China's foreign policies will require
military assistance, quite possibly the circumstances will
involve either the South China Sea, or South Asia (and the
Indian Ocean)
.
In addition to fairly diverse western arms purchases
(especially since the PRC-U.S. rapprochement), China has also
been marketing her own arms and thereby generating more
foreign currency for other purposes. A brief look at the
elaborate bureaucracy controlling these sales will provide
added insight into the Chinese government as a whole.
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Located between the PLA and the Central Military
Commission (CMC) are 23 arms sales related companies, which
are purporte ^sponsible to the CMC. These companies are
staffed at th jhest levels by family members (sons, wives,
brothers, da- s), of high ranking CCP and PLA personnel.
Hence decisic out arms sales (how much, what item, which
customer) , are made primarily if not entirely within a family
network, which includes Deng at the apex, rather than the
institutionalized bureaucracy. The Foreign Ministry is not a
necessary player in this decision loop; it might not even be
informed as to sales that have been approved or pending.
Comparatively speaking, the Chinese must have considerable
difficulty in trying to comprehend the U.S. government's
decision making apparatus, since so much of it is open to
public scrutiny.
Economic reforms at the hands of the liberals have not
been easy. Three up and down economic cycles took place
during the 1980s, with inflation at one point reaching 27% in
1988. Both rural and urban sector reforms were occurring.
Zhao wanted to lift all price controls in 1989, but was unable
to do so.
Meanwhile, U.S. trade with China was approximately $2b
in 1979. By 1989 that same trade was $18b. China's total
worldwide trade in 1980 was $38b, and it climbed to $135. 7b in
1991. Japan is the PRC's largest trading partner, with the
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U.S. second and Germany third. U.S. investment in the PRC, by
1990, was about $4b.
PRC officials are now reported to be allowing foreign
companies to play greater roles in service .-.idustries . Plans
are being considered to privatize housing, dec:, -..rol prices,
and convert a large amount of state inc.stry into stock-
holders' companies. Deng visited the Capital Steel Corpora-
tion in May 1992, and complained that the CCP was not imple-
menting enough reform measures; he is said to have mentioned
"I don't understand economics, but I know a good economy when
I see it". Deng is now travelling in northeast China,
drumming up support for reform policies. Hainan, a few months
ago, opened a stock exchange of its own, and a deputy prime
minister from Beijing ordered it closed; after the official
returned to Beijing it was reopened. -^^
It is no longer debated whether or not PRC GNP will
surpass the former USSR's GNP. Rather the debate centers on
when that will occur and what its significance will be;
estimates range from an early 2 010 to somewhere later in the
21st century." One formula states that at the beginning of
the 1980s, China accounted for 5% of world industrial produc-
tion as well as GNP, and the USSR 15%. But Soviet growth
slowed in the 1980s, and China grew at over 8% a year, with
its PCGNP doubling between 1977-1987. Now with the USSR out
of the competition, and the original 2010 estimate already
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looking a bit conservative, China will in relatively short
order posess the second highest GNP in the world.
It is , -o not debated that Chinese PCGNP certainly
does not and ibly never will, in the foreseeable future,
match that c" er nations who all have smaller populations
(e.g.: Europ- .'apan, Oceania, the U.S.).^^ Regardless, the
capabilities inherent within the larger PRC GNP will provide
China with significant options. Tying present and expected
capabilities together with historical Chinese ingenuity and
inventiveness provides a picture full of domestic and interna-
tional potential.
Current calculations of PRC PCGNP vary ($260 to over
$400), according to the formulas used for the calculation.^^
Regardless of the figure, China is obviously an exceptionally
poor (per capita) country. Resources at the national level
are likewise strained, yet due to the tremendous demographic
base, national resources far outstrip the per capita expecta-
tions that would be associated with smaller countries.
Another indicator of the necessary robustness of China's
economy, despite her meager PCGNP, the economy must create
approximately 15 million jobs each year just to stay ahead of
unemployment
.
Despite the reality of China, then, as a poor country,
the government will still have tremendous resources with which
to work. This power may be regarded as discretionary power ;
China, unlike virtually any other nation, and despite the
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general international climate of stability that is beneficial
for its current growth, does not inherently need or prefer to
seek alliances for security purposes, or for any other
purpose. Without entangling alliances as ^heck, and with
traditional Chinese concerns fluctuating as they will,
internally or externally, PRC choices can be expected to be
more arbitrary than not. Chinese options will be discre-
tionary because the Chinese will ultimately have to answer to
fewer parties for their own choices, if they answer to anyone
at all. China's incursion into Vietnam was ostensibly to
teach them a lesson, and the Sino-Indian border conflicts were
likewise of short duration. There is also a story, unproved
but typical, stating that the Ming Court heard disparaging
reports of how Chinese in California were being treated: a
fleet of Junks was then dispatched to teach the Californians
a lesson. But after the Junks reached Monterey, the crews
liked their destination so much they decided to stay. So
regardless of the amount, type and purpose of her directives,
PRC power in future years will more and more be of a discre-
tionary sort. China will be able to afford it, and will have
few hurdles to clear, if any, in order to use that power.
A certain few of China's concerns center on her
borders. Since 1949, China has been eager to discuss border
ramifications with all of her neighbors, especially India.
New Delhi is content to rely on the 19th century British
formula for the line between India and China, whereas China
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wants nothing to do with offering legitimacy to colonialist
intrigue of a distant era. China instead insists on direct
talks with her current neighbors to discuss border issues,
which will render a different and more immediate sense of
legitimacy to the process. Other concerns China has, beyond
her borders, center on the South China Sea and a combination
of territory and natural resources. The PRC claims, outright,
the Spratlys and the Paracels, but so do a number of other
states (Taiwan, Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei)
;
this last item has potential for friction.
As a way of utilizing and encouraging further develop-
ment of her resources, China has been urging many of its
students to receive educations abroad. When relations with
PRC and U.S. were normalized in 1979, 2,230 students were
sponsored by the government and sent overseas to receive
higher education. In 4 years, the total number of students
who had left China were 25,500, of which 7,000 were not
officially sponsored. Of all the students to have left China
in recent years, roughly half of the officially sponsored
students were sent to schools in the U.S.-^^ According to Li
Peng at the 7th NPC annual plenary session this year, there
have been a total of 150,000 PRC students to go overseas
through mid-1992, and most have not returned (this number is
actually closer to 64,000, and many of them are in the U.S.) .
China wants these self exiled students to come home, regard-
less of their political persuasion (which, in itself, is a not
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unremarkable tacit indication of China's hunger for reform in
all its guises )
.
Despite these increasing numbers of students, China
currently has only one-tenth of the number of University level
students as does the U.S. (and many of them are overseas).
Given the disparities between the U.S. and PRC populations,
this low proportion of PRC university students to population
is actually far lower and represents a serious educational
shortcoming which China needs to correct. China has in fact
been aware of this unflattering discrepancy, but the typical
Chinese relationship to intellectuals has had such a painful
side to it that Mao's blunt response to redress that grievance
was totally inappropriate. A recently published interview
with Fang Lizhi, conducted prior to Tienanmen, states:
"My (Chinese) students can barely feed
themselves. Their wages and fellowships
together come to less than 10 yuan a month.
. . .my students want to keep studying with me
in hopes of eventually going overseas. Some
students quit school because regulations
require that they withdraw before they can go
abroad. . .
"
(young people) are at a loss what to do.
They don't know what the future holds for
China, and in China the prospects for individ-
uals are very tightly linked to what happens
to the country. The individual's life is
dependent on politics. Not like Hong Kong, or
the United States; in the United States presi-
dents can come and go, and people aren't
affected very much. But not so in China. "'^
This interview by Fang continues further and paints a bleak
picture in the minds of his students regarding China's chances
for continued national progression and unity: indeed, the
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concept of "national" is loath to many of them. However, we
need to keep these specific observations in wider perspective.
Some of these practical concerns of China's students
came to a head prior to Tiananmen in several University-
cities, when PRC College students actively protested against
the presence and favoritist treatment accorded to students who
were visiting from Africa.
Of the Chinese students who are overseas, roughly half
of these are sponsored by the PRC, and others pay their own
way (usually via overseas relatives or funds from the univer-
sities themselves as well as from the host governments).^®
Much or most of this burgeoning expertise will sooner or later
find its way back into China as students eventually return
home and other scholars or practitioners wind their respective
ways through the PRC. Recent student demonstrations in
Beijing and elsewhere in China are especially significant
because those same students will eventually move into the PRC
governing structure as well as into other facets of Chinese
industrial and social life.
A very significant sidelight of the Tienanmen demon-
strations indicated that although the students wanted "democ-
racy", very few of them actually knew what it was, or rather
how to implement it. The students failed to have a plan of
action, which is probably now being corrected as some of them
congregate overseas; for them, the sense of individual
participation in "politics" was still largely foreign (not-
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withstanding that traditional rule requires the "mandate of
heaven"). Students who were quoting Lincoln and Jefferson
over (global) TV portrayed a remarkable picture, but apparent-
ly did not appreciate the inertia of the PRC government and
perhaps some of the problems inherent in running the PRC, nor
did they grasp the practicalities and implications of "democ-
racy" . But whether or not those students actually knew what
democracy or multi-party pluralism was, and how to implement
it, seemed very doubtful (at least at the time of Tienanmen)
.
Occasional groups of students have been asked to explain
democracy, and their responses indicated they did not know too
much about it, but they certainly wanted more of it.^^
Tienanmen was a spontaneous outburst, and will not be the last
such display of feeling; the students will have to do better
next time than shout at the authorities if they wish to have
an effect on the political process.
China is in fact hard pressed right now to find
meaningful occupation for many - most - of its better trained
citizens, lending a certain malaise to their perception of how
things are. Coupled with their recent memories of Tienanmen,
the malaise becomes downright nasty. But it is also the case
that in those areas where employment has been found, it is of
the highest caliber, and these opportunities will continue to
increase at exponential rates as China's reforms take hold.
For better or for worse, what we see here is the proverbial
jump-start, on a national level, of an old engine that was
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retooled and is now lurching down the street as it receives
fine tuning and gets up to speed. The students are not
satisfied with the pace of reform, and wonder about the
appropriateness of national direction and even national
integrity. Not only must China work to improve the lot of its
university students, but education in general requires much
attention. Over 30% of rural children still drop out of
school to work, China's national education budget is less than
half that of other developing countries (while serving more
students), and people generally regard education as something
that consumes rather than as something that gives. But, all
in all, despite these difficulties, learned complaints, and
the overtones that we decry, safe money has it that Chinese
national viability is a good bet.
Possibilities of civil war can never be discounted,
but indications suggest that sufficient vertical allegiance
exists between the center and outlying areas to offset any
rending of the national fabric. Stories abound about provin-
ces ignoring the center's directives after Tienanmen regarding
reinstitution of various conservative measures, but this need
not indicate a lack of cohesion. Rather, it might indicate
that the prevailing authority resides in those vertical chains
of allegiance that come to rest with liberal personalities at
either end rather than with conservatives. There certainly
are precedents in China's history for Warlord activities and
provinces in full pursuit of their own objectives, but those
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examples represent a different and no longer applicable
milieu. Deng is convinced, and perhaps rightly so, that the
CCP survived June 1989 and the events to have overtaken East
Europe and Moscow, by the very fact that economic reform has
been in progress and the people are not (entirely) dissatis-
fied: "without reform, there will only be a dead-end road".
He goes on to say that "we (CCP) must not be afraid . . .because
political power is in our hands. "^® Politics may, therefore,
continue to be a pursuit for the few and not for the many.
But as China continues to unfold, this conception may begin to
alter along with the evolution that China's sense of authority
is sure to develop, out of necessity and efficiency.
China's minorities, as a factor of reform, are
relatively marginal since they are but a fraction of the
entire population. They also, however, are found almost
exclusively along China's outlying provinces, and have been
the local majorities in Tibet and Xinjiang. Many of them are
Muslim, and China makes use of this in its public relations
with neighboring countries to the south and west. While
domestic reform measures are roughly similar throughout the
provinces (except for within the SEZs), China has been
encouraging joint ventures between these outlying provincial
peoples and foreigners from the south and Middle East . We
will return to this subject in Chapters IV and V.
The era of liberal reforms prompted the government to
relent somewhat with aspects of individual expression, and
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religious practice of all sorts emerged into the daylight.
The muslim peoples opened old mosques and started construction
on new mosques, with this activity leading to skirmishes with
the authorities during which several "rebels" and policemen
(up to 50) were killed. Minority presence in China is much
less than that of the former Soviet Union, and hence not of
the same degree of concern to Beijing as to Moscow, but China
still responded quickly to these difficulties and much Islamic
activity was again curtailed. In the 1980s, especially via
the 1982 "Document 19" administered by China's United Front,
all religious intolerance was forbidden (although religions
were not given inherent rights of expression) , as long as
belief was not inimical to the state (i.e.: was "Chinese" and,
also, not a hindrance to the new reforms) .''^ The CCP has
taken great liberty to arrest leaders of "unauthorized" or
"unofficial" religious groups.
Before Zhao was purged, one method he employed to
encourage thinking about reform and China's place in the world
was to convene conferences about Toffler's most recent book
Powershif
t
. (This was also done for Toffler's earlier work
Third Wave , which was a best-seller in China) . Zhao urged
policy makers to study Powershif
t
whenever they could, which
became another best seller in China, second only to the
speeches of Deng Xiaoping. ^^
Indigenous efforts have continued during this period
of Dengist reform to enhance the process of eroding tradition-
145
al Chinese cultural barriers to modernization. The most
notable recent effort of this type was a documentary, made in
1988, called "The Yellow River Elegy". It was televised
nationally, twice, and television now reaches at least 73% of
all Chinese (the largest television station in Asia is based
in Beijing). ^^ This documentary was harshly critical of
Chinese icons as depicted by the Yellow River, the Great Wall,
and the Chinese Dragon. China's traditional veneration for
the Yellow River, around which Chinese civilization has
developed, was lambasted for its inward turning focus, for its
having kept China preoccupied with itself while the Europeans
ventured forth on blue water to explore the world. Likewise,
the Great Wall, which had been constructed at immense cost and
intended to keep barbarians out, only succeeded in keeping
Chinese in. Villages and homes and minds were also walled, to
keep people and thoughts prisoner. Finally, the Dragon, which
had become a symbol for the all-powerful Emperor, was actually
depicting, according to the "Elegy", the limited flexibility
of China's rulers because there was no power sharing, no
parliaments, no loyal opposition to keep everyone on their
toes, no free speaking or thinking. Tienanmen occurred since
the viewing of this six-part series, and it came under severe
attack by hardliners back in 1989. It may likely begin airing
again in the not-too-distant future, especially now that Deng
has forced the hardliners to resign from the propaganda and
culture ministries.
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other popular reform efforts or documentaries that
attempted to maintain the reform efforts are the documentary
"Black Snow" . This film speaks to the present generation of
youth who rebel against family and traditions, then have
nowhere to go and don't know what to do. In a lighter vein,
the popular TV series "Stories from the Newsroom" satirizes
the "corruption and mutual back-stabbing that pervade Chinese
society"; it particularly pokes fun (and sharp inherent
criticism) at nepotism, leftism, CCP favoritism, graft,
bumbling bureaucracy, heavy handed media, robots that are more
human than editors, and parodies of the succession struggle
where 5 sub-editors all vie shamelessly to succeed the senior
editor but bicker so much that the only solution is for the
senior editor to stay on/^
Continued work by the CCP with the people of China
leads to still other reform measures, which demonstrates the
extent of reform still required within China. Party members
have recently started to persuade Shandong and Hebei Chinese
that proper day-care does not include burying their toddlers
in bags of sand up to the child's chest. The children remain
in these bags, except when the sand is changed (as a diaper),
and receive little or no attention, play, etc. Studies show
that these children develop slower with low IQs; their poverty
laden parents, on the other hand, believe the children to be
more polite, obedient and filial - important aspects of
Confucian tradition. ^^
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A particularly half-hearted reform measure, also
recently initiated, is a campaign to eradicate smoking; up to
80% of PRC males may be smokers by 2000 if present trends
continue. Hence the PRC on the one hand is encouraging the
program, but the deficit ridden state receives up to $5. lb
annually from the tobacco industry, which is considerably more
income than is received from any other single source, and will
not be easy to do without.
China's reform efforts, in addition to the good
reports of industrial capacity and educational awareness, also
have a down side. The rush to reform, whether of the plodding
central planning variety, or the get rich quick method, has
generated difficulties with natural resource management.
Significant environmental damage and pollution is being caused
by tremendous industrial growth and the use of coal for most
of the country's energy. Taipei, across the straits, with its
head start on industrialization, has experienced severe
ecological havoc; Taiwanese residents, in their nascent
democracy, are just beginning to find voices to decry their
lamentable environment. Hopefully the PRC can reign in its
pollution before it gets out of hand.
Severe water shortages are another side to the
environmental damage China is now facing. Recently the Mayor
of Beijing warned that the capital city would literally have
to be moved if the water shortage could not be solved; ground
water in Beijing's vicinity is being tapped so much that the
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city is actually sinking. A combination of population growth,
industrial expansion, and current shortages will result in a
two-thirds reduction of available water in Beijing by 2000.
The entire North China Plain, where 200 million now reside, at
current rates of consumption, will have 6% less water than
required by 2000. In accordance with expected increased
demand, Beijing is expected to have a 50% water use require-
ment increase by 2000, and Tianjin (an industrial city),
expects to have a 120% increased rate of water consumption.
China currently subsidizes the water supply to its
people by up to 6 times what the individual is charged.
Chinese industry, that is old and decades behind advanced
countries, uses disproportionate amounts of water. One steel
mill, which uses 330 tons of water for each ton of steel,
compares to only 10 tons of water per ton of steel in some
developed nations. Agriculture has been the least efficient
user of water, with its irrigation consumption increasing 6
times during the last 25 years; 60% of the irrigation water is
lost in transit. China is planning to divert water north, via
the ancient Grand Canal, to the region from the Yangtze River,
but without improved consumption practices, this diversion of
water will only be a temporary palliative.
A "Green 'Great Wall'" project in Gansu province
utilizes irrigation from the Amur to feed a new agricultural
village of 1,200 people, where 20 years ago there was only
desert. Parts of Gansu are so dry that the evaporation rate
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is ten times the amount of average annual rainfall/^ This
project is typical of efforts being taken in Gansu, and
undoubtedly elsewhere, to find new space and arable land.
However, this same effort will have to utilize less vulnerable
irrigation techniques to avoid water loss as much as possible.
Other subsidies that China provides are a severe
strain on the national budget, preventing the application of
its economic resources to other more pressing dilemmas, such
as wage reform and new employment possibilities for workers of
inefficient state industries that are slated for bankruptcy.
In 1990, China spent about $20b on direct subsidies, almost
one-third of its budget. This cost has grown 30% annually for
the last decade; hidden subsidies (housing, transportation)
,
are not included in this figure. Wang Bingqian, the Finance
Minister, said in March 1991 that "subsidies have reached the
point where the state treasury cannot sustain them".^'^ Zhu
Rongji, as Mayor of Shanghai in March 1991, was working
towards eventual removal of all subsidies for housing.
China's problems are many, but the resourcefulness of
the Chinese is also something to be found in high quantities.
This moment of time in China's hist02ry, so to speak, is unique
because China now is eager to learn all she can from whoever
she can. Meaning that it is now in China's interests to send
its people everywhere, to receive guests from almost any
quarter, and to avoid antagonizing anyone unnecessarily.
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As part of a few final comments on China in this
section, Lucian Pye remarks that had it not been for the
turmoil of the GPCR, China would not have leaped so decisively
into the bold reforms of the post-Mao era:
"If China had not been scarred by the
violent turmoil of the late 1960s and early
1970s, the most likely alternative to Mao's
revolutionary utopianism would have been
little more than the dreary prospect of an
orderly, bureaucratic form of Communism"/®
If Pye is suggesting that the Dengist reforms would not have
occurred at all, had it not been for the turmoil of Mao's
GPCR, that is a debatable proposition. Then again, if he
means by this that reform would likely have happened anyway,
though perhaps at a snail's pace, that would seem to be closer
to what is the case.
For it should be noted that, during the Maoist era,
even then the hierarchy was in constant disagreement over the
proper scope and format of economic policies (and hence also
the emphasis placed on political or ideological policies as
well). Leftists were constantly looking over their several
shoulders at the faction of Deng, Liu, Chen and others.
Periods of economic retrenchment did occur in the PRC before
1976 as respites from the unrelenting pressures of the GLF and
GPCR. Indeed, after 1976, while Deng was reasserting his
position and the Gang of Four was being removed, almost all
the major figures remaining in the CCP were reformers of one
sort or another, whether radical, moderate, or centrist.
Indeed, the very reason that the GPCR occurred in the first
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place was due to the economic and political retrenchment
(i.e.: measures leading to modernization, or reforms), then
taking place as a salve to the GLF
.
In that case, it might even be argued that if the GPCR
had not occurred, that probably would have reflected a weaker
position of the leftists throughout the 1960s, suggesting that
Deng could have succeeded Zhou immediately at Zhou's death,
and possibly also that Deng never would have been purged (in
the 1960s or in 1976) . Hence the disruption of the GPCR would
not have been a factor, and a modest reform program, or at
least something closer to stability (i.e.: plodding growth),
would likely have already been in place for a decade or more
before Mao's death, placing China miles in front of its
subsequent position in 1976.
The role of Deng has had to be similar to that of all
things to all members. His combined goal required keeping the
CCP in power, placating the conservative faction as necessary,
and forging ahead with reform measures whenever possible to
enhance the inevitability of economic growth and moderniza-
tion, or reform. Deng's agenda is hard, but he has progressed
again and again through the arts of compromise. The network
of his support, or guanxi , is extensive; his many years in
Party and Army have given him contacts throughout the country.
When Deng had to accede to Zhao's purge, Jiang's
accession to head of the Party was no accident. From Deng's
perspective, Jiang could appeal to the go-slow reformers since
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he kept a lid, more or less, on Shanghai during the 6-4
debacle. Plus his Shanghai background meant that he was
familiar with economic, industrial and demographic issues of
modernization (not to mention his cosmopolitan outlook and
pianistic abilities with western music). Jiang was, there-
fore, a suitable figure until the smoke from Tiananmen
cleared. ^^
To return to Pye's observation about the speed or
nature of current (post GPCR) reforms deriving their character
by reacting to earlier events: there is plausibility in that
assertion. Each swing of the pendulum always seems to be
offset, sooner or later, by swings in the opposite direction.
However, it seems eminently more plausible to maintain that
the reforms in question would have proceeded apace regardless,
and perhaps even at a faster overall rate.
The biggest dilemma currently facing the CCP and PRC
concerns, paradoxically, their own administrative well beings
rather than that of China. China's health seems to be in
better condition than the risks of transformation currently
being faced by the CCP and the PRC. As for the peaceful
evolution now ongoing within China that is postulated by
Western journalists, and which the CCP finds to be so annoy-
ing, and that is related to the prevalent sense of authority
which is now evolving: that sense of authority and the Chinese
understanding of it seems to be tied to obvious displays of
familial or state power that render possible only one choice
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or category of choices for those who are governed. If power
could somehow be conveyed in a more subtle or institutional-
ized fashion, if Chinese could simultaneously entertain
opposing points of view, then the overwhelming vertical stages
required for simple variations of policy would not be re-
quired. Some sort of horizontal or lateral access, across a
wide spectrum of offices or other concerns, would do much to
facilitate institutionalized trust or reliability, where
currently there is little or none. Computers and other
business or educational procedural opportunities may play an
educational role here, where they require the individual to
entertain genuine choices between various possibilities,
including more than one that could be correct. The national
stage of millions may be modified by individual arenas.
B. MIDDLE EAST
Shifting gears from an overview of China to look at the
Middle East requires more than a small adjustment, and a few
ironies . With China our focus was confined to one national
polity, but in the Middle East we must consider several,
although the land mass (for the entire region) is roughly
equivalent. Further, the Middle East has a much broader demo-
graphic range than China but with a smaller population base (a
combined 300 million in the region we are considering, or 25%
of China's population. One third of this Middle Eastern
population group is from Pakistan) . While these numbers are
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smaller, their growth rate is almost triple that of China's,
therefore having other varying characteristics and societal
dimensions
.
As with China, we shall begin our look at the Middle East
with an overview of the geography. Whereas China has the
highest point on earth, the Middle East has the lowest spot at
a location appropriately named the Dead Sea, 1,312 feet below
sea level. Nothing flows out of the Dead Sea; it is so saline
and full of other minerals that nothing can live in it. The
overwhelming physical impressions conveyed by this region and
the entire Middle East are the absence of moisture (except for
coastal areas and major river systems), abrupt vertical
changes in landscape whenever elevations change, stark
contrasts, and heat; much of the land mass is desertified, and
is watered by three of the largest and most ancient river
systems in the world.
The first of these rivers, the Nile, flows north from
central Africa into a fertile delta region that supports
Egypt's 53 million (up from 40 million in 1980). Histori-
cally, the Nile's annual floods have been the irrigation
source for Egypt's agriculture; that source is now supplement-
ed by the High Aswan Dam, constructed in 1960 with Soviet
assistance. West of the Nile begins the great Sahara Desert,
spreading into and across North Africa to the Atlantic
coastline over 1,000 miles away.
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The Levant area itself, on the Eastern end of the Mediter-
ranean, enjoys a Mediterranean climate along the coast.
Further inland another relatively minor north-south river
system, the Jordan, runs south from the Sea of Galilee for
about 60 miles to the Dead Sea, providing much needed irriga-
tion and drinking water for inhabitants of the region. East
of the Jordan is desert, and to the west is the Judaean
Wilderness, a dry, hilly expanse otherwise known, for the most
part, as the West Bank, pockmarked with Arab villages and
Jewish settlements. Jerusalem is just a little over 10 miles
west from the northern end of the Dead Sea, and the capital
city of Jordan (Amman) lies about 20 miles east of the river.
East and northeast of Galilee the land rises into a plateau
and peak area, between Syria and the Galilee, where snow
occasionally gathers and which is much prized as a strategic
location: the Golan Heights. Damascus, the capital city of
Syria, sits on the lower slopes of Mt . Hermon at just 30 miles
northeast of Israel's (current) northernmost point.
The Jordan River valley continues north of Galilee, and is
occupied for about 2 miles by the Jordan River (still in
present-day Israel) . The valley area continues further north,
with various other still smaller rivers in place of the
Jordan, and the valley now becomes known as the Bekaa - an
important central part of Lebanon where agriculture is found,
as well as, incidentally, a flourishing drug trade during
recent years. This area also has strategic significance. The
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ICedar forests for which Lebanon is known have long ago been
razed. Beirut, on the coast, is almost due west of Damascus.
Further south, midway between Beirut and the Jerusalem area,
and also on the coast, is Haifa; this point of land forms a
natural harbor area and is utilized as such by the Israelis.
South of Jerusalem and the Dead Sea are the Negev and Sinai
areas - deserts that fill the space between the Mediterranean,
the Nile, and the Red Sea where it divides into the Gulf of
Suez and Gulf of Aqaba
.
These four international capital cities, Jerusalem, Amman,
Damascus and Beirut, that are the center of so much attention
and frequently grace our television screens, could be comfort-
ably placed between Philadelphia and Washington, D.C., or
between Los Angeles and San Diego.
Further north of Beirut, and primarily to the East, is
found the second of the three major river systems in the
Middle East: the Tigris and Euphrates. These two rivers
combine to make one system, flow out of Anatolia's highlands,
and meander southeastward, past ancient names such as Ashur,
Babylon and Ur, finally generating their own delta area at the
Persian Gulf. This delta region forms a perennial marsh that
runs halfway to Baghdad from the Gulf and covers much of
southern Iraq. Baghhdad itself is in the vicinity of ancient
Babylon, and approximately in the middle of modern Iraq.
Mountain areas are to the north, bordering Turkey, Armenia and
Iran - where the Kurds live.
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Continuing east from Mesopotamia is Persia, a mountainous
and inhospitable region which was almost impossible for
Alexander's Greeks to traverse. On the other side of Persia
are more deserts, or Baluchistan, and the Middle East's last
major river system, the Indus. This river flows south out of
the western Himalayas near the base of K2 in Kashmir: a high,
green, and splendid place that has been described as one of
the most gorgeous locations on the planet. The river contin-
ues south, through Punjab and into Sindh until it empties into
the Arabian Sea near Karachi. Pakistan is essentially a
glorified river valley, with the Indus running through the
center, except for the open and hot spaces of Baluchistan that
extend west along the coast to Iran's mountains. The river
valley now supports a population of almost 110 millions; this
figure represents an average annual growth factor of 3.1%, and
has practically tripled in a few decades from only 36 millions
in 1951. To the west, above Baluchistan, is Afghanistan and
all its mountains. The famous Khyber Pass is a major avenue
on the Pakistani-Afghan border, roughly mid-way between Kabul
and Islamabad. To the east of Pakistan will be found the
Hindu multitudes of South Asia; Bombay is just around the
corner
.
Pushing north from Islamabad to Pakistan's border area,
and north again about the same distance (500 straight-line
miles) across the Karakoram Range, places us at Kashi (Kash-
gar) in Xinjiang, or at one of China's Silk Road terminuses,
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where travellers turned southwest out of China. Kashi was on
the southern route, with the next stops being Islamabad and
Kabul en route to Baghdad and Istanbul. Today a highway,
completed in 1982, links Kashi and Islamabad across the 16,000
foor high Pamirs in the Karakoram Range. Kashi itself, with
a 2,000 year old Sunday bazaar, is on the edge of the
Taklimakan Desert, a prominent feature of Xinjiang: the
desert's name means "when you go in, you don't come out".
Once the Silk Road travellers arrived in Islamabad they could
continue west or follow the river south to the Arabian Sea.
Nestled in between these river systems, east of the Nile,
south of Tigris/Euphrates, and southwest of Indus (or inside
the Fertile Crescent), is the Arabian peninsula, an area
equivalent to the U.S. east of the Mississippi, and where
water may well become more valuable than oil in the next few
years. Much of the interior of the peninsula is all desert,
a dry and alternately mountainous and sandy expanse. Coastal
ranges are lined with wadis, or valleys ranging from a few
feet to over a mile in width, and that change from dry
boulders and gravel to flood waters that rise quickly enough
to catch travellers unawares when it rains in the mountains.
The interior is now a unified Kingdom, containing the two
holiest shrines for the world's millions of Muslims, many of
whom will travel each year to Mecca on the annual Hajj. A
large southern portion of the interior is so formidable that
it is called The Empty Quarter.
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Surrounding the interior, on the east and south, are
coastal states. Sheikdoms, sitting between the Sea or Gulf and
the coast mountains in the south, and controlling access to
most of the world's oil reserves. With the advent of oil and
nationalization of its production, the last 20 years - only
the space of time since I left High School - have seen incred-
ible growth and construction within these states. Entire
cities, with high rises, sewers, communications, transporta-
tion centers, utilities, harbors, machinery, manufacturing and
retailing, financial centers, hotels, hospitals, universities,
and more have all grown out of the sand. They are, for the
most part, spotlessly clean. Everyone who drives a car has
learned to do so only in the last two decades. Aerial
photography is not infrequently incapable of identifying these
newly constructed areas, compared to their previous appearance
(aside from prominent geographical features), if viewed over
spans of only 2 years. Two examples of these "new" cities
include Muscat (from 1970, at the location of an occupied but
barren ancient settlement) , and Abu Dhabi (new from 1966) . By
contrast, Cairo and Jerusalem and the other cities north of
the desert, in the fertile crescent, have been continuously
settled, and sometimes little changed for millenia. North of
the interior is the Syrian desert: more hot open expanse
leading to Damascus, Amman and the Jordan Valley.
The Middle East, then, is an area of stark contrasts, vast
open expanses, and rare cushions. Only a few short years ago,
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travellers and residents either carried what they needed for
survival on their person, on their camel, or had it nearby.
Nomad hospitality is legendary. Tribal existence was the
norm, aside from the few fixed settlements inland, along the
rivers, and at intervals along the coasts.
Demographically, the area is similarly diverse. Entire
civilizations developed separate from each other along the
three primary river systems. Travellers from Europe and Asia
frequented the routes that criss-crossed the region. Nomad
life coexisted with the cities. Dark skinned Egyptians
mingled with Phoenicians and the Syrians from further north.
Persians were a whole race apart, and the Muslims of Pakistan
have different lifestyles and priorities, aside from Islam,
than their coreligionists.
The population of Jerusalem is remarkable for its vibran-
cy, where Armenians and Greeks and Jews (Orthodox and secu-
lar) , and Arabs and Coptics and Romans and Turks and Russians
and Templars and still others all combined, and still combine
to this day, to share a city with never-ending uneasy live-
and-let-live agreements among its inhabitants.
Some population groups share a great deal of homogeneity
at the ancient centers (deltas, major cities) . Others reflect
a wandering tribal existence, which is now being converted to
sedentary pursuits by combinations of economic necessity and
governmental fiat. Then still others carry the incredible
diversity within which they have lived, with Jerusalem as the
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prime example; Istanbul is another possible candidate, but
beyond our purview, and also a place where riches were
deposited instead of a place where riches grew.
Another striking and sobering feature about contemporary-
demographics in the Middle East are the very size and contin-
ued growth of the resident peoples. Population growth in this
century has been almost catastrophic, considering the limited
resources of the region. The consequent strain on resources
and food production, drinking water, employment prospects,
attendant security risks and costs, and so on are immense. It
is indeed true that water may become more valuable than oil,
at least to the inhabitants. The new emphasis on agriculture
and the greening of deserts, plus a burgeoning industrial
capacity, indigenous armaments industries, and more have all
placed demands on the local water tables that can no longer be
met
.
The last major demographic distinction to be addressed
here is related to the near complete arbitrary fashion with
which the contemporary Middle East was carved. Only at one
end of the Levant is a primarily homogenous grouping of people
found within the recently carved national boundaries (Egypt)
.
The area as a whole is much more suited for empire or tribe
than it is for states. Iraq is a near impossible concatena-
tion of Marsh Arab Shi'ites, middle class Sunnis, and spirited
Kurds, who choose to have little to do with each other; as
part of the Ottoman Empire Iraq was a collection of 3 provinc-
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es rather than one administrative unit. Moreover, the ruling
circle resident in Baghdad emanates from a microcosm in
Tikrit, upriver from the capital, which is hardly represen-
tative of the country as a whole.
The Gulf states, until very recently, had inland borders
that meant nothing to indigenous peoples who did not have, nor
care to have, geopolitical concerns. Lebanon and Syria were
oddly drawn by the French so as to facilitate French rule and
maintain the heterogeneity of the area; it wasn't until the
1950s that persons living in Syria began to feel anything like
Syrians, and this happened only after Syria and Egypt formed
a brief political union in 1958.^° Jordan's make-up is a bit
less fractious, but nonetheless a superimposed structure
inside neat lines, over a desert people, intended as a buffer
against Bedouin for the British, and with a ruling family
transplanted from the Hijaz (that still exists uneasily, if
not with open feuding, with the House of Saud)
.
Saudi Arabia is perhaps the most natural of all the Middle
East states (along with other members of the Gulf Cooperation
Council, or GCC) . Here a ruling family of one area of the
peninsula took it on their own to unite the entire peninsula,
or most of it, and were possibly able to do so because no
other Colonial power truly wanted it. All empires skirted
Arabia, preferring to stay close to the Mediterranean, rather
than penetrate into the Arabian Desert.
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Palestine, or Israel, or the Transjordan, is truly the
most recent superimposition of a national polity sundering
other allegiances in the Middle Eastern area. A combination
of British rule, UN partitioning, and Jewish-Arabic war making
have generated a state of incredible strength and purpose and
with strains of "nationalism", yet with borders that probably
have a greater likelihood of undergoing adjustment than of any
other state in the world (except for those states, of course,
that might be engaged in hostilities, or otherwise pursuing
negotiations leading to national redefinitions)
.
To reiterate earlier suggestions regarding the fluidity of
the Middle East (and China) , it is helpful to keep in mind the
region's development, geography, neighbors, and avenues of
discourse or access with surrounding regions (particularly
China) . The Middle East is a natural window on Asia, it is a
region of movement.
Again, by focusing on only the primary Levantine states,
this review is somewhat arbitrary and loses the added ingredi-
ents of Anatolia, most of North Africa, and much of Persia,
but will still be representative of the heart of the region
and also of much that concerns international geopolitics. By
necessity, a greater diversity of peoples will be covered in
this section than was evident with the review of China, and it




The circumstances involving the establishment of this
state are utterly unique and without precedent. Placing
Israel into its own category for review is not meant as a
slight or plaudit, either to Israel or to the surrounding
Middle East states. Rather, the intent is to administratively
facilitate review of a unique situation.
Israel, insofar as it is a Jewish State, is almost
entirely a nation of immigrants. Notwithstanding the cultural
or historical attachment of Jews to Palestine and of their
desire or wish to reside in Jerusalem, one result of their
actual arrival after centuries of diaspora has been local
displacement, regional hostilities, and a considerable amount
of international diplomacy. One of the essential paradoxes of
Zionism, the movement that begat Israel, is that it is (said
to be) primarily secular in orientation, or nationalist,
intending only to provide Jews with a homeland of their own.
Hence, location should not necessarily be an issue, but
location did in fact become a crucial issue. Indeed, Theodore
Herzl - the movement's most effective initial director,
although not its founder - at one point agreed to accept the
East African Protectorate (i.e. : Kenya) from Britain as a home
for the Jewish people; other proffered or suggested areas for
Jewish homelands were Argentina, Cyprus, and the Sinai. ^^
But, of course, the Jewish homeland wound up in Palestine,
precisely because location was an issue. At this juncture,
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any attempt to try to defend zionism as secular becomes very
difficult; Zionism is very much related to the question of
what it means to be a Jew, insofar as being Jewish is to have
a special relationship to a physical place (Jerusalem)
, and
apparently the majority of early Zionists believed that there
could be no Jewish homeland unless it was in Israel.
The internal debate of what it means to be Jewish is
very much alive to this day in Israel. The primary governmen-
tal figures would prefer a secular orientation for the state
as a whole, but all Israeli governments have ruled with the
assistance of one or more of the small religious political
parties; the Knesset was thus obliged to maintain certain
requirements about observing the sabbath, kosher dietary laws,
and so on. So Israel is secular, but it isn't. Also Zionism
is secular, but it isn't. Even with this most recent elec-
tion, when Labor polled far better than Likud for the first
time since 1977 and could have formed a government without
incorporating a religious party (for the first time in
Israel's history), an orthodox party, the Shas, was included
in the ruling coalition. The Ministry of Interior portfolio
will thus go to Shas. Given this state of affairs, we find
secular Jews who in fact are contributing directly to
maintenance of a religious state.
We also have a few Orthodox Jews who do not support
the (current) state, secular or sacred. They believe that
Israel, now, is heretictical : it is a violation of the divine
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will and an affront to the Messiah who will begin the State
himself, in his own good time (but hasn't done so yet) . These
Jews are the Neturei Karta ("Guardians of the City" in
Aramaic) , and they have carried their beliefs to the point of
interacting with the PLO. During the recent peace negotia-
tions, this group had two of their members from New York City
attached to the Palestinian delegation (in an advisory
capacity) . Another Orthodox anti-zionist group, larger than
Neturei Karta, is the Edah Haredit; this group will not deal
with either the Jewish state or the PLO . ^^ While these
relatively small groups actually live in Jerusalem (also
elsewhere) , they do not regard themselves as citizens of
Israel; they do not pay taxes, or serve in the army, and so
on.
One of the first acts of the new Israeli government in
1948 was to proclaim the "Law of Return", stipulating that any
Jew has full citizenship if he or she chooses to live in
Israel. In 1989 Israel's Supreme Court reaffirmed that being
a Jew, under the Law of Return, included Reform and Conserva-
tive Judaism (the majority of U.S. Jews) , as well as Orthodox.
For years the Orthodox in Israel have been trying to narrow
the focus of this law to include only Orthodox. Recently, as
with many other sacred and secular organizations around the
world, some of Judaism has been rethinking its own orienta-
tion. Hence both Reform and Conservative Jews now train and
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utilize women Rabbis, and so on, which is all a bit too much
for the Orthodox Jews to understand or accept.
After establishing the Law of Return, Israel was able
to in-gather Jews from all over the world, with their citizen-
ship already established based on their being Jewish.
Immigra-tion has been in effect long enough for other genera-
tions of Jews, from the initial immigrants, to be born in
Israel. These Sabras are now entering the higher political
ranks. Many now living in Israel, and others still arriving,
continue to be Jews born outside of Israel. Eastern Europe
was the first primary source for the migrations to Israel.
These first and second waves of immigrants, or aliyahs
("coming up"), were ashkenazic in character (German or
European based Jewry) , and received much impetus from post-war
experiences in Europe (the holocaust). Subsequent immigra-
tions have originated largely from Jews living in Arab or
Islamic lands; these sephardim (Spanish or oriental based
Jews) helped to change the composition of Jews in Israel from
a predominantly European outlook to where the mix is almost at
50%. Future immigration, particularly those now entering
Israel from Russia, may tip the balance back towards the
ashkenazim. Almost 25% of the world's Jewish peoples live in
Israel, with about the same number or more in the U.S.
Initial Jewish settlement in Israel was of a communal
nature, based on kibbutzim (collective settlements) and mo-
shavim (cooperative settlements). Agriculture and security
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were both stressed. Kibbutzim and moshavim are now the
minority, but are still prominent in that a disproportionate
number of military (IDF) officers come from these communities:
while representing only 8% of Israel's total population, they
provide roughly 25-30% of all IDF officers." As of 1986,
there were a total of 269 kibbutzim and 458 moshavim in
operation.
Israel's population includes a resident group of
Israeli Arabs, those persons (Muslims, Christians and Druze)
,
who were indigenous to the area before the establishment of
the Israeli state. Currently there are about 750,000 of these
non-Jewish Israelis, plus another 1,800,000 Palestinians in
the occupied West Bank. Altogether, including the occupied
West Bank, the Jewish Israelis represent about 60% of all
inhabitants of greater Palestine. Since current birth rates
are higher for the non-Jews (2.62%) than for the Jews (1.34%),
the future demographic make-up of Israel will depend upon
immigration rates, growth rates (education) , the extent of any
hostilities, and perhaps other variables as well. Owing to
the immense concern for security that Israel has, plus the
belief that a high percentage of Jews in the population is
required to ensure security, the characteristics of Israel's
population will continue to be closely observed by the
government
.
Returning again to the paradox of Israel's peculiar
stasis between the secular and religious worlds, Israel has
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looked on Jerusalem as its capital city almost from the moment
Israel's independence was declared in 1948. After unifying
the city as one result of the 1967 war, Jerusalem's status has
become increasingly central to any discussion involving the
future of Israel. A lot of emotion, various interpretations
of historical material, security requirements, international
interest, and now resource management enter into the debate
regarding Jerusalem's future. It is a thorny subject. To
date the U.S. maintains a consulate there, unrelated to our
embassy in Tel Aviv; many other countries have gradually been
moving their embassies into Jerusalem.
Israel's governmental structure is also unique, a
blend of British and American democracies. The Knesset, or
parliament, is a unicameral house with distribution of its 120
seats dependent upon percentage polling by the several
political parties. In other words, each party publishes its
list of hopeful Members of the Knesset (MKs), prior to
national elections. Its seats in the Knesset are determined
by computing the percentage of the national vote the party
received. Then the published party list is used, in order of
rank from highest to lowest, to determine which party members
fill the seats it has won. The Prime Minister is usually the
leader, or first listed member, of the party to win the most
seats. Since no one party will typically win a majority of
Knesset seats, governments become ruling coalitions, and this
is where one or more of the smaller parties, including the
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orthodox, will become part of the government, even though
these smaller parties represent only a small percentage of the
popular vote.
Through these continued coalitions, then, one or more
of the orthodox parties have always been members of the
government. This particular reality is a growing sore point
for the country as a whole, because many Israelis feel
uncomfortable and even resent that these small orthodox groups
continue to have access to power, to budgets, to priorities,
and all the rest. Recent debates over the applicability of
the Law of Return and who is a Jew fueled this dissatisfac-
tion, as did the occasion when a Shas Rabbi changed his mind
about the efficacy of trading land for peace. This Rabbi, as
a MK, communicated his decision to Shamir in the form of a
demand, which resulted in removing the support of Shas from
Shamir's ruling coalition. Additionally, as Labor and Likud
have been competing with each other for the last 15 years over
who is able to form a government, the religious parties have
been wooed more and more by either side. Consequently they
hold out for the biggest slice of political pie. Legislation
and activity via the Rabbinate has been forthcoming, sponsored
by the Orthodox, on issues of funding for Orthodox schools,
what is and is not proper for the advertising industry (no
women in bathing suits, thank you), the closing of pork
processing facilities, and so on.
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Another insertion of Orthodoxy into the political
process occurred when a Brooklyn Rabbi, the leader of a
Hasidic sect (who has never visited Israel), insisted that
Torah mandated no land could ever be ceded away if Jewish
lives were at stake - and hence Peres was unable to form a
majority coalition, and the government went back to Likud. ^"^
In 1990, over the space of a few weeks, the orthodox Shas
brought down Likud, and then the orthodox Lubavitch prevented
the establishment of Labor. In short, there has been a
growing element very much like caprice into Israeli politics,
and Israelis are growing weary of it. Quite possibly this
situation contributed to Labor's recent victory over Likud.
Also, it has been recently decided, by a Knesset vote and
against the wishes of Shamir, that starting in 1996 the Prime
Minister will be elected directly by popular vote and not
through the Knesset procedure of forming governments or party
lists
.
The political spectrum in Israel, in addition to the
national religious parties, includes a cornucopia of political
parties. Largest among them are the Labor and Likud blocs,
with other special interest parties on either the left or the
right (Peace Now, from the Mapam; Shelli and Rakkah, left of
Mapam; Maki, Israeli Communist Party; Kach, extreme right
wing; and others), plus the Orthodox, who can be either left
or right as we have seen. In 1949, 24 political parties
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participated in the elections and 16 earned seats; by 1977, 23
participated and 13 won seats. ^^
Labor's bloc is the oldest and best known political
grouping in Israel, with its formation extending before
initial statehood into the British Mandate period. Within
this bloc, the Mapai party is the cornerstone: Ben-Gurion was
its leader and became the first Prime Minister. Mapai members
have often held influential positions within the World Zionist
Organization and the Jewish Agency. Mapam was another Labor
stalwart, on the left, supportive more of diplomacy and
compromise than of unyielding policies. Other leaders that
emerged within Labor's ranks were Levi Eshkol, Golda Meir and
Yitzhak Rabin.
The 1977 elections brought Likud into the government
for the first time, and Begin became prime minister; the
Democratic Movement for Change (DMC) party formed just before
the election, took votes away from Labor, and the DMC ' s 15
seats kept Labor from forming another coalition. One of the
purposes behind Likud's formation was to insist that no land
from the 1967 conquests would ever be returned to the Pales-
tinians. The Herut party (Begin's, from 1948), the Liberals,
and several other opposition parties combined to form Likud in
1973. Other parties include the Tsomet (extreme right-wing),
and Meretz (left wing, some of whose members support formation
of a Palestinian state) . The newly elected Labor government
under Rabin has made a coalition with Shas and Meretz; this is
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the first government in which the orthodox National Religious
Party (NRP) has not been a member since Israel's founding.
Israeli society includes several interest groups, of
which the political parties are an extension. The largest,
most powerful and oldest societal grouping is the Histadrut,
a glorified labor union formed in 1920. It has semi-official
status, includes trade union leaders in its membership, shares
a directorate with Labor, accepts contracts from developing
countries, offers training to labor leaders and women's
groups, etc., and sends technicians on missions to developing
countries. Histadrut has enjoyed frequent leadership exchang-
es between itself, the Labor Party, and the Knesset. By the
1970s, over half of all Israelis were members of Histadrut, it
was the country's largest employer, 90% of all organized
workers belonged to its trade unions, 60% of Israelis were
insured by its health fund, and 25% were employed by its
es.^^
Two other very visible interest groups with political
and/or social impact are Peace Now (PN) and the Gush Emunim
(GE) . PN began from veterans protests after the October War
in 1973, based on the premise that the Knesset and Ministries
were not availing themselves of opportunities to generate
agreements and perhaps even peace with the surrounding Arab
communities. In the eyes of PN, climates of opinion had been
changing within the Arab world and Israel was not adjusting
accordingly and taking full advantage of the situation to make
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peace. GE, on the other hand, emerged from the NRP as a vocal
supporter of the view that God gave the land of Israel to the
Israelis and Israel should not give it back to the Arabs for
any reason whatsoever. Hence GE and other kindred groups,
plus the Kach (who openly advocate removal of all Arabs from
Israel and annexation of the West Bank) , are supportive of
continued settlement construction and expansion in the West
Bank. Kach, by the way, was a political party banned by
Israel in 1988 due to its racism and was led by another New
York Rabbi, Meir Kahane, who emigrated to Israel in 1971.
While he was visiting New York on a speaking engagement in
October 1990, Kahane was shot and killed.
Aside from all this political intrigue, Israel has
pursued a remarkable course of development over the last half
century. Starting with agriculture, and now as a major citrus
exporter, Israel parlayed burgeoning investment returns,
strength of immigration, and considerable international aid
into a GNP that reached $22b by 1982. However, Israel's
predominantly socialist orientation, constant influx of
immigrants, and absolute priority of defense created a
lopsided state budget heavily dependent on external largesse.
Inflation was a major problem, reaching almost 500% per year
by 1984; it has now been brought under reasonable control and
is down into double digits, under 20%. Israel's exports have
increased from $300m in 1950 to $lb in 1968 and $8. 2b in
1987."
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Israel's uppermost security concerns are reflected by-
defense expenditures that amounted to 23% of GDP in 1983: 30%
of all national output goes to security or defense. Almost
half of the national budget is for security, along with one
fifth of the labor force. Per capita costs for defense have
escalated to $1,000 as of 1978.
Security has not only been a cause for expenditures,
but also significant income. Military sales have provided
Israel with as much as 2 0% of foreign income from manufactured
items, and is recorded under the rubric of machinery and
electronics. The country's defense ministry, in the 1970s,
absorbed as much as 40% of the national budget and 20% of
GNP . ^^
One of the most glaringly apparent aspects of Israel's
economic life has been the amount of assistance it receives
from external sources, especially from the U.S.. On average,
annual aid now includes $1.2b for economic aid, $1.8b in
military assistance, and up to $1.2b in other special allow-
ances. When bonds sales, and other outright contributions are
added, total annual aid to Israel from the U.S. is approxi-
mately $6b. Translating that figure into per capita aid
results in almost $641 per person per year. The next highest
U.S. aid recipient is Egypt, at approximately $2b per year, or
not quite $40 per capita.
Israel's socialized public sector employs more people
than any other non-communist country. As of 1982, productivi-
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ty in Israel fell lower than in most of Western Europe and
only 25% of all workers were in industry. ^^
Obviously Israel's economy would go under without this
external influx of U.S. aid; quite apart from the requirements
on which the aid is based, one has to wonder about the
viability and survivability of Israel's economy. Part of the
aid package is the provision that the U.S. purchase a speci-
fied amount of Israeli materiel each year, which further
assists Israel's arms industry. In addition to these dollars,
Israel has been voicing the need to find an additional $70b to
$80b over the next five years for purposes of settling the
Russian immigration.^"
Energy costs are as much a part of Israel's budget as
are found elsewhere. After the Iranian revolution, that major
source of Israel's oil supply was cut. (Israel also lost
another supply when the Sinai was returned to Egypt) . Israel
therefore had to rely on world markets, and by 1980 Israel's
average annual energy import bill was over $2b, almost 10% of
GNP.
Closely related to Israel's economic and military
well-being is the subject of energy and research. Which leads
in turn to the Israeli complex at Dimona in the Negev,
highlighted by an expose provided by a Moroccan Jew named
Mordecai Vanunu through the Sunday Times of London (5 Oct.
1986) . That quiet story, combined with subsequent reports,
conjecture, and an interesting new book ( The Samson Option , by
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Hersh, which may have to be taken with a grain of salt) , leads
to the possible and likely conjecture that Israel is an
undeclared nuclear power with as many as 100 to 200 warheads
parked under the sand, along with having the means of deliver-
ing those devices. Israel has launched her own satellite into
orbit, and possesses sufficient aircraft and other battlefield
weapons necessary for use with nuclear devices.
On 22 September 197 9, Israel was recorded as having
performed a low-yield nuclear test in the South Indian Ocean
1500 miles southeast of the Cape of Good Hope; the test was
discovered by our VELA satellite. This particular test was
one of three, using nuclear artillery shells, with ships from
Israeli and South African navies observing. ^^ Israel also is
said to have conducted at least one successful low-yield
neutron bomb test, underground in the Negev, during the mid
1960s."
Perhaps most remarkable and most sobering of all about
these disclosures is that Israel further is supposed to have
pursued an active program of targeting the USSR with nuclear
weapons, proposing on one occasion that Israel and the U.S.
jointly target the USSR. Pollard was providing U.S. military
intelligence to Israel at the time, which assisted Israel in
doing this. At the height of Pollard's activities in 1984-85,
he was providing Israel with information about positions of
Baku oil fields and military installations in Southern USSR.
These are indeed sobering revelations, if true, for a nation
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of four million people to suddenly de facto become one of the
world's largest nuclear powers."
There is another sense in which the region of Israel
and/or Palestine is top heavy and subject to strain. The
combination of population pressures, agriculture, and burgeon-
ing industry are taking their toll on local water resources.
Supplies of potable water are so tenuous, with projected
availability so grim, that timely changes in habits, plans,
and even livelihoods of the region's inhabitants are mandated.
There is a necessity for regional environmental
cooperation. Agriculture and urban development have expanded
water usage six-fold since 1948: there simply is no longer
enough water for Israel's agriculture and everything else.
The Sea of Galilee (Lake Kinneret) is as low as it has ever
been in 60 years; it's down to the point where the water will
become saline if it drops any further. Israel's two aquifers,
one near the coast and Gaza, the other further inland and
under the West Bank, are both overdrawn; the water at Gaza is
now brackish, unfit for agriculture and human consumption.
Conservation measures were instituted last year, but they are
hardly sufficient. Israeli agriculture needs to be redirected
into less water intensive crops, which will take years to
fully implement. Jews use about 9 times the amount of water
used by Arabs; the Arab population's consumption rate is
capped militarily by the rate they utilized from 1967 (despite
their increasing numbers)
. Added Jewish settlers to the
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region from Russia, or wherever, will further overtax the
supply. New water must be provided from the Litani, the Nile,
from Turkey, or from desalinization/^
Agriculture's share of exports is 30%, and the fanners
use 70% of Israel's water, with the government subsidizing 30%
of the water they use. Most of this water is provided by the
limestone aquifer under the West Bank, and the region's supply
is dangerously low. An indication of this is provided by the
level of the Sea of Galilee, which is now at the point of no
return
.
One way of finding additional water resources, by the
state, has been to employ a growing network of treatment
plants to reuse waste water for agriculture. To find still
more water, Israel wants to construct a canal from the Yarmuk
to the Sea of Galilee, to move water both ways, depending on
the season. This particular project contrasts to the Jordani-
ans, who have been trying to dam the Yarmuk, but have been
unsuccessful because of needing prior approval from Israel.
Palestinians in occupied lands have been prevented
from increasing their water supplies since 1967. New Israeli
settlements have dropped more than 40 deep wells, some of
which were next to Palestinian springs, causing the springs to
go dry. Then, in some cases, the Israelis provided water back
to the Palestinians, but only by selling it. Water has become
a very potent issue for conservative politicians opposed to
giving land back to the Palestinians, and also for Palestin-
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ians who wish to regain their rightful share of the region's
resources. If present usage of Gaza aquifer water continues,
at twice the consumption rate which the aquifer can support,
there will be catastrophic results for living standards and
agriculture there. All of Israel, in fact, "is on the
threshold of a catastrophe".^^
As if the above strains of economics, security, and
natural resources weren't enough, the Intifidah adds ingredi-
ents to the region that need to be addressed. Land appropria-
tion by the Israelites for construction of settlements or
other purposes, on top of the acquisitions made from vacancies
left by refugees who left their homes in 1948 and 1967 (who
are not allowed to return) , add to the tension on the West
Bank and Gaza. The Palestinians have long been in search of
a state of their own, to which Israel is adamantly opposed.
Israel also has been reluctant to have any dealings with the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); since the PLO claims
to be the lawful representative of the Palestinians, Israel's
stance on the matter effectively deprives the Palestinians of
a voice. Since December 1987 the Palestinians of the West
Bank, primarily the youth, have engaged in sporadic yet
dependable defiance, strikes, and stone throwing violence
directed toward the Israelis. By June of 1991, anywhere from
800 to 1,100 Palestinians were killed by the IDF as part of
Israel's effort to curb this defiance and aggression. Addi-
tionally, the Palestinians themselves had killed another 350
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of their own, described as "collaborators". The PLO leader-
ship was trying to control and stop these latter killings, but
without complete success. Aside from responding in the
streets by the IDF, Israel also routinely bulldozes the homes
of those Palestinians suspected of violence, regularly detains
scores or more, has cordoned off particular areas, prevented
the locals from going to their jobs or markets, and also
closed schools and universities in the West Bank and Gaza
areas. This last measure, by depriving Palestinian youths of
their education, is creating an in-house trajedy of societal
proportions, with literacy rates among Palestinians beginning
to suffer. The degree of importance with which the Jews
themselves regard education makes this measure particularly
malevolent
.
Recently deaths have been reported among Jewish
settlers and others as the Intifadah continues to take
invidious turns. This simmering discontent has become yet
another issue for the planners to solve if the region is to
attain peace and stability. One domestic effect for Israel,
in reverse, has been that since the beginning of the Intifada,
1 in 15 Israelis have refused to serve in occupied territo-
ries, and 1 in 10 actually go to prison over this issue. (The
"Peace Now" group is not among those who support selective
service, based on where the Army sends you) . ^^
As a beginning response and partial answer to all of
the above, the long awaited Middle East Peace Conference has
182
begun. It is a slow process, but remarkable if for no other
reason than that all Arab-Israeli participants were in the
same room together. This peace process is an important aspect
of resolving Middle East antagonisms, and will be addressed
again in chapter seven. It is often said that this process is
characterized as a decision to either trade land for peace,
thereby getting an agreement, or not to trade land for peace,
thereby getting little if anything at all. There is some
truth to this simple characterization, but behind the actual
trading of land are all those other issues of government
composition, interest groups, economics, and so on. The
simple formula of land for peace has a labyrinthine foundation
below the surface.
2. Other Middle East States
Our above review of Israel was the portrayal of a
state that meets traditional criteria of being, in fact, a
nation state. There are an entire range of perhaps insupera-
ble difficulties to be found within the fabric of that state,
but all the typically European nation-state trademarks are
there, with a few others thrown in. The government is
institutionalized, there is stability in the political process
(despite the dozens of political parties), there is a func-
tioning infrastructure (even if it might not be able to run on
its own) , and the people (or at least the Jews) are active and
involved with their government (during the electoral process)
.
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Before that, the review of China portrayed a country
that was trying very hard, and slowly succeeding, to redefine
its nationalism. In so doing, that process indicated a
further likely and ongoing modification being made by the
Chinese people, knowingly or unknowingly, regarding their
perception of authority and tradition. Finally, this last
evolutionary adjustment, enhanced by modernization and a
growing economy, will quite possibly have profound effects on
how the Chinese develop their law, political offices, decision
making apparatus, systems of accountability, provisions for
succession of central power, and so on.
Moving now to the Other Middle East States, we find a
grouping of dissimilar would-be nation states, each with its
primary concerns, each with nascent governmental structures
that do not yet have legitimacy in their own right (over and
above the power of the personalities who occupy those offic-
es) , each facing increasingly real-time dilemmas of needing to
find employment for multiplying populations and the require-
ment to husband dwindling resources, each working out its own
accommodation with Islamic-modernization tensions, and each
wondering how to interact with the others, with the UN, with
the Palestinians, and with their nemesis Israel. These Middle
Eastern states lack the advantages of Israel's institutional-
ization, and of China's overwhelming center of authority with
all its vertical relationships. They are somewhere in
between, attempting to institutionalize their political
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apparatus, to make accommodations between Islam and national-
ism and modernization, and to draw their constituent popula-
tions into the process of government.
Each of these other major Middle East states are known
for certain primary characteristics. Saudi Arabia, of course,
is known for its bankroll and conservatism. Jordan usually
plays the moderate, caught between factions, attempting to
serve as an active or passive arbitrator. Iraq, aside from
Baghdad and its associated cosmopolitan aspects (in better
days), and in a thinly disguised bid to assert Arab leader-
ship, has been focusing attention on military preparedness.
Syria, another contender for Arab leadership, and also another
state quick to acknowledge the virtue of muscle, has yet to be
the center for pan-Arab thought that it would like to be,
while working through as best it can a Byzantine political
party to institute or carry out its ideas. Egypt, interest-
ingly enough, has no bankroll or army or moderator impulse
that stands out above each of its neighbors to give it an
immediate and single reference point. However, Egypt falls
somewhat into the all-of -the-above category, is characteristi-
cally first in the region to carry on with a project or
purpose later to be adopted or felt by the region, and was
regarded by the others as a necessary partner in their
struggle against Israel.
Egypt's 53 million are the single most concentrated
national population in the Levant (having rough parity with
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Iran) , and are projected to double in size within 25 years at
current growth rates to 110 millions (or the current size of
Pakistan)
.
Compared to 14m for Saudi Arabia, 3m for Jordan,
12m for Syria, and 18m for Iraq, Egypt's population alone
(concentrated around the Nile Delta) commands a certain
gravity or attraction in personal and cultural affairs amongst
the Arab world. Regardless of what the respective government
positions are with each other, Arabs from across the Middle
East will go to and from Cairo or Alexandria for employment,
education, culture, travel, and other activities. Ever since
Napoleon first made Egypt aware, in the late 18th century, of
the realities of an outside world, and since Muhammad Ali then
changed Cairo and the Nile Delta from an agricultural backwat-
er to an industrial and educational center actively interact-
ing with the West, Egypt has been in the general forefront of
regional concerns, the first in the Arab world - generally
speaking - to pioneer the way. The most recent example of
this was the Camp David Accords and unilateral Egyptian-
Israeli peace of 1978 (assuming that other Middle Eastern
states will also arrive at understandings with Israel). A
flurry of activity in Baghdad attempted to isolate Cairo after
the Egyptian-Israeli accords were made, but those isolationist
measures were ultimately non-effective.
Another feature that the other Middle East states seem
to share, whether they want to or not, is that their current
national governments, operating through a collection of
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political edifices that preside over largely arbitrary borders
with only minimal senses of institutionalized legitimacy, are
all largely irrelevant or out of touch with the day-to-day
living that occurs within their respective national borders.
One exception to this characterization is Saudi Arabia: the
Royal Family seems to occupy a more stable position than many
of the surrounding heads of state. The Koran is regarded as
Saudi Arabia's constitution, and the Royal Family governs
through the Sharia: age-old desert traditions permeate the
relation between royal family and the people. The pace of
modernization within the Arabian peninsula, however, may
require the King to speed his reform plans ahead of schedule,
if in fact he does have a schedule for reform (as he claims) .
While central authority in China was very much
associated with one or more personalities, it was also tied
into a bureaucratic edifice of several vertical relationships
that would frequently include family members; this was so if
for no other reason than that China is a large polity and
there is much to keep track of. In Egypt, on the other hand,
and elsewhere in the Middle East, central authority (especial-
ly in the foreign policy realm) is also associated with a
strong personality, but without attendant vertical or horizon-
tal bureaucracy linkages. Nasser and Sadat were very much
their own men when it came to the odd momentous decisions that
went on to flavor Egypt for years hence. Examples of these
include: only 14 people knew in advance of Nasser's decision
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to nationalize the Suez; Sadat told no one of his decision to
join with Libya and Syria in the Federation of Arab Republics
in 1971; only 2 people knew of Sadat's decision to expel
Soviets from Egypt (and only a few hours before the Soviet
Ambassador was told); Sadat planned the 1973 war with Syria's
Assad before telling his own Generals; only one person knew
Sadat was going to Jerusalem in 1977/''
The Egyptian regime did try genuine multiparty
politics in the 1970s, but reverted to a primary party (the
government's party) with other minor parties that provide
essentially no legal opposition.
Egypt's primary political figure, the President,
acquires his perceived legitimacy through the perception of
the people of the country before he is really accepted. The
fact that he is in office, or was elected, is ancillary to his
needing the mantle of popular support. Generally this is done
through momentous occasions or decisions, and since Egypt is
a fairly homogenous place, despite its population size, such
an occasion or decision usually involves the foreign policy
sphere.
The leader's ability to garner popular support through
foreign policy decisions first requires that domestic needs
are basically met. Egypt's population again requires a
minimal economic growth per year just to avoid unemployment
(currently another 1,000,000 persons every 9 months). In
terms of food production, Egypt has been losing its scanty
arable land alongside the Nile due to urbanization and
flooding, and 70% of all food is imported. To counter these
trends, the country has been trying to extend agriculture
beyond its current bounds, into the desert, and since 1981
this attempt has been finding some success. So far 1.6
million acres of desert have been made arable, with most of
that occurring since 1981 when the laws were modified to favor
private individuals over the government; individuals were then
allowed to purchase up to 300 acres, and companies up to
50,000 acres (instead of 100 acres per person or company).
The large businesses, with more resources at their disposal,
fare better than the individuals. As a result, over all food
production is improving: prices of fruits and vegetables have
stabilized despite a general 30% inflation rate in the last
few years . ^®
This very success has generated its own difficulties,
however. Similar to the growing dryness of the Jordan River
valley, Egypt has faced its worst drought in a century during
the 1980s. The Nile is the primary, and sometimes only, water
source in a country without rainfall (the rain falls upriver,
away from the delta) ; in recent years river traffic has been
stranded and the strategic reservoir behind High Aswan is
reduced by 20%. The government is looking for new aquifers,
encouraging the discontinuance of crops such as rice and sugar
cane, and looking for other ways to conserve. The Nile
meanwhile continues its century-long decline of liquid volume
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each year. It is expected that another 2.8 million acres can
be brought under cultivation with available aquifer supplies,
but this amount added to the current 6 million acres will only
meet 50% of the country's food needs by the next century, A
former Egyptian diplomat suggests that "the politics of the
Middle East after 2000 will be a struggle over water". ^^
Egypt is also proceeding with reforms in the urban
sector to increase economic viability. Known for its stifling
bureaucracy, Egypt is trying to reduce the public sector, but
in doing so will be releasing 40,000 to 150,000 new workers
into the job market each year for the next three to four
years. As Egyptian law does not permit a worker to be fired
outright, the employer must present an alternative employment
scheme to the worker in order to release him/her. According-
ly, Cairo plans to use the Social Fund of the World Bank to
generate new employment, although unemployment will likely
result anyway.
Another source of revenue for Egypt is oil and natural
gas, of which it also has significant reserves. However,
production has been slowing and companies (BP, Elf Aquitaine,
and others) , are beginning to reduce their efforts in Egypt so
as to provide more assets in better markets. They would like
to see an improved business climate.
Egypt is a poor country; its PCGNP is now $731.''° A
fair amount of economic growth will be required just to retain
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this status quo. Unlike China, whose PCGNP is lower but whose
GNP is approaching superpower status, Egypt's GNP ($37b).
The primary wish of Sadat, that economics and foreign
relations would improve after the treaty with Israel, has not
materialized, or at least not to the degree that was hoped
for. The business sector continues to languish, and Israel's
primacy with the U.S. congress over approving or disapproving
weapons sales to the Middle East irks Cairo. As a counter to
this Egypt is entering into production or coproduction license
agreements to produce weapons and military support equipment
in Egypt. This will help to boost its own economy and
generate potential sales for Egypt in the region and possibly
elsewhere .^^
Meanwhile, Islamic extremists are increasing their
agitation for imposition of Islamic law. The Muslim Brother-
hood, technically illegal but tolerated by the government, has
been given access to increased employment within the bureau-
cracy, as of a few years ago, to try and take the sting out of
their circumstance. Recent increases in violence suggest that
the plan is not working, or not working well enough.
On the intelligentsia side of the dissent spectrum, a
new play that recently opened in Cairo lampooned Arabs and
pan-Arabism rather severely, claiming that the best attribute
of an Arab government is its oppression of its people, and so
on. Individual actors represented the various states, with
examples being the Egyptian as quiet and naive, the Iraqi as
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big, burly and obnoxious, the Jordanian portrayed as a
moderate, and the Ladies as more concerned with their make-up
than in assisting with the great problems of the day.''^
In Saudi Arabia the traditional form of rule is still
maintained. The royal family makes the important decisions,
as well as meeting other obligations; the family itself is so
extensive that it registers as a tiny fraction of the state's
entire population. Again, the land presents a tremendous
spectacle to see; that plus the tremendous growth of infra-
structure during the last two decades has done much to
transform the Peninsula.
Saudi Arabia's development expenses from 1968 have
been $776b, or $65,000 per each of its 12 million citizens.
The current 5-year plan, from August 1989, calls for another
$2 00b expenditure. Results of those expenditures have
included 465,000 homes, 22,200 miles of roads, 1,437,000
telephone lines, and 8,631 elementary schools (more than one
school per day in the last 20 years), plus over 4,000 other
higher level schools. '^^
The Saudis continue to increase their agricultural
yield each year, and now are exporters of food. Yet they are
running into the same problem as the Nile and the Jordan
regions with water depletion, because continued irrigation for
wheat is expected to dry out the underground aquifers in only
2 years. At the moment, Saudi Arabia could import wheat less
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expensively than the amount that they pay to grow it, not to
mention the potential harm to their strategic supply of water.
Saudi ' s royal family is now going through the motions
of reform measures, with the idea of increasing participatory
government, although the King is very much opposed to trans-
planting western democracy onto the Saudi peninsula. The
House of as-Saud has been promising a majlis, or consultative
assembly, for 30 years, but has not yet provided it. After
the Gulf War, however, with the area's sensitivities geared to
new expectations, the old promise resurfaced and was confirmed
in March 1992. The announcement was not received well,
however, because current expectations now far exceed the
possibilities of a majlis. Rather, as propounded by the
Islamic scholar Khalid M. Khalid in 1985, the Saudis want a
Shura, or a genuine elected parliament. The new system would
be based on authority emanating from the people, separation
between authorities, a multiparty system, regular elections,
and a free press. ^^ The Saudis basically want to live in
Britain, and the King is having none of it.
Some of the Saudi clergy, who were initially opposed
to a majlis, now favor it because "they see it coming and they
want to influence the shape it takes ".'^ Other clergy
continue to espouse the traditional, and conservative, sharia.
Several elements of Saudi peoples are eager to try reform
measures; these elements include women (who performed essen-
tial tasks during the Gulf War, but are now back in seclusion
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and not liking it), professionals, other educated persons,
members of the royal family.
Currently the King is selected by the royal family
council, of which he needs to retain its support. All
decision making requires consensus within the family; because
the family is so extensive, the net effect is to pursue
policies that are consonant with the population at large. The
King is finding, however, that one result of all those schools
he has been constructing has been the development of a desire
by his people to participate more in the world around them,
Saudi Arabia regards Israel as the enemy, or at least
one of the primary negative factors in the region. This sense
of antagonism has different levels, including, obviously, the
military level. But there is also a cultural level, with
Israel seen as a Western outpost all too near the heart of
Islam. On the militair/ side, Israelis make fairly routine
(training?) overflights of Saudi territory, have made practice
bombing runs on Tabuk, and used Saudi airspace for the attack
on Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981. The AWACS sold to Saudi
Arabia by the U.S. apparently have no offensive capability
against Israel, and are not capable of detecting Israeli
incursions, although those AWACS are able to detect flights of
other (Arab) countries .'^^
Saudi Arabia also views Israel as a nemesis because
its presence, and support by the U.S., has forced neighboring
Arab countries to go to the former USSR for support. Saudi
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Arabia has been a good military customer of the U.S., having
been one of the best customers of U.S. arms; the Saudis have
routinely been the customers during some of the largest
military sales in U.S. history. Saudis have also made major
purchases from the French and the British.
The Saudi royal family continues to utilize opportuni-
ties to take diplomatic pot-shots at Jordan's King Hussein;
the antagonism between Hashemite and as-Saud has not disap-
peared. Recently, the Saudi royal family offered a sum to
renovate the 13-century-old Dome of the Rock shrine in
Jerusalem. King Hussein, after he learned of this, also
offered $8. 25m for this purpose, and the Islamic Supreme
Council of Jerusalem accepted King Hussein's money, turning
down the Saudis'. This episode represents a 66-yr-old Arab
rivalry over who is the rightful caretaker of the Islamic holy
places (Mecca and Medina also, as well as Jerusalem)
,
plus a
more recent rift betweeen Saud and Hashemite over the Gulf War
against Iraq. (The Hashemites were of the Hijaz before being
expelled by as-Saud) . When King Fahd announced he was
donating $9m for repair of the Dome, King Hussein immediately
sold his London home to acquire his own donation for the
project
.
One other facet of life on the peninsula which effects
political decision making is the large community of expatriate
workers. Several thousand foreigners from the U.S., Pakistan,
Philippines, Europe, China, India, and so on have migrated to
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the Middle East to earn petro-dollars and to help with the new
construction and introduction of technology that is occurring
throughout the region.
Jordan, as a poor and small country nestled between
Israel and Saudi Arabia, is not in a good location. If there
is fighting with Israel, Jordan is almost inevitably drawn
into it. The King is a proud and benevolent leader, usually
in the thick of things, and no doubt is keenly aware of the
cross channels that lie over the Middle East, as he is under
most of them. This time last year, in an effort to foster
moderation, growth, and undermine fundamentalism at the same
time, the King legalized political parties and "has given
birth to a new sort of legitimacy that depends on the democra-
n process " .^'
Jordan, Syria, and Israel have already experienced
fighting over the diminishing water available from the Jordan
River. Jordan's non-renewable aquifers are being tapped at a
loss of 15%, and its population growth is 3.8%, the highest in
the region. President Eisenhower in 1953 brokered an agree-
ment whereby Jordan was to receive 275 million cubic meters
annually from the Jordan River, but Israel and Syria take more
than their shares and hence make this agreement impossible.
Jordan was hoping to acquire more water from a joint project
with Syria, based on a dam to be constructed on the Yarmuk,
but Israel hasn't allowed it because Israel claims this would
deprive Israel of its fair share of the Yarmuk, Syria, mean-
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while, is planning 7 smaller dams on the Yarmuk for water that
it is losing to Turkey, due to Turkey's extra utilizaiton of
the Euphrates.'®
As one development stemming from the participation of
all parties at the Middle East Peace talks, Syria is now
allowing Syrian Jews to travel and migrate to Israel. Two
weeks ago, Israel repaired a Syrian merchant vessel that was
having difficulties, welcomed the Syrian crew into port, and
escorted the vessel safely back out of Israeli waters. Israel
has also recently allowed Syrian flights over Israeli airspace
to provision Syrian troops that are stuck on Syria's Mt
.
Hermon . '^
One of Syria's major distinctions prior to 1963 was a
proclivity for frequent governmental change. Originally
governed by the French, it was partitioned without regard to
the inhabitants, and consequently had little to encourage any
sense or growth of nationalism. The Ba'ath Party began in
Syria before Israel was declared a state, and it advocated
pan-Arabism and secularism. In 1963 there was a Ba'ath
sponsored coup, only to be supplanted by a neo-Ba'ath coup 3
years later. Minorities were very much a part of public life,
as the French hadn't wanted the Sunnis to participate so as to
keep the country divided. Druze and Alawis were predominant
players in the coup, secularism was encouraged, economics was
diverted to the public sector, and an elaborate Party struc-
ture and government apparatus took shape. Hafez Assad
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eventually emerged as the ruler, and the political climate
became one of basic legitimization of Assad by the Party,
although in actual practice power still flowed from the top
down. The Ba'ath wanted to modernize and penetrate and
secularize the countryside, which is not unlike what took
place in China, yet the Syrians have provided the electoral
process with almost complete disregard: only 5% voted in the
1977 elections.
Assad sees the well being of Syria as closely allied
to that of the Palestinians, those who left their homes in
Israel in 1948 and 1967 and are now prevented from returning
by the Israelis. He also is much involved with the fate of
Lebanon, which was a historical portion of Syria. As a
minority ruler over a decidedly passive-hostile population,
and not well liked either by Saudi Arabia or Jordan, Assad is
at the center of any number of controversies. His growing
isolation led or at least contributed to his turning to the
USSR as a client state in 1980. In the late 1970s, political
stability within Syria was very tenuous, with assassinations
almost on a daily basis. Later, when Islamic fundamentalists
in 1982 were conducting an intifadah of their own in the city
of Hama, Assad simply razed the city's center, and bulldozed
20,000 into mass graves; "all such rules of firm dealing are
now called Hama rules ".®°
Syria's economy has been slipping, and she also has an
increasing birth rate, which is, overall, not that much worse
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than is found elsewhere in the region. However, Syria has had
a large military expenditure as a client state to the Soviets,
and maintains a long-time rivalry with Iraq over leadership in
the Gulf and greater Middle East. A 1974 project that placed
a dam on the Euphrates, with Soviet help, has turned into a
lemon: many of the Soviet-made generators were faulty. Plus
much of Syrian soil contains gypsum, and when combined with
irrigation it turns to mush. Syria is now trying to ship its
water elsewhere, since it is unable to use it all. The dams
that Turkey is building will cut the flow of water into Syria
by half; Syria's own projects were badly designed, and
Turkey's projects will exacerbate the dilemma. Syria is now
trying to forge an agreement with Jordan about sharing the
Yarmuk (Israel must again be party to this agreement by
providing approval to the World Bank in order for funding to
commence for Syria's proposed dams on the Yarmuk) . Eventual-
ly, and not in the distant future, Syria's water and economic
problems will supersede its ideological orientations and
conflicts.®^
Aside from the political climate, Syria's general
economic and physical climate is not inimical to positive
growth, although her internally tumultuous national life and
continued bad luck with major projects have not conspired to
work in her favor. Soviet leaders apparently gave notice to
Syria, before the break-up of the USSR, that Syria should not
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expect to reach strategic parity with Israel; that is, at
least not with Russian assistance.
With Iraq, we have another case of poorly drawn
national boundaries, a history of controlled competition
internally to the country leading to Sunni and beyond that to
Tikrit leadership. The Ba'ath Party also is the underpinning
of the government, or nominal base. Basically there was a
situation with a fair amount of potential, where the ideals
espoused by the Party, if applied selectively and expeditious-
ly, could have done much for the country and reduced instead
of aggravated its inherent divisiveness . Despite the elabo-
rate governmental structure, rule continues to emanante from
the top down and major decisions are known only to a few. As
demonstrated during the Gulf War, even Saddam's Army did not
know what was in store, where he was taking them, what they
were or were not going to do or face.
The Shi'ite population of Iraq is susceptible to the
Islamic climate that prevails in Iran, and Baghdad has been
aware of that. Baghdad is also typically harsh on the
northern Kurdish population; their desire is for at least
autonomy and control of the revenues within their region;
Baghdad has not been willing to acquiesce.
The Gulf War evidenced the incredible mismanagement,
stupidity, and possibly some terrible cunning, of Saddam.
That alone is evidence of another structure in which the power
flows from the top down, and only through a few conduits. He
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obviously knows what the requirements of maintaining power are
in Iraq. Even if the U.S. had been successful in dislodging
him, the next ruler would most likely have come from the same
geographical faction, or possibly a Sunni from Baghdad. The
historical border feud between Iraq and Kuwait is not over,
but hopefully future give and take between them will be at a
less severe level. As for Umm Qasr, Shatt al-Arab and the
border with Iran, those will also be ongoing concerns, no
doubt for as long as Iraq wants to maintain her present
national configuration. Iran would equally no doubt enjoy
being able to redraw the map to include the marshes of
southern Iraq, along with the shi'ite shrines and peoples
found there.
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IV. CHINESE ACTIVITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Chapters IV and V are summaries, in either direction, of
interaction between China and the Middle East. The summaries'
brevity reflects a partial listing only: they do not reflect
the complete number or type of activities that have been
taking place in this arena. Information for these summaries
was collected from sources in the public domain. For each
item recorded, others were left out due to a paucity of
information, as well as those other items that I am certain
were either overlooked or missed.
For China, to speak of the Middle East is not to speak of
a readily defined area. China's direct contact with the
regions beyond her frontiers occurred at various intervals and
distances, from the Great Wall's terminus near the Gobi desert
to Genghis Khan's march to the Mediterranean. Moreover, the
Middle East as a term encompassing the eastern Mediterranean
is a European invention. Contemporary PRC diplomatic rele-
gations of this area, for reasons incorporating internal
political reshuffling as well as increased economies of
international perception, have alternately placed it under the
departmental venues of African, or North African and Middle
Eastern, or Asian, or simply Middle Eastern categories.
In addition to this evolving sense of administrative
placement, or rubric, of the Middle East, China has also
experienced a revised strategic sense of the Middle East.
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This revision is to some degree a matter of semantics, and
primarily reflects the two main periods of leadership in China
(Mao and Deng) . But even more than chronological periods, the
evolving sense reflects the ideological side (Mao) and the
pragmatic side (Deng) ; within the realm of foreign policy, the
respective primacy of these two "sides" do not necessarily
represent the corresponding primacy of Mao or Deng in Beijing.
The Middle East had long been regarded as an important
area relative to China. Consensus among the CCP in Beijing
was that control of this region by a hostile power would lay
bare the approaches to China. ®^ A combination of observation
of the progress of World War II, early understanding of
Marxism, and a decidedly Chinese streak of individualism led
to China's postulation of the Middle East as a heart of the
Intermediate Zone (also as part of the Third World) . The
Three Worlds theory was not officially propounded until 1974,
but its development hung over Beijing in the years prior.
Basically, Beijing claimed that the USSR and U.S. were in
a direct struggle for world domination, with control of the
Middle East therefore representing a necessary aspect of
gaining control over the intermediate zone. This heart of the
intermediate zone, or at least one of its hearts, was in turn
necessary to effect control over China.
From World War II, when China was concerned that the
Middle East not fall into Axis hands, to subsequent CCP
development of the Three Worlds theory where the Middle East
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became the locus of struggle between U.S. and USSR (a Chinese
variant of the bipolar world theory) , the Middle East retained
a central position of importance in Chinese political think-
ing. Whether from the standpoint of hot struggle against the
Germans, or cold struggle against the U.S. and former USSR,
China was concerned to keep the Middle East free of outside
big-power influence. Even now, with the Middle East seen more
as a center of economics, and Third World rhetoric passe, it
remains crucial not only to Middle East integrity but to the
perceived well being of China in a stable world that the
Middle East remain free of hegemonic influences.
From this vantagepoint , China's first main contact with
the states in that area occurred at Bandung in 1955. The
diplomatic forum afforded by that gathering, and China's
presentation of her Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,
reaped large diplomatic and practical rewards with much direct
interaction starting between them almost immediately after the
Conference. These Five Principles reflect largely the
pragmatic side of CCP thinking, with the Three Worlds theory-
overlapping both ideology and pragmatism, and Lin Biao's 1965
"Long Live the Victory of People's War" article representing
the radical, or ideological, side.
Beginning in 1955, then, China normalized relations with
four Middle Eastern states and began an ever increasing series
of trade and economic agreements. China also had another side
to her activity in the Middle East and elsewhere. With the
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memory of the CCP victory still fresh in their minds, the CCP
leadership was quick to offer diplomatic encouragement (moral
support) and whatever materiel assistance could be found for
revolutionary efforts in wars of national liberation found
around the globe. It is important to note here, however, that
despite this willingness on the part of China to help, however
she might, with People's Wars, this was not a blanket policy.
China's dictum of self-reliance often meant that the home team
might have to fend for themselves. China also would not
support liberation struggles against governments, right or
left, that were themselves free of colonial domination.
In the Middle East, China's contact with armed struggle
occurred with the PLO, and the PFLO/PFLOAG. Arafat first
traveled to China in 1964, and assistance for the PLO included
weapons, training, and probably advice. By 1971 China
discontinued its assistance to PFLOAG, and in 1972 at the UN
China announced its disapproval of PLO terrorism. China had
been engaged with other economic initiatives in the Middle
East prior to 1971, but at this point in time China had gained
entrance to the UN, normalized relations with the U.S., and
Deng was rejoining the CCP. China's interest in the Middle
East had retained the flavor of encouraging independence from
hegemony, but the People's War sidearm was being muscled out
by the pragmatic missile and "neutral" arms sales to any
national players in the Middle East. China's aims remained
constant, her approach had adjusted.
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As is evident from the above paragraphs, placement of
topics within these next few pages will be somewhat arbitrary;
many could be listed under two or more headings. As an
example: arms sales could be listed under security, or
economic, or diplomatic headings, and found under China (as
the seller) or the Middle East (as the buyer)
.
A. ECONOMIC
Economic ties between the Middle East and China have been
developing for the last several decades. In 1955 a Sino-
Egyptian trade agreement was concluded, and Egypt has since
been one of the primary trading partners of China.
China's economic links with Kuwait go back to 1965 when
the first cooperation protocol between them was signed. Other
arab states with which China now has substantial trade
agreements and/or other joint projects include Syria, the
U.A.E., Jordan, Iraq (before the Gulf War), Pakistan, and
elsewhere through North Africa.
From 1956 to 1975, China sponsored the following numbers
of official delegations to the Middle East: 19 in 1956, 3 in
1957, 6 in 1958, 3 in 1959, 4 in 1960, 5 in 1961, 11 in 1962,
5 in 1963, 13 in 1964, 20 in 1965, 19 in 1966, 3 in 1967, 1 in
1968, in 1969, 6 in 1970, 2 in 1971, 22 in 1972, 13 in 1973,
15 in 1974, 8 in 1975. These delegations included members
whose interest was economic as well as military. Other parts
of the Middle East (e.g.: Morrocco, Algeria, Tunis, etc.), had
visiting delegations from China as well.
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It should be remembered that, aside from contact with
other countries in the Socialist sphere, the first major
contact China had with the world at large was at and after
Bandung (i.e.: the Middle East). It is also very intriguing
to note that after Tienanmen, when China was anxious to place
her trade patterns and volume back into a higher gear, the
Middle East was China's first destination. Yang Shangkun and
a large delegation visited Kuwait in December 1989, in search
of economic trade and funding to take the place of Western
trade that had been cut due to Tiananmen. He arrived in
Kuwait after having visited Egypt and the U.A.E., and planned
to continue on to visit Oman. Abu Dhabi guaranteed that trade
and economic cooperation would increase between the U.A.E. and
China. The U.A.E. also expressed its thanks to Yang that
China had not yet "set up ties with Israel".®^
China has had upwards of 10,000 workers in Kuwait, and
others elsewhere throughout the region (Iraq, Oman, Saudi
Arabia)
. The currency remittances they provide back to the
PRC are substantial.
B . SECURITY
Arms sales by China are a strong source for currency, and
a well known aspect of Middle Eastern events. These sales not
only help China to meet the objectives it has established for
itself, but also provide foreign currency reserves. Sales are
made either directly from China to the Middle East country, or
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involve third parties (North Korea) . In addition to conven-
tional weapons sales, China has also been providing nuclear
technology to the region (Algeria, Pakistan) . A few typical
examples of these sales are as follows:
Throughout the bulk of the Iran-Iraq conflict, China
quietly sold materiel to both Iran and Iraq, all the while
maintaining a formal and strict neutrality. These goods were
passed through other intermediaries.
After Afghanistan was invaded by the USSR, China joined
Saudi Arabia and the U.S. in getting arms to Afghanistan, with
the joint effort coordinated through Pakistan.
In March 1991, Syria purchased Scud-C missiles from North
Korea, with Saudi financing. In November 1991, the U.S.
elicited a promise from Beijing that China would not export
its M-9 missiles to Syria; a week later, China purportedly
agreed to help Syria construct its own missiles. On 10
February 1992, PRC missile technologists visited Syrian
industrial plants near Hama and Aleppo. On 22 February 1992,
Bush reinstated a previous trade agreement between the U.S.
and China regarding satellite parts and high-speed comput-
ers.^^
Qin Jiwei (China's Defense Minister) visited Pakistan and
Bangladesh, in February 1990, to boost military cooperation.
Li Peng had already visited these countries a few months




China had sold calutrons to Iran, and was helping Iran to
construct a small reactor in 1990. Three years ago, China
started to help Algeria construct their own reactor. The
Pakistanis machined 6 nuclear warheads last July with Chinese
sales and technical assistance.®^
Conventional wisdom has posited that Israel and China
began a military liaison, a few years ago, and the appearance
was given then of future increased activity between them as a
very likely probability. They have indeed normalized rela-
tions. Israel is a veritable gold mine for R&D, battlefield
lessons learned (with some of the most sophisticated equipment
available anywhere) , and a source for comparisons between
Western (U.S., European, Israeli), Eastern (Soviet), and Other
(Arabic, desert, asian) , equipment and tactics. There are
other accounts as well of Israeli technology sales, both
recent and long-standing, to China (Patriot missile?), armor
gun sights, improved gun fire control, avionics, and others.
Israel has a burgeoning high tech industryand would like to
find a backer to help them fund it; INTEL'S 3 86 computer chip
was developed in Israel. Israel also has an interest in
indigenous aviation design. Other Israeli skills are more
prosaic in nature, and will not be mentioned here, but are of
no less interest to China. Israel is already providing China
with expertise regarding water management and irrigation,
animal husbandry, military hardware for tanks, and possibly
other items.
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Israel is not unlike a laboratory, where various other
nations may vicariously learn valuable skilly and insights
into human and technical matters, ranging completely across
the spectrum from military items to industry and agriculture,
or even economics and the effectiveness of governmental
policy. China knows this and would no doubt like to gain as
much access to this laboratory as possible.
C . DIPLOMATIC
Aside from tentative feelers with Pakistan and Egypt, also
some unrequited feelers from Israel, China's first real
diplomatic activity and success with the Middle East came with
its participation in the Bandung Conference. At that confer-
ence Zhou Enlai met with Nasser, Palestine leader Shukairy,
and diplomats from Syria and Lebanon. Within a year, China
had normalized relations with Egypt, Syria and Yemen.
Relations had already been normalized with Afghanistan just
prior to Bandung.
As part of the Korean War experience, China requested both
Egypt and Pakistan as members of a 7-nation commission to
consider the Far East situation and make recommendations.
From 1953-1957, China emphasized peaceful coexistence
between communist and non-communist countries. That emphasis
was soon to pass, however, as China entered the turbulent
years of the GLF and GPCR.
Very instructive to note is the enlightening fact that,
during the GPCR when all diplomats were recalled to China for
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consultation, the Chinese ambassador to Egypt stayed in Egypt;
he was the only PRC diplomat not to leave his post.
As of 1988, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Bahrain still had not
normalized relations with the PRC. One of mainland China's
primary intents since its inception has been to isolate Taiwan
diplomatically. This was done to facilitate PRC entrance into
the UN, also to encourage Taiwan to think about eventual
reunification with the Mainland under Beijing's suzerainty.
The People's Republic has in fact been successful in acquiring
full relations with all Middle Eastern countries, although
since Tienanmen there has been a resurgence of interest
through the region in Taiwan,
PRC and Israel have held regular discussions at the
Foreign Ministry level each year in New York since 1987 when
the UN General Assembly convenes. These were a precursor to
normalization, and China initially claimed, of course, that
they were solely for multilateral discussion of regional
topics of interest to both and not bilateral topics.®^
After Tienanmen, China's first international forays to
repair diplomatic damage (as well as to reconstruct trade)
,
were into the Middle East, to try to repair her image and to
generate some external economic activity. Yang Shangkun, with
a large delegation, visited Egypt, Kuwait, U.A.E. and Oman to
discuss bilateral concerns, economic interaction and PRC
assistance via the UNSC in resolving the Iran-Iraq talks. ®^
Only a few months after Tiananmen, Qian Qichen made multiple
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stops throughout the region by calling on Jordan, Syria,
Egypt, Unisia and Iran. Li Peng also visited the Middle East
in the winter of 1989, stopping at Pakistan. After Yang
Shangkun's junket was completed, Qin Jiwei returned to the
region (Pakistan and Bangladesh) , to improve military competi-
tion.
It has been suggested that China's foreign policy in the
Arab world reflects China's general foreign policy as a whole.
I submit that this statement is more appropriate when re-
versed: that China's general foreign policy reflects China's
foreign policy in the Arab world. ^®
Through a calculated program of economics and diplomacy,
Beijing succeeded in isolating Taiwan internationally. This
helped the PRC to gain its seat in the UN and access to the
various other diplomatic and economic doors around the world.
All Middle Eastern states now recognize PRC vice Taiwan.
Meanwhile, Taiwan had provided significant assistance to Saudi
Arabia (building projects and personnel training), as well as
to other Middle Eastern states.
The recent emergence of independent central Asian Islamic
states is of considerable concern to China. The PRC '
s
displeasure with Moscow in losing its grip on the USSR is not
just because China is now the last socialist nation, but also
because central asia is now potentially more volatile than
ever before. Beijing's resettlement of millions of Han
Chinese into Xinjiang has inserted a calming (i.e.: bureau-
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cratic) influence into those broad provincial areas, but as of
late 1991 the Muslims maintained their majority and no doubt
have a healthy birth rate.
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V. MIDDLE EAST ACTIVITIES IN CHINA
A. ISRAEL
Coininents regarding Israel's activity in China mirror those
offered in the previous chapter. There is much conjecture,
but little black and white evidence in the public domain. It
is thought, with a high degree of likelihood, that Israel has
provided China with up to $3b worth of arms, plus expertise
and sales in the areas of animal husbandry, drip irrigation,
weapons upgrades for tanks and avionics.
Israel has long been suspected of illegally transferring
U.S. arms to China (also Thailand, South Africa, Venezuela,
Ethiopia, and others) . Most recently, this suspicion concerns
Israeli sales of Sidewinders and Patriot missiles to China.
PRC has reverse engineered the Sidewinder and sold it to Iraq.
Moshe Arens has said: "No one should find it unusual that
Israel will, from time to time, sell items to other countries,
including China ".®^
Whereas Israel was the first Middle East state to recog-
nize the PRC in 1950, full diplomatic relations between the
two were waylaid first by the Korean War and then by Bandung,
when China saw more political capital to be gained by ap-
proaching the Arab states rather than Israel.
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B. OTHER MIDDLE EAST STATES
Activities of the other Middle East states in China are
also mirrored, largely, by comments in the preceding and
following chapters. A few additional comments follow.
China is very eager to have Middle Eastern capital applied
to its provinces, and accordingly has courted the Gulf States
and others in the Middle East to encourage financial activity.
Kuwait has provided a number of loans to China, with one of
these mentioned here:
Between 1982 and 1984 Kuwait loaned China $150m for four
projects, including the Xiamen Airport. ^° China, previously,
had been Kuwait's primary initial contractor, before the Gulf
War, for construction of almost all the new Kuwaiti homes,
power stations, refineries, and hospitals.
The entire period from Bandung (and even before)
through to the present is marked by increasing trade between
the Middle East and China. This is especially true in the
early-to-mid 1980s, when a multitude of trade agreements,
projects, and joint financial institutions were started.
A symposium in 1986, held in Yinchuan (Ningxia) , was
intended to attract Arab investment, begin exploitation of
local natural resources, initiate Chinese technology transfer
to the Middle East, and of course to enhance trade. A similar
symposium was held in 1984 in Urumqi ; that area, by 1986, had
attracted up to $100m in foreign investment, plus major trade
contracts with Syria, UAE and Kuwait."
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In November 1991, when China was still trying to
regain its international prestige and activity after the
Tienanmen incident, the Emir of Kuwait was visiting Beijing,
ostensibly for trade discussions, at the same time as U.S.
Secretary of State Baker. Baker's visit was the PRC ' s biggest
diplomatic coup since Tienanmen, but the People's Daily gave
the following coverage to those two events: the Emir of Kuwait
received a large story, which dwarfed a smaller front-page
story about Baker's visit to Beijing. ^^
There is no reason why the advantages sought by Israel
in China can not also be sought by the other Middle Eastern
states. Pakistan is an immediate case in point, where a
healthy pollination of Chinese technology is enhancing that




There is a spirit akin to the "Wild West" now in China and
also in the Middle East, related both to their own spirit and
to the unfolding of the New Order. It is a spirit where the
inhabitants of both regions sense new horizons and are busy
with participating in the several events leading to those
horizons. It is this spirit, found here and there elsewhere
in the world as well, which will find its natural expression
primarily between these two regions toward each other; that,
plus their geographical and historical proximities, the
precedents of the Silk Road, their fluid characters, and their
emerging needs, will encourage interaction between them. Both
regions will have other activities as well, and those other
activities may well overshadow (in volume) the activity
between China and the Middle East. Chances are much better
than fair that China will (eventually) be eveirywhere, or
wherever she pleases: this activity will be economic in
private or public sectors, it might also be diplomatic, or
possibly even military; as the U.S. is "everywhere", so also
might China be "everywhere" (and Japan, and Europe) . In that
sense, positing Chinese-Middle East activity is to posit
nothing, precisely because the PRC will have tentacles almost
everywhere. But despite such ubiquitous activity, the
connections between China and the Middle East will be special,
closer than others, for all the reasons mentioned above.
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After noting that China's government is more precisely a
government of persons rather than institutions, we might ask
if "policies" can be resident within this personalized
structure. The fairly detailed presentation of China's
hierarchy was provided in chapter three so as to better be
able to grasp the intricacies of public and private decision
making by ruling members of the CCP. While the structure of
China's government is vested in its personalities with an
institutional framework growing around them, and we are led to
suspect that the PRC ' s governing practice is more fluid than
ours, we can still observe PRC activities that remain constant
over a period of years, despite personnel turnovers and other
vicissitudes. As constancy of effort is taken to represent
policy, therefore we can expect to find Chinese policies, even
though they might be politically resident in an unfamiliar
manner
.
Considerable time was taken earlier to review the politi-
cal aspects of these regions, particularly China. This was
done to tir^ and convey the senses of energy and change
prevalent within them, as well as to suggest some of their
needs. It is necessary to have a flavor of the change or
evolution coursing through the polities of the Middle East and
also through China to posit the conclusions of this thesis.
It is necessary to know that China will always by reforming,
regardless of who is in power, and also to recognize the
importance China places on the Middle East. It is necessary
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to know that the Middle East is experiencing unprecedented
growth of infrastructure and demographics, that polities there
have yet to establish the degree to which they will become
institutionalized, that Islam is in a process of readjustment
or rethinking. It is necessary to sense the fluid nature of
peoples and (historical) geographical proximity of China and
the Middle East. Without these flavors, or senses, it is not
enough simply to posit or list trade and delegation exchanges
between these two (or any other) regions, and then be able to
say that they will continue. The Silk Road is being reborn,
and in a big way.
A. DOES CHINA HAVE OR EXERCISE A "MIDDLE EAST POLICY?"
The first item that must be addressed here is a tribute to
Zhou Enlai who, quite likely, was the cotter pin who held
China's foreign policy together. Throughout domestic calm or
upheaval, much of the continuity that China experienced with
foriegn policy matters was probably attributable to Zhou's
activities as Premier, confidant, and mediator. He also was
very much a realist - he had to be - so as to know how and
where and when to direct his attentions.
To say that the PRC has goals or wants in the Middle
Eastern region need not imply that China has an active intent
to somehow physically penetrate that region. Diplomatic
maneuvering from within the PRC, UN, or other organizations,
as well as the existence of economic trade, occasional
assistance packages, etc., may all count as activities and as
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policy directives and all may count decidedly toward this or
that outcome in the Middle East region. So to say that China
has activities or goals elsewhere need not be demonstrated by
anything more than certain perceptions in Beijing and, for
example, perhaps the existence of certain practices within the
SEZs or western provinces, where economic interaction is
likely or desired to occur.
China's habit of self -portrayal as a Third World country
is, at best, of dubious veracity. China has persisted with
this portrayal from the time of Bandung, as a calling card for
its never ending search for economic and diplomatic partners.
Although China has a very poor PCGNP, and will likely retain
a relatively poor PCGNP in the forseeable future, her GNP is
not the stuff of a developing country. The section on
Superpowers explains this more fully. Secondly, in the light
of present day geopolitics, it is highly unlikely that there
are any Third World countries. The Third World refers to a
group of states that are non-alligned (relative to the U.S.
and former USSR) and developing, probably also with a history
of having been victimized, more or less, during the age of
colonialism. With the Cold War over, however, and the
subsequent categories of state types revised, there are
several more variables that go into classifying a state aside
from criteria of polarity. There are developing, and poor,
and debt-ridden states; the Third World state of just a few
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years ago is no longer, because there is no First or Second
World state.
Any policy that China might adopt can be expected to be
beneficial for herself, at least from China's point of view,
and China's premier goal, at the moment, is to modernize. We
can also expect, therefore, that policies related to the
Middle East will somehow be beneficial for China's moderniza-
tion. For modernization to occur, China prefers and requires
a stable international environment, hence her policies might
also be expected to enhance international stability from the
understanding China has as to what stability actually con-
notes. We need to remember that China's understanding of
stability may not necessarily be similar to our own under-
standing of that concept
.
China also believes that since the demise of the USSR, the
world has become a potentially turbulent place. Li Peng in
October 1990 mentioned that things are "more dangerous now
that the Cold War is over and the New Order is not yet
established".^^ Taking note of China's current policy for
the Middle East (and Central Asia) , will say a lot about
China's view of that region as well as the current state of
world affairs.
If, however, instead of considering all the information
available to us and we focused on only one or two specific
issues, it is not difficult to see that in place of long term
or regional policy we might find directives of a more tran-
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sient nature. In this way it is not too difficult to appreci-
ate how a conclusion (focusing only on, e.g., arms sales),
might suggest that activity amongst China and portions of the
Middle East is sporadic at best and/or opportunistic at worst.
Discussion of the topics in this section, and throughout
this chapter, will generally follow the headings provided,
although some topics may be found under more than one heading
(e.g. : arms sales could be discussed under economic, security,
and diplomatic sub-headings).
1 . Economic
China's long term interest in the Middle East has not
been unrelated to that region's newly acquired wealth. The
Middle East, in a manner of speaking, has provided China with
the best of all possible external worlds: in addition to
diplomatic and security benefits, activity with the Middle
East region can also generate needed foreign exchange and, in
so doing, demonstrate that the PRC is a reliable neighbor. As
of 1985, China's economic interests in the Middle East
included these generic facets: to sell as many PRC products as
possible, to export surplus labor to the region, and to
attract investment for projects inside China.
Despite the checkered history of China's involvement
in the region, these facets or principles seem to hold
throughout . One example that stands out centers around
China's presence in the Yemen during the 1960s and early
1970s. Chinese workers were present in the region simulta-
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neously with others from the USSR. Both of them were working
on road construction, amidst local hostilities. Despite the
situation, the Chinese were steadfast in their pursuit, and
left some of their number behind in roadside graves, because
they were there to construct a road and not to dodge bullets
or wait until the storm passed. By contrast, the Soviets
worked on the road as they could, preferring to take everyone
home with them. Other observations, based on comparisons
between PRC and (former) Soviet workers, indicate that the
Chinese do what they indicated they would do, do it well
enough, and then go home.^^ There is no quid pro quo extrac-
tion. That alone makes Chinese assistance very attractive,
when compared to U.S. or former USSR expectations.
Another aspect of Chinese labor characteristics is
uhat, quite regularly, a group of workers will only stay in
one location, or on one job, for about 6 months, then go home,
to be followed by another group of workers. In this fashion
more workers are taught skills, and more receive experiences
than otherwise would have occurred. It is as if the Middle
East were a big OJT laboratory. In 1988 there were about
10,000 Chinese expatriate workers in Kuwait, with similar
numbers elsewhere in the Middle East.
Insofar as China portrays itself as an "Islamic
state", depending on who the audience is, there are no doubt
officials in Beijing who would like nothing better than for
Muslims in the Gulf region and in Xinjiang and Ningxia to
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jointly develop thriving trade, industry, and perhaps even
research. By doing all of this, presumably there would be
less and less room for complaint by China's minorities about
whatever, so long as they consent to remain within greater
China, thus solidifying Beijing's rule over her vast frontier
and allaying any lingering concerns about defense and security
matters. Trade and activity of this sort could also be
developed between China's frontier provinces and the new
central Asian republics; activity in that region and of that
type is a natural.
Now, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there
is opportunity as well as danger for China with the recent
appearance of independent Muslim central asian states. The
opportunity is for the Chinese Islamic population, drawing on
a stronger center tradition and access to national resources,
to set up shop with their neighbors and turn the area into a
big bazaar. If trade between the two could be coordinated,
with Xinjiang's goods regularly reaching Shanghai and Central
Asian goods already linked to Europe, a thriving "steppe
economy" could be harnessed. The danger, of course, is in the
potential national separatist feelings that could spread
(further) into Xinjiang and Tibet. Additional ready-made
trade routes would also lead into Pakistan and Afghanistan.
That entire area is set to move, and Beijing would love to see
it happen, provided - of course - that separatist passions
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could be held in check, or overridden by the attendant
prosperity engendered by a continental bazaar.
China now has the political trust (or at least the
growing neutral recognition), of most Middle East countries.
This is something that China wants to nurture, and utilize as
much as possible for her benefit in the process of securing
the above. ^^
2 . Security-
It was mentioned earlier that China would prefer to
have a stable international environment within which to pursue
her modernization, so as not to be upset by external wars or
other turbulence. The stable environment would allow China to
focus her energies on putting her own house in order and get
up to speed. What is not clear from this general perception
is what China actually regards as stable.
Using the Iran-Iraq conflict as an example, with
China's professed neutrality throughout that war, and also
with China's sale of arms to both sides through intermediar-
ies, it would seem then that stability, for China, does not
require the absence of all conflict. For China, the Iran-Iraq
conflict had the effect of keeping the USSR and U.S. off
balance, at least in the Gulf and/or Middle East region, if
not world-wide. Insofar as individual actors and self
sufficiency are prized national characteristics, and insofar
as hegemony from any one source is seen as threatening, it
appears then that this lengthy conflict between Iran and Iraq
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contributed to stability (for China) through requiring the
Soviets and U.S. to keep one eye over their shoulder, and
hence unable to focus entirely on the Middle East as a whole,
or on any other region. Keeping the superpowers looking out
of one eye, instead of two, is thus what China regards as
stable
.
China is large enough that she does not seriously have
to worry about being attacked by her neighbors. China also
has a credible, even if nascent, nuclear deterrent with which
to ward off larger and farther away neighbors. Indeed, by
having kept the (other) powers-that-be off balance (with the
Iran-Iraq war) , China herself was more balanced; stability,
for China, might very well mean the presence of low grade
conflict in various places around the globe, as long as that
conflict is not in China. This perception of stability will
hold until China is up to speed, or until there is no more
danger from other superpowers acquiring hegemonistic sway, or
until all the other developing nations are strong enough to
withstand the need to accept someone else's (read the U.S.')
influence. Hence China, in her view, was able to maintain her
neutrality while selling arms to both sides, or perhaps
precisely because China was selling to both sides.
For this off-balance friction to occur and keep the
great powers at least somewhat preoccupied, it is not neces-
sary to generate actual hostilities. It is enough simply to
generate the possibilities of potential conflict to keep the
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Iother powers off balance. Hence China's missile sales to
Middle East countries. With Syria and Saudi Arabia and Iraq
and Iran all able to target others among themselves, including
Israel, the political equations become more complex and make
it harder for interested nations outside the region (the U.S.)
to maintain constant policies, or even dispassionate overviews
of the circumstances.
Other reasons that China has for developing good
relations with the Middle East include not only her general
intent to foster international security and stability (i.e.:
peace on a global scale, within which the Middle East obvious-
ly has a place) , but also a more direct interest in securing
immediate tactical gains advantageous to China's local,
regional and ultimately global intentions. Pakistan figures
prominently in such considerations as exemplified by the not
inconsiderable efforts made by the PRC to keep on good
relations with the Pakistanis. Such efforts help to provide
a counterweight for China against both South Asia (India) , and
Russia, as well as aiding to further secure portions of the
PRC border, assist with establishing relations with other
Islamic states, provide more avenues of contact with the rest
of the Middle East (and other states: N.B. Kissinger's initial
contact with the PRC via Pakistan) , and to possibly provide
future naval facilities accessible to China within the Indian
Ocean (N.B. PRC assistance with the construction of port
and/or base facilities at Karachi)
.
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The subject of security from China's vantage point
must also include Beijing's concern regarding potential
Islamic unrest in Xinjiang and other outlying areas. This
concern has been heightened by the establishment of the
Central Asian Republics. Unrest simmers in those areas. The
government has tried to lessen it by relocation of Han to the
area, and by relaxing restrictions on some religious activi-
ties. Nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism still fester,
however. Beijing would very much like to see economic
development of the area, either through contacts with neigh-
boring Central Asian Republics or with Arabs or Persians from
the Gulf area (with their checkbooks), and growing skills.
a. Technology and Lessons Learned (Israel)
China routinely utilizes a unique strength via its
penchant and ability to reverse engineer materials and
gadgets, small and large. By this approach, China is able to
purchase a few items, remake them into items they want or
need, and then make others on a production basis. This
process is routinely followed with military hardware and
whatever else.
It should therefore come as no surprise that China
seeks to purchase quantities of this and that, not only for
purposes of employing the new item, but for dismantling it and
incorporating its principles into something that is Made-in-
China. Undoubtedly one of China's goals and expectations for
being in the Middle East, whether via Israel or one of the
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Islamic states (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran), is to gain access
to the multitude of technology that is finding its way into
the area, whether it's from the U.S., former USSR, Europe, or
indigenous to the region. Recent disclosures of Patriot
Missile technology falling into the lap of China is a case in
point. This thesis makes no claim as to whether this particu-
lar incident was an Israeli or Saudi indiscretion, whether it
occurred via paper transfer, part transfer, or on-site
inspection, or even if in fact it occurred at all. The point
is that this sort of occurrence is one of the expectations and
goals, de facto if not de jure, that China most definitely has
with regard to the Middle East.
No other region in the world has such a direct and
steady convergence of materiel and interests flowing into it,
whether these external sources are North American, European,
Russian, South African, or now East Asian. Israel was
highlighted in the sub-heading to this section because she has
been the major recipient of largesse, bought or donated, in
the Middle East. The U.S. intelligence community has long
suspected the illegal turn-over of U.S. hardware by Israel to
third parties.
b. Offsetting Other Non-Middle Eastern Powers
It is in China's interest for the Middle East to
be its own keeper, rather than to have another power dominant
in the area. A preponderant U.S. or former USSR in the Middle
East would only serve to weaken China's southwest asian flank.
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China would rather deal with the indigenous peoples of the
Middle East rather than with other powers speaking through or
over or for them.
As indicated by the discussion on stability, China
recognizes and prefers the virtues of self-sufficiency,
especially when those traits contribute to China's increased
flexibility. China's initial concern is domestic which leads,
in turn, to desires for exterior stability. International
stability, on the whole, does not preclude local brush fires,
especially if those fires further dilute hegemonic influence
of any one power in that region.
China would rather see Israel as completely
independent, not beholden to anyone else, if in fact this
would add to the innocuousness of the region. But if the
affect were reversed, and the states (Israel and/or the other
Middle Eastern countries) , became overly aggressive or
independent to the point of being meddlesome, then China may
also find it advantageous to keep closer tabs on her Middle
Eastern neighbors. While PRC appears to desire an indigenous
Middle East, it could be, eventually, that the clamor of
voices from that region will soften PRC ' s insistence on
complete " indigenization" of the Middle East. China may find
herself sucked down the same diplomatic hole as everyone else.
The other Middle Eastern states likewise find themselves more
beholden to outside powers than they would prefer.
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China's presence in the region obviously dilutes
the presence of other external powers, not only the U.S. and
former USSR, but also Europe, Taiwan, South Africa, and etc..
As mentioned above, the diluting of other voices within the
Middle East, aside from the indigenous ones already there,
would be to China's liking. Two immediate and related effects
of such a dilution: remove a potential threat from China's
flank and concomitantly make it easier for China to maneuver
in that region. Maneuverings may be economic, diplomatic,
even military.
China precedes to act primarily via bilateral
relations, eschewing alliances or treaties or promises
(outside the realm of institutions such as the UN) . But
despite this singular procedural quality, I maintain that
China seeks to acquire regional influence (or even interna-
tional influence) , via these bilateral relations and/or
activities. By affecting a region through her presence, or
arms sales, or other economic initiatives, she inserts a
ripple effect into the equations considered by other states as
they compute current international realities.
Some view China's interests in the Middle East as
not, necessarily, for the benefit of the Middle East:
"China's policy toward the Third World is
not formulated in a vacuum. It has long been
heavily influenced by broader Chinese policy
concerns. Thus, even though Chinese spokesmen
repeatedly have maintained that support for
Third World concerns remains at the center of
Chinese foreign policy, careful examination of
the record over the past decade shows that
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such concerns at best have a secondary role to
play in determining China's 1980s approach to
foreign affairs. The examination shows that
China's foreign policy is based primarily on
its perceived need for stability, security and
development, a policy that depends chiefly on
China's relations with the United States and
the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, China does
retain a strong interest in maintaining an
image of close identification with the devel-
oping countries and has demonstrated a tenden-
cy to do so whenever it will support, or at
least not seriously jeopardize, its primary
needs of stability, security and development."
The primary concerns of these leaders have
not focused on support for the Third World;
they have focused on efforts to guarantee
Chinese national security, maintain internal
order, and pursue economic development."^^
"The interrelationship of 'independent
foreign policy' concepts demonstrates the
typical way China continues to use its stance
toward the Third World to define the pattern
of its relationship to the two superpowers and
as a means of maintaining its distance from
them. Chinese explanations of their policy
are, of course, idealized if not self-serving.
While the independent foreign policy is no
doubt conceived as a long-range strategy, it
is also subject to change based on changing
relationships with the superpowers and on
international developments in general. Any
particular Chinese policy approach represents
a conceptualized reaction to very real events
and to perceptions of Chinese self-inter-
est.""
"China's efforts to position itself as a
Third World leader can be interpreted in light
of the effort to find supporters in (its)
quest for independence from Superpower control
- hence the current strong emphasis on Third
World identity."
Experience of foreign encroachment and
past Chinese humiliation combine with a tradi-
tional preference for self-reliance and a
cultural concept of Chinese superiority to
prevent China from easily trusting other
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states or dealing with them on an equal ba-
sis" .
China is, in fact, still fighting its way
out of centuries of isolation, still deciding
how it can maintain its security and "Chinese-
ness" while implementing an apparently neces-
sary integration into the international commu-
nity. Despite the notions of some outsiders
to the contrary, China's foreign policy con-
tinues to be propelled by national interests
rather than ideology. Identification with the
Third World contributes toward achievement of
those basic Chinese goals that do not change
under successive leaderships: achievement of
national security and international recogni-
tion of China's rightful position of promi-
nence and authority"
.
Beijing is conscious of its national self-
interests and is unlikely to compromise them
for the sake of hallowed Third World princi-
ples. Instead, China's representatives have
adopted a conservative modus operandi which
balances criticisms of the First and Second
Worlds with Beijing's own search for develop-
ment assistance and the protection of interna-
tional conventions".
The future of China's relationship with
the Third World remains uncertain, although
China's self -identification with that group
will almost certainly continue well into the
21st century. Because it is difficult to
define the Third World and because Chinese
policy is so clearly driven, as it must be, by
China's own national concerns, China's Third
World relations will undoubtedly depend more
and more on individual relations with Third
World states. ...China's need to deal
separately with Third World nations, to come
out from the refuge of an umbrella Third World
policy, will become increasingly clear as the
points of conflict between China and Third
World countries develop unevenly - as they are
bound to do. "^^
That China pursues her own agenda while purporting
to assist others is not, nor should it be, surprising. What
this points out is the necessity for us to be familiar with
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what China's concerns actually happen to be, the time table
that China expects them to occur by, and domestic variables
that color China's own decision making.
Harding suggests that the PRC will work through
bilateral channels, primarily or only, in the course of her
diplomatic and/or international activities, rather than seek
regional or Third World leadership roles (as Lillian Craig
Harris suggests ).^^ I submit that China will actively seek
de facto regional roles or influence through selective
bilateral relationships, thereby effectively offsetting
hegemonic influences of other great powers (and any other
would-be usurper of regional influence, be it Russian or
European or Japanese or South Asian or whatever) . This type
of interest from the PRC will be most certainly directed
toward the Middle East; the Middle East has long been recog-
nized by China's leadership as playing a critical role in
international stability and even in the safety of China
itself .^°°
An initial relative scarcity of resources avail-
able for external distribution or otherwise to be allocated
via international programs of aid or assistance kept China
from being able to compete with other nations (especially the
USSR), through economic largesse. The PRC also experienced a
unique series of domestic constraints and internal growing
pains (the GLF and GPCR) that hampered efforts to implement
consistent foreign policy applications.
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By the time China began a more active Middle East
role in the middle 1950s, her emphasis, like that of the
Soviets, had shifted to a predominantly Arab approach. Israel
was relegated to aggressor status. Various subsequent trade
agreements began with Egypt in 1955. The intermediary aspect
of China's Middle East activity also was demonstrated in 1955
as the PRC acted as midwife between Egypt and Czechoslovakia
to arrange an arms deal for Egypt; such third party inputs, or
more distant political support and encouragement, was fre-
quently China's vehicle of choice (or only vehicle), for
Middle East involvement . ^°- By early 1956 Egypt was the
first Arab state to establish diplomatic relations with China.
The Suez crisis of 1956 generated comparatively
immense Chinese concern, both of a practical and rhetorical
nature. Offers of monetary support and manpower assistance
(250,000 troops), were made to Cairo from Beijing. ^°^ Mean-
while, Syria and Yemen joined Egypt in establishing diplomatic
relations with the PRC, followed by Iraq in 1958.
Growing contacts with Yemen led to Chinese
involvement in the revolutionary struggles located on the
southern Arabian peninsula; PRC advisors and materiel assisted
the PFLOAG until 1971. Chinese workers also assisted with
road building and related projects in Yemen during the early
1960s. The establishment of the PLO in 1964 was followed by
PLO delegations to China in 1965 and PRC support (arms and
training as well as rhetoric), for the PLO in 1966. As China
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grew away from her combative revolutionary approach to
international afairs, she toned down her rhetoric and assis-
tance, but without altering the sense of importance associated
with the Middle East. Further PRC contact with the PLO grew
increasingly moderate, culminating in the 1971 PRC statement
that PLO terrorism was not condoned, although PRC support for
the PLO continues. These years also saw Chinese rhetorical
support (and minimal practical support) , for other revolution-
ary groups or movements elsewhere in Asia and Africa.
China's activity in the Middle East turned a
corner as the 1970s began. PRC withdrawal from regional
revolutionary conflicts preceded diplomatic recognition by
Kuwait in 1971; by 1975 the range and quantity of Chinese
exports to Kuwait exceeded those to any other Middle East
state. China's diplomatic relations now included all Middle
East states except Saudi Arabia, Israel, Bahrain and Qa-
tar. ^°^
The 1980s saw continued Chinese political modera-
tion in the Middle East and elsewhere. The PRC was generating
over $1 billion of welcome foreign exchange from that region
during each year of the early 1980s. Arms deals and trade
continued with other Middle East countries, both those with
official PRC relations and those without, although prior ties
of PRC assistance to ideological lines or revolutionary
pursuits were no longer evident. Chinese activity in the UN
supported "Third World" aspirations as the first PRC veto in
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1981 attempted to aid Tanzania's Salim A. Salim gain the UN
Secretary Generalship from Waldheim.^°^ The Iran-Iraq war of
1980 eventually found Chinese aid going to both belligerents,
as well as elsewhere in the Gulf region; the PRO missile sale
to Saudi Arabia in 1988 was one of the final results of that
conflict
.
In this region China is able, with relatively minimal
input, to either: 1) offset U.S. and other influence and/or
designs; 2) keep a certain level of friction between the U.S.
and other powers by maintaining (just enough) regional
instability, though not to the level that threatens interna-
tional stability; or 3 ) to assist U.S. and/or other (former
USSR) objectives in the vicinity by acquiescence or direct
collusion. Even with a quiet presence there China is able to
significantly affect the international equation as it pertains
to the Middle East.
Among contiguous states, China's main concerns are
Korea, Japan, Southeast Asia and South Asia (also, of course,
the former USSR) . Like Russia, the number of potential
disgruntled neighbors is large, but China's great advantages,
however, include knowing that anyone would be foolish to
seriously invade or otherwise begin hostilities with China,
also that China does not suffer from the potentially debili-
tating internecine strife of competing nationalities (as might
the USSR). The PRC ' s huge population, indigenous resources
and growing technological capability would provide insurmount-
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able barriers to any would-be antagonist. Only India could
perhaps survive such a struggle with China, although the cost
would be enormous, for doubtful outcomes.
3. Diplomatic
By contrast to the former USSR, most of China's
international activity (aside from the Korean War) , from 1950
to the mid 1970s consisted primarily of diplomatic maneuver-
ing. The few economic resources that were available for
"hands on" PRC foreign policy were utilized where they were
expected to most effectively promote China's interests.
Within the Middle East China's efforts centered on Egypt,
Kuwait and the southern Arabian peninsula, as she continuously
tried to buttress her position vis-a-vis Taiwan and the UN.
It has been suggested that with the USSR's demise,
China is actively seeking to promote itself as a Socialist
counterweight to U.S. primacy in the Middle East, South
Africa, and elsewhere . ^°^ This, I manitain, has been one of
China's aims throughout, regardless of the position or health
of other great powers. That is, whether it was the U.S. or
former USSR now in the Middle East, China would seek to
promote a counterweight, any counterweight, against it: this
could be a socialist counterweight, or an economic alternative
counterweight, or etc..
China in 1990 has been celebrating the 2,000th anni-
versary of the Silk Road. Aside from enjoying this birthday,
one ostensible purpose of the lengthy event is to help clear
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away the negative image caused by Tienanmen. The June 1989
massacre set China's diplomatic initiatives back quite a lot,
especially with regard to the large industrial powers. But
China's response to repair that episode has been to ply the
Middle East with visits, increased trade and economic packag-
es, and gradually work her way back into the international
mainstream.
a . Taiwan
It is very much in mainland China's interests, in
its dealings with Taiwan, to isolate it diplomatically and
otherwise. If Taiwan could be effectively isolated within the
international community, then China would have easier access
to Taiwan's diplomatic ramparts. Recent pragmatic and
constructive initiatives coming from both Beijing and Taipei
have been directed toward each other, and imply an interest on
both sides to pursue constructive avenues towards discussion.
Regarding eventual reunification of PRC and ROC,
the question is becoming not so much a matter of if as it is
of when. Taiwan's concerns include having to experience a
drop in living standards, or being swamped by a possible swarm
of job seekers. China, in turn, is doing her best to close
the PCGNP gap, at least between Taiwan and the coastal
provinces
.
The Tiananmen episode hurt China's efforts in this
diplomatic sphere with Taiwan, as well. Although the PRC
established full diplomatic relations with all countries in
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the Middle East, Taiwan has continued to maintain some
contacts in that area. Immediately after the events of
Tienanmen, through April 1990, Taipei has had more success
with Third World countries than has Beijing.^°^
jb. Reduce Great Power Influence
Reduction of Great Power (read U.S. and USSR)
influence in the Middle East, Afghanistan and Pakistan, has
long been a central tenet of China's foreign policy efforts,
and very similar, if not identical, to Beijing's desire to
render the Middle East influence-free. A curious twist of
fate has helped to provide at least this one policy of China's
with great success. For not only did the USSR pull out of
Afghanistan, but its demise (not appreciated by the conserva-
tives or the liberals in Beijing) , has also removed USSR
presence from all of Central Asia. China now must deal with
the independently minded Republics just on the other side of
her borders; Beijing is clearly concerned about the impact of
potential Muslim or pan-Turkic nationalism, especially as it
might develop in Kazakhstan, Kirgyzstan and Tajikistan, on her
western-most, troublesome, and strategic provinces of Tibet
and Xinjiang.
China provided direct assistance (via Pakistan)
,
to the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan during Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. This assistance started before the invasion, but
was most extensive, in conjunction with aid from the U.S. and
Saudi Arabia, after the Soviets were inside Afghanistan.
240
China's aid included the provision of military training to the
Afghans. Of all the PRC aid that went to the Afghans, some of
it was direct, although much was coordinated (and even paid
for) by the U.S. via Pakistan.
B. DOES ISRAEL HAVE OR EXERCISE A "CHINA POLICY?"
Israel, of all the countries under consideration in this
chapter, probably has the most pronounced ideas and intents of
how to proceed with the Israeli-Chinese rapprochement, and
also of what Israel hopes to find in that relationship.
A fact of Israel's existence has been a considerable
amount of isolation. To counter this trend, and make some
friends in the process, Israel sought relations and interac-
tion with other developing countries (Africa, Latin America,
Oceania, and elsewhere) . At the peak of this activity, Israel
had sent over 7,000 various experts on official bilateral and
multilateral missions, and more than 20,000 people came from
these countries to Israel for training. ^°^ But the Arab
countries were also getting more involved with the pan-African
movement and OAU, which was being reciprocated by the African
countries towards the Arabs. In 1973, after the war, most
African states (except for Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland, and
Botswana, severed relations with Israel).
Israel, of all the Middle Eastern countries, has demon-
strated the most long-standing interest in establishing
relations with China and, as is the case with relations
between any two countries, is no doubt doing what she can to
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ensure that the relationship remains viable and/or interest-
ing, if not profitable, for China.
Israel began her attempt to secure diplomatic access to
China by being among the first states in the world, and the
first in the Levant, to recognize China in 1950, For various
reasons, including the Korean War, China was unable and
unwilling to reciprocate, and then became involved in the
Bandung spirit which led China to court the Arabs instead of
Israel. Israel has much to gain from increasing her outlets
to the world, and can be expected to pursue her new access to
China with due diligence; this is true whether for reasons of
economics, security and R&D, or increased diplomatic exposure.
1 . Economic
Avrahim Tamir, director-general of Israel's Foreign
Ministry, said in 1988: "The Far East has two-thirds of the
world's population and its emerging economic superpowers ... if
we don't change our perception, we will lose the future".
That quote just about says it all; Israel is plainly aware, or
at least more so, of where respective population strengths are
located, and so on. Israel's director-general of economic
affairs at the Foreign Ministry, Yitzchak Minervi, proceeded
to visit Beijing in October 1988. At the visit China "ex-
pressed a willingness to supply Israel with oil and coal,
while the Israeli representative was said to have come with a
list of some twenty proposals for helping China in such fields
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as farming, technology, medicine, industry, fishing, and
energy, well beyond restricted defense aid".^°®
It is obviously in Israel's interest to generate as
many outlets or avenues for trade and diplomatic interaction
as possible. Not only trade, but also potential sources to
share costs of R&D, and perhaps even actual production of
whatever, either as a shared venture for domestic purposes
only (e.g.: defense), or for joint profit on international
markets. The UN (Israel's original benefactor), and the U.S.
(Israel's current benefactor), cannot be depended on forever
to provide the external support Israel has required to survive
and thrive.
a. New Markets
China is obviously full of potential to be a
recipient of Israeli goods. It is the old capitalist dream of
being able to tap that market. Israel hasn't the capacity to
produce enough to saturate China's market (no one does),
meaning that Israel, once having gained access, could pull out
the stops and reap considerable rewards.
There has been considerable quiet evidence that
Israel was offering or providing assistance to China during
the late 1980s in the following areas: countertrade, technical
assistance, and agricultural programs. ^°^ For sensitive
reasons, not wishing to upset the sensitivities of Arab states
or the U.S., etc., this information was not waved about in
public by the politicians.
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Israel's standing throughout the world is still
not on easy street. For example, their embassy in Buenos
Ares, Argentina, was destroyed by a bomb on 17 March 1992; the
Argentine government suspected terrorists, internal and
foreign, who performed the deed. Argentina now has the
largest Jewish community in South America (220,000), is a
haven for World War II Nazis, and they are upset at
Argentina's improving ties with Israel.
Jb. Diversification
A combination of avenues for support, regardless
of the ties of world Jewry or other links, would make it
easier for Israel to follow her own dictates rather than the
wishes of someone else. As always, the more avenues of
support for Israel, the better. Israel will always attempt to
keep the voices of support pluralistic, or disjointed, rather
than a harmonized chorus with shared intent and/or direc-
tion/purpose .
Israel's economy is more likely to develop on the
side of high tech rather than mass production or agriculture,
due simply to its relative small size and diversity. Hence
Israel has the added requirement to produce a wide variety of
smarter goods, and to have a broader distribution available
for those goods. This in turn generates additional needs for
Israel to lock in the initial funding required to work in this
high tech arena.
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As another example of Israel's intent to buttress
its own support, economically and diplomatically, it has been
seeking and establishing broader ties with South Africa
recently. In 1991 South Africa's President visited Israel,
which was the first time since 1978 for a South African leader




National security is the premier agenda for every
Israeli government. One of the benefits Israel hopes to
achieve by having established relations with China is to
somehow have a voice in China's arms sales to the Arabs,
although it is unlikely that Israel might gain, with China,
the same access to decision making about which weapons the
Arabs recieve, as with the U.S. Prospects for generating a
China Lobby would seem to be nebulous at best. However, this
could be difficult, unless Israel can find some way of making
themselves appealing or valuable to the Chinese. After
representing Israel at the normalization procedure in Beijing,
David Levy (Israel's Foreign Minister) spoke with Qian Qichen
and discussed, among other things, the arms race in the Middle
East. Levy believed that "the fact that we are listening to
one another .. .will somehow stem this flow of arms."^^° The
imperative nature of grasping this particular problem of arms
proliferation was literally brought home to Israel during the
Gulf War, when Israel experienced being the recipient of SCUD
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missiles launched from Iraq as part of Iraq-Kuwait Gulf War,
18 Jan 1991 (Israel did not respond).
Again, with the U.S. as the primary and perhaps only-
backer of Israel for security purposes, aside from Israel's
own burgeoning industries and other European suppliers, Israel
more and more places herself at risk to being dictated to
regarding what equipment she may have and even what she may do
with it. To Israel, this is not attractive, to say the least.
It is conjectured that China, as of 1987, had pur-
chased as much as $3b of military equipment from Israel, ^^^
a. Possible R&D Assistance
Again, obviously, China is probably better
situated to gain more from, and to better utilize through
reverse engineering, R&D than any other country in the world.
China is also probably better situated to participate in
whatever R&D projects she wishes, with whomever she wants to
participate with, than any other country - at least in the
long run. This is due to her relative isolation from other
entangling alliances and the obligations/restrictions imposed
by those alliances, plus China's relative wealth (on a
national scale) , that will allow her to pursue almost any-
thing. Israel is "banking" on this set of realities, that
China could readily make use of R&D, and that Israel can
provide it for them. The only true restrictions China will
face, regarding R&D, will come from her perceptions of the
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Ireactions of others and whether or not China will wish to
respond to those perceptions.
Israel has certain projects that she would very
much like to proceed with, such as the Lavi fighter aircraft.
However, the expense of the unit, its proposed utility and so
on were not conducive to the U.S. to warrant continued funding
of that project for Israel. Hence Israel received another
pill of awareness reminding her of the degree of dependence
(to the U.S.) she is in right now.
To that end, and from Israel's point of view, the
encouragement of the development of internal lines of communi-
cation (i.e.: infrastructure) within China is a good thing.
Ironically, strengthening China will have the concomitant
effect of keeping her pliant and malleable. Isolating China
will make her moody and possibly dangerous, in a capriciously
unpredictable sort of way. Israel seems to have grasped this
fact, and is proceeding with her program of economic and
diplomatic diversification.
b. Diversification
There is evidence that Israel was offering and
probably providing military assistance to China from the late
1980s on, as was mentioned above. ^^^ For China, this is
good, at least for the moment. China is in the midst of
modernizing her forces, and also of reconfiguring her forces.
Assistance of the sort that Israel might be able to provide
would be very handy. This type of assistance will not always
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be useful, because China will, sooner or later, make all the
adjustments and additions she wants (militarily) . At that
point, Israel will need to make a readjustment in terms of
what Israel might continue to be able to provide which China
would find useful.
The danger to this approach is that, sooner or
later, if China manages to come up to speed, China herself
will be able to provide all and more than what she needs or
wants. At that point, Israel will have to find something else
to do or offer, if she wishes to be unique.
One obvious immediate goal for Israel is to find
a plethora of markets within which to sell her war products
and thereby help to keep them affordable. China just might be
able to provide some help in this respect.
Defense Minister Arens visited Beijing in November
1991, followed by a business delegation and the head of a
state-run arms manufacturer. Various sources have confirmed
Israel as having sold items to China in the areas of missiles,
guidance systems, and fire-control systems for tanks. Israel
is also strong in avionics, tank armor and armaments, and may
well have sold some of these items to China as well: "Israel
is known to be less than scrupulous about onpassing embargoed
arms technologies, as recently revealed in South Africa". ^^^




Unlike other states, Israel's relation to the effects
of diplomacy is much closer to home. It was diplomacy (in
equal or greater weight than economics or other concerns),
that first gained for Israel her charter as an independent
state. It is the continued use of diplomacy, with at least as
much importance or clout as economic and military venues, that
continues to retain for Israel her lines of support and her
viability as an independent state.
Israel is also concerned about China's arms sales to
the Middle East in general, some of which are ironically
improved by virtue of Israel's own initial assistance to
China. With normalization, Israel feels it will have a
greater voice in calling China's attention to this concern.
a . Recogni tion
Direct recognition by China is expected to be a
boon to Israel's diplomatic maneuverings . Such recognition
would do much to open other doors for economic, etc., interac-
tion, as well as provide another (ostensibly) friendly voice
within international councils/perceptions. With each advan-
tage comes disadvantages: China's increased presence, or more
immediate accessibility, via diplomatic normalization of
relations may also increase the weight of Israel's reliance
upon China, if the PRC should ever be displeased with Israeli
actions/reactions, on whatever subject.
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b. Dilute U.S. Influence
This factor, above all the others, and throughout
all the others, is a primary concern for Israel in its quest
for diversification. It will reduce the necessity of main-
taining an exceptional lobbying apparatus in the U.S., and it
will possibly broaden avenues of financial support. This
potential added support, however, will not be of the variety
and quality and dependability of the sort found through the
U.S. Jewish community. Israel will have to play a careful
diplomatic game for many years, while at the same time
endeavoring to stabilize and wean their economy away from
reliance on external largesse.
C. DO OTHER MIDDLE EAST STATES HAVE OR EXERCISE A "CHINA
POLICY?"
The answer here is also yes, but possibly to a lesser
degree, relatively speaking, than the policy maintained by
Israel, or than that evidenced by China towards the Middle
East. This is partially because the other Middle East states
are still learning their statecraft, and partially because of
the plethora of voices resident within the Levant.
Egypt, influenced partially by Soviet contributions to the
Allied effort during World War II, was the first Arab state to
establish continuous relations with the USSR in 1943. Iraq
and Lebanon followed suit in 1944. In 1947 the USSR voted in
favor of the Palestine Partition, then in 1948 was the second
state (after the U.S.) to recognize Israel and even helped
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supply arms to that new country, thus assisting the initial
Zionist war effort. Shortly after, however, the Soviets
reoriented their efforts in favor of the Arab states and
Israel grew more isolated.
1 . Economic
The benefits of interaction with China are much the
same for the other Middle East states as they are for Israel.
Perhaps even more so, because most external powers interacting
with the Middle East historically have wanted a slice of the
Middle East pie (oil rights, profit sharing, base agreements,
landing rights, overflight rights, etc) . China does not give
this appearance; her "slice" may simply be the added benefits
to security and diplomatic maneuvering and economics afforded
by interaction with the Middle East. China simply doesn't
have a history of interfering in that region, nor does she now
indicate or show a desire that she wants to do so. That alone
makes China especially appealing to the Levant, and more than
offsets any real or apparent quality dilemmas with Chinese
goods or range of services available through aid. Most of the




Abu Dhabi, in the Gulf Coast, is planning trade
missions to go to the Far East. Abu Dhabi's earnings are now
$15b/yr from oil revenues (and they are pumping extra to make
up for the shortfall by Kuwait and Iraqi), plus $90b/yr from
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investments. Abu Dhabi, and the other Gulf states, are
looking wisely to increase their economic interaction over-
seas . ^^^
A major concern of Oman is precisely to increase
their avenues of economic participation, either by inviting
activities into the country, or by utilizing investment and
going abroad. Oman among all the Gulf states has a cosmopoli-
tan tradition, and has hosted several leading Chinese delega-
tions in the process of exploring economic alternatives.
One can only wonder at the reactions of the other
Middle Eastern states to this new circumstance. We are aware
of Chinese arms sales to the region, but little mention is
made of Chinese economic ventures into or out of the Middle
East. As of 1985, indirect trade between China and Saudi
Arabia had reached $100m annually.
Prior to the Gulf hostilities between Iraq and
Kuwait, China had done extensive contract work in Kuwait. It
is said that most of the public buildings there were built by
the Chinese, although contracts for their reconstruction after
the war have gone to U.S. companies.
b. Location for Investment
The Director of the Arab Fund for Economic and
Social Development, Abdul-Latif Yousif Al Hamad, believes that
a united Gulf market could take the place of Hong Kong as an
international banking center when Hong Kong reverts to China
in 1977. This would require the GCC states to pool their
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financial and human resources, and work together to defend and
develop their position. This is seen as a genuine possibility
by the Gulf residents, with their advantage increased by
geographic advantages. However, if they do not act soon, and
act together, this idea to replace Hong Kong could be swamped
by globalization . ^^^
In December 1984, a manager of the International
Business and Credit Bank told the correspondents of Xing Hua
News Agency that Middle East investors regard China as one of
the best countries for investment in the world. ^^'^ Certainly
the rate of return on investment will be good, provided the
investment itself survives.
As mentioned previously, China as a vehicle for
investment or other services is generally regarded favorably
within the Middle East, relative to what the Middle East has
experienced when receiving help from other sources (Britain,
U.S., USSR, and so on).
2 . Security
The topic of security, between China and the Middle
East, needs little introduction. At the height of arms sales
during the Iran-Iraq war, China was selling about $2b worth of
weapons annually, with most of that going to the Middle East.
As for the arms sales to the Middle East that origi-
nate with the U.S., Israel exercises a fair amount of veto
power over how much and what type may be sold to other Middle
East states. For this reason alone, it is not hard to imagine
253
a hard pressed or determined buyer going out to find another
supplier, regardless of whatever else the buyer might think of
the seller.
a. "General Store"
In keeping with China's general attractiveness to
Arabs as a source of aid and/or investment, and also of
China's apparent willingness to sell whatever is available
(provided that "stability" is maintained), and in keeping also
with China's desire to offset the influence of other major
powers, it makes a great deal of analogous sense to consider
China as an international "General Store", or 7-11, open 24
hours a day, 3 65 days a year.
This is not meant to be sarcastic or belittling,
but to emphasize the nature of the economic reality now facing
the world. But having said this, I still do not want to
suggest that money is the only criterion used by China when
considering a sale of whatever. The other factors that go
into the sale are all of the above: modernizing China,
maintaining stability in the region, offsetting the influence
of other powers. As an example of this type of selective
largesse: in Oman the local Chinese medicine clinic (two of
them, staffed by Chinese) , received just as much press as any
of the arms sales in the gulf, and that was while the allied
armada was massing for the attack on Iraq to free Kuwait.
254
Jb. Diversification
The obvious entry in this section starts with the
Saudis, who were not happy with their inability to purchase
Lance missiles from the U.S., so they went to China instead.
There is another entry to make for the Syrians, who recently
managed to acquire needed materials for their own construction
of missiles (so China could say the PRC didn't sell any
missiles to Syria)
.
Added to this are other instances of China's
assisting Middle Eastern countries (Algeria, Pakistan) with
materials and advice for the construction of nuclear facili-
ties .
3. Diplomatic
Aside from groups such as the FLO, who need all the
support they can find, diplomatic muscle has not been a
primary goal sought by the Middle Eastern countries with
respect to China. They are impressed, of course, with the
weight China carries by having a permanent seat on the United
Nations Security Council, but in terms of individual bilateral
recognition, that has not been a primary goal.
In 1964, Arafat helped to establish the FLO liaison
office in Beijing. His third visit to China occurred in May
1984, and in December 1991 he visited there again. China has
consistently supported the FLO through moral support, and also
through materiel and training during the early stages of their
relationship. China has since taken a more moderate or
255
balanced tone with the PLO; shortly after Arafat's visit to
Beijing in December 1991, China's Vice Foreign Minister Yang
Fuchang visited Israel to discuss normalization plans.
As but one example of China's regional presence now in
the Middle East, even in view of their overall relatively
modest investment in the area, the New UN Secretary General
praised China as a "leader and defender of the developing
world". The new Secretary General is Boutros Boutros Ghali,
an Egyptian, who made those remarks during a visit to Beijing
on 13 April 1992
.
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VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
Before delving into policy implications for the U.S.
regarding China and the Middle East, initial comments on world
affairs and the nature of foreign policy will assist our
methodology and provide additional support for the conclu-
sions .
The requirement is little short of paramount for America
to be judicious and steady with its policy decisions in the
coming years. Much is changing in the world, much more than
mere discussion about Bipolarity being superceded by Multipo-
larity. Polities the world over are reorienting themselves as
the New Order continues to unfold. Europe is on the verge of
political union, Moscow now rules a nation (and perhaps a
Commonwealth) instead of an empire, the UN is gaining new
responsibilities, China is evolving, the Middle East is
joining the global community, satellite coverage is being
provided for all of China and East Asia, Cold War antagonisms
are fading^^^ and both older and newer frictions are surfac-
ing. ^^®
Additionally, global environments and economics are also
changing; they themselves are perhaps the primary impetus for
the evolving New Order. Economies are expanding, but domestic
spending is tight. Many developing nations, not to mention
the U.S., are heavily in debt and seeking ways to reschedule
their obligations or otherwise lessen the repayment severity.
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The U.S. SScL bailout alone has a higher price tag than our
bill for World War II. Gaps between rich and poor, both
domestically and internationally, have grown exponentially in
the last 30 years: on average, 20% of the population controls
80% of the wealth. Evidence of environmental despoliation in
Eastern Europe, also Taiwan, China and East Asia, plus the
developing countries, has created a new global issue that is
attracting everyone's attention. The recent UN sponsored
environmental discussion and treaty preparation at Rio was the
largest gathering of heads of state ever to occur; ecological
concerns are rapidly becoming priorities with domestic as well
as foreign agendas
.
Asia, now with well over half of the world's population,
figures more and more prominently in U.S. politics and
economics. The Pacific Rim is fast supplanting every other
region of the globe in just about every measurable category.
Six of the nine largest armies of the world, not including the
U.S. and former USSR, are located in the region; the next five
are found in the Middle East and Taiwan. '^^ For the last 2
years, average annual economic growth in Asia has been almost
10%, with this expected to continue; during the next decade
Asian growth rates are projected to double those of the U.S.
and Europe. ^^° In 1980, half of all U.S. gross trade was in
the Pacific. By 1986, this trade grew to be an overwhelming
majority (75% more than with Atlantic countries) . '^^ It is
anticipated that by 2000, U.S. trade in the Pacific will be
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twice as much as that in the Atlantic. Much of this trade is
with Japan and the NICs, also ASEAN, but there is nothing to
suggest that China will not eventually share her respective
percentage (an enormous percentage) , of this economic activi-
ty.
Economies in the region, even across the Pacific, are
highly intertwined: multinational companies, instantaneous
communications, rapid transit, floating currencies, cross-
national television, shared environmental concerns, fluid
skilled adult relocations, investments and more are combining
to reduce national purviews. Such is the close interaction of
the region that it has been suggested, for example, that
Japanese representatives in the not-too-distant future may
well be in Washington and vice versa, with these officials
having at least observer status if not themselves becoming
active participants in the political process. ^^^ When and if
this occurs, officials between Washington and Brussels may
also likely make exchanges.
Central Asia is now a big question mark, as five new
Republics have appeared through the USSR's demise. A host of
new international ramifications emerge in the process of
sorting out traditional rivalries and tensions in that area,
not to mention reassessing former Soviet relations with the
Northern Tier (Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey) . China as
well will be keenly interested in developments in the region,
as Tibet and Xinjiang border on three of those five new
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Republics. Secretary of State Baker travelled there shortly-
after their formation to make assessments and try to insert a
modicum of stability through diplomatic activity and recogni-
tion.
Traditional U.S. emphasis on NATO and Europe ought not to
be discarded, but readjusted; there must be due recognition of
current and future centers of trade, populations, and all of
their attendant concerns. An editorial by Kissinger, early in
1989, saw Europe as the continued undisputed center of future
global events, despite Gorbachev and perestroika; the events
in Berlin, Beijing, Moscow, and the Persian Gulf, which were
then just around the corner, had unfortunately for Kissinger
not yet occurred. ^^^ One example of this shifting emphasis
has been military reallocations by Congress: U.S. troop
strength in Europe has recently been cut to 100,000, with
future cuts likely as Europe readjusts. Meanwhile, 23,000 are
now stationed full time in the Persian Gulf region (75% of
those are with the Navy)
.
As for the current state of world affairs in terms of
armaments, modern weaponry is coming into a world of its own.
One indication of how weaponry impacts our lives is provided
by this comparative review on space requirements for tactical
troop movements: in Ancient times, 1 square kilometer was
required for 100,000 troops. Napoleon required 20 square
kilometers. World War I saw that requirement increased to 248,
World War II increased it further to 3,000, Israel's Yom
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Kippur War needed 4,000 square kilometers for 100,000 men, and
1978 NATO maneuvers in West Germany required 55,500 square
kilometers for 100,000 men.^^^ Participating units in World
War IT'S nautical battle for Midway utilized much of the
entire Pacific Ocean; current naval architecture and technolo-
gy allows for future nautical engagements to cover multiple
ocean groups. The recent Gulf War saw a UN coalition of
scores of unlikely allies opposing Iraq; the combination of
high-tech and medieval tactics that ensued, even through a
relatively short duration, completely engulfed the region
(including Iran, whose passive acquiescence generated as many
ramifications as her active participation would have)
.
Hostilities in the contemporary arena, then, especially on
sensitive issues, have broad tentacles and are not to be taken
lightly.
It is clear, then, that proper response to the question of
U.S. policy regarding China and the Middle East in the 1990s
and beyond, with special reference to China's own interaction
with the Middle East, requires that we take into account
several variables, in differing regions, that may well affect
or otherwise be affected by the U. S . -PRC-Middle East triangle.
Moreover, the Middle East is very fast becoming a region
unlike anything which we have seen or known in that area
within corporate memory, and is doing so very much at the
visible heart of extensive trade routes and the not-so-visible
heart of religious and emotional concerns. Ramifications for
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any one issue involving these relationships may well spill
over into other issues.
Items, therefore, that may likely affect our dealings with
the PRC and/or the Middle East, over and above relations that
might exist directly between the Middle East and China, or
between the three of us together, include: the UN's evolving
roles, China and the Spratlys and the Paracels, the Soviet
Union's dissolution, Europe's emergence as a unified bloc,
trade blocs in general, regional security concerns plus the
arms trade, technology and communication advances, the
phenomena of fundamentalism, and resource management to
include ecological concerns. Each of these items is a subject
in itself. But the speed with which various concerns are
called to our respective attention, or with which they are
intertwined, causes us to be mindful of the others while
directing specific attention to any one of them.
Two more comments on method before proceeding:
1) It was stated earlier that our world views might well
experience modifications and thereby become more effective and
responsible, prior to our generation of policies and direc-
tives, if we first became aware of what the other guy was
thinking and why he thought that way.^" The other side of
this, of course, is that we also have thoughts, in a certain
collective manner, and do so - or try to do so - as responsi-
bly as possible. Which is quite a mouthful. Because it
requires us, in the realm of policy, to be as absolutely
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certain as possible about the other guy, about what he is
thinking and why, about the environment in which he lives,
plus what he wants for his life - in addition to knowing those
things about ourselves. Then , and only then, may we proceed
with policy and its implementation.
A natural question at this point is to ask where we should
first direct our attention: to the other guy or ourselves?
Because knowing one effects how we know the other. There is
no rule, other than that we do both as best we can. Chicken
or egg dilemmas do not apply, for we start wherever we happen
to be, and the rest is a process. Usually we begin with
ourselves, but understanding someone else helps us to know
ourselves (and vice versa) , much as learning another language
provides insight into our own. It is a back and forth
process, which, sooner or later, hopefully incorporates
dialogue, communiques, and all the rest. If there is no
dialogue, then we do everything possible to make genuine
dialogue happen, ensuring throughout that the integrity of
everyone concerned is scrupulously maintained. Every fence
has (at least) two sides; if we live with fences, then we need
to demarcate them and become mutually comfortable and familiar
with each side, arrange for its maintenance and security, and
so on. If we live without fences, or with gates or other
access from side to side, then we need to be prepared for
subsequent developments and recognize, all the more, that
effective dialogue is a sine gria non.
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(When we broach the extremely sensitive realm of suggest-
ing or even claiming what the other guy should do, aside from
what he wants to do, we run the risk of being no more effec-
tive than the most extreme fanatic regarding whatever)
.
2) Still yet another assumption surfacing through these
pages is the accepted premise that, all things being equal, it
is the case that people will - for the most part - choose the
positive (or better, or good) side of an issue, provided the
individual or group has all the pertinent information and
facts at their disposal. Which is not unlike Confucianism.
In other words, if someone knows the good, then they will
choose the good, which is why dialogue and exchange and educa-
tion become so meaningful. Now this proposition is by no
means certain, for it depends on what any particular group or
society regards as acceptable or necessary, and has been much
debated from the Greeks through to the present (if for no
other reason than simply a lasting curiosity over how best to
prove or disprove it) . But regardless of its place in
reality, and whether or not it is true or only just wishful
thinking, I mention it here because it is incumbent on us to
ensure that "good" decisions are made, to ensure that all the
education and training and quality of life necessary to enact
proper decision making are available not only to ourselves but
also to all those with whom we interact.
A tricky aspect of this is in the manner of providing or
recognizing the tools (education, etc.), available to all who
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need them, without impairing the system which receives or
perhaps already has some of those tools, or without assuming
that since "they" are not like "us" it therefore becomes
necessary for "them" to first change in order to benefit from
(our) tools and education.
Dialogue is learning as well as teaching, accepting as
well as proselytizing, with the entire process leading to
agreements, compromises, and hopefully further appointments.
Dialogues, by definition, require participation from more than
one party: if the required participation is not present, then
the dialogue is either shut down or someone takes the trouble
to somehow, and respectfully, inform the other that some sort
of agreeable participatory exercise must occur. The sun
shines over all of us. Each fact must be considered, not just
those that might be in front of our noses, or those which we
prefer. Responsibility is sometimes extremely difficult, and
might even be impossible under severe cases; perhaps a proper
response in those instances, all things being equal, would
simply be to keep the doors clean, strong, and open (or hinged
and able to open) , then hunker down and wait. If we were ever
to come under attack, then we respond accordingly, proportion-
ately , and, if neccessary, we "whip their ass".^^^ Where
other measures might be required for the sanctity of life and
freedom of choice, then so be it.^^^ These procedures are
all aspects of passive and active diplomacy, as Clausewitz
reminds us. Anything less is irresponsible.
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A. U.S. AND THE PRC
China's overriding concern, as we have seen, is to
modernize. The absolute crux of any U.S. policy process with
regard to China in the 1990s and beyond is recognition of this
fact , as well as, especially, also recognizing that virtually
all of China's leaders are themselves reformers . They are all
entirely intent on reforming China. They differ, however, on
their understanding of how reform is to occur. Therefore,
again, during this current period of Four Modernizations, some
are "liberals" or "reformers", while others are "hardliners"
or "conservatives". Under Mao, all of them would have been
"moderates" (with the Maoists being "leftists"). There are
undoubtedly some leftists in the government today, but their
heyday is over; the moderate distinctions which now prevail
were less pronounced during the 1950s and 1960s.
This current hierarchy of Chinese rulers, with its
differences of reformist categories, generates interesting
responses when superimposed on the ethical realm. First of
all, the fact that the hierarchy is entirely reformist of one
stripe or another, is "good", in a strictly utilitarian and/or
historical sense. Beyond that, the choices they make of how
or even why to enact this reform, as liberals or hardliners,
and how they choose to be liberal or conservative, can be
"good" or "bad" . There are at least two levels of activity
within the Chinese political spectrum as presently configured.
It is of crucial importance for us to note these two strata;
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on the one hand we can appreciate the underlying and primary-
task that all members of the PRC hierarchy are genuinely
involved with, on the other hand we can, as required, respond
more critically regarding their methodology and day to day
choices
.
Passing judgment on an official's methodology, simulta-
neously along with the fact that he/she occupies a place in
the government to begin with, is wrong. To pass judgment on
a hardliner simply because it is expected that there was
nothing he/she could do that was beneficial for China,
regardless of the probability that it would be excruciatingly
slow, is wrong.
On top of these two strata, there is the intriguing and
difficult position currently occupied by Deng. As mentioned
before, not only does he balance conservatives and liberals,
but he alternately supports one faction, then the other,
despite his preference for reform at full speed ahead. While
he has been trying to retire older (conservative) members, and
bring younger technocrats and others likely to back liberal
reform measures into the CCP, he still needs the support of
his major players to maintain the viability of the CCP. This
was especially true after Tiananmen. Regardless of appearan-
ces that take center stage from one month to the next, it is
unwise to pin specific labels on Deng, especially if those
labels are of a conservative bent.
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It is absolutely imperative for the U.S. to keep China, as
much as possible, interacting with the world community. China
will, eventually, reach the point where few options will be
unavailable to her; for China to be in such a position and at
the same time shunned by the world community, hence alone or
not on speaking terms with other states, would certainly not
give China much reason to make decisions that would be in
concert with the best interests of the international communi-
ty. It simply makes good sense, not to mention the opportuni-
ty we might have in passing to share other alternatives or
options with the Chinese, to continue as much contact with
them as possible. We must keep China involved in a two way
street of exchange and interaction.
1. Ideology and the "Death of Communism"
Among China's classical corpus is a work entitled The
General Mirror for the Aid of Government . It was compiled
before 1086, as an aid to Chinese Emperors on how to best
conduct their business. Mao studied this work while in Yanan
after the Long March. Deng was also a student of this work,
and studied it thoroughly while living in Nanchang, Jiangxi,
after being purged from the central government during the
GPCR. On Aug. 3, 1972, Deng wrote to Mao, at Zhou's sugges-
tion, admitted that he had made mistakes, and confessed that
he had been wrong with saying in 1962 (after the GLF) , that it
mattered not whether a cat was black or white so long as it
caught the mouse. In February 1973 Deng and his family left
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Nanchang and the Jiangxi tractor factory for Beijing; on March
10, Mao and Zhou formally proposed to restore Deng as vice
premier of the State Council. ^^®
These episodes and many others indicate that there is
something else going on within the CCP than just a borrowing
of Marxist thought, or even the creation of Socialism with
Chinese Characteristics. There is something very "Chinese"
about what Mao and Zhou and Deng have been doing (and also
with Chiang Kaishek and Sun Yixian before them) . Obviously,
to recount the early history of the CCP is to discover the
Russian influence, the Moscow trained Party officials, the
Comintern directives, and the constant references by Mao to
the need for maintaining Marxism over revisionism. But there
are other influences or aspects of the early CCP as well, such
as the modernization attempts that had been ongoing for almost
a century within China, the legacy of the May Fourth movement,
the influence of Europe, Japan and the U.S. as well as that of
Russia, and the difficulties of voicing or representing
western ideas through the Chinese language.
This last item is significant, because regardless of
the ideas being translated into Chinese, whether they are
religious, political, or whatever, direct translation from
western Judeo-Christian romanization into the ideogrammatic,
Confucian and Buddhist milieu of the Chinese language is just
about impossible. This one hurdle is almost enough in itself
to question whether what the Chinese have been doing can be
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best described as Coinmunist , in the Soviet sense, rather than
any other label. That is, no matter what revolutionary system
the Chinese might have borrowed, it would eventually have had
to be translated so as to give primary weight to the Chinese
countryside, as we have seen, and so on. As for other issues
such as the primacy of central planning (Soviet style) rather
than decentralized control: this topic has been an ongoing
subject of debate within the CCP since before the GLF . The
CCP has basically agreed that modifications to the Soviet
model had to be made for proper utilization within China, but
the degree and scope of modifications have been debated ever
since
.
As for Deng's successor, there is probably no one
within China who has the same authority to keep the military
and political coalition together, as we mentioned earlier. ^^^
However, to therefore say that China will probably follow the
route just taken by the USSR under Gorbachev (dissolution) is
not at all self evident. Gorbachev's focus was on political
reform, whereas Deng's Four Modernizations have been economic.
What we do not know is the extent of Chinese political reform
that will follow from those economic changes, or even how
inevitable such political changes might be. Some changes are
inevitable, and dissolution is certainly one of the possibili-
ties, but there are others at least as probable if not more
so, and they include:
270
IWhile the overall transition which China is experienc-
ing may well continue for another 100 years or so, the point
at which China enters some sort of representative government
may not be quite as distant. The type of "representative"
government which might emerge, or the degree to which input
from below enters into the decision making apparatus, depends
much on the corresponding development of things such as law,
communication, mechanisms for redress of grievances and - if
need be - alterations of governmental composition, accessibil-
ity of economic advancement, quality of life, education, and
so on
.
It is not impossible that the Chinese predisposition
for a strong center, or a version of some sort of beneficent
authoritative figure, will continue to hold sway at the apex
of a pyramid, as long as, for example, those at the lower
rungs are satisfied that their concerns, needs, etc., were
being taken into account. If advances in communication
continue to make themselves available to all elements or
aspects of society, which certainly appears as though this
will be the case, it is not hard to imagine that a consider-
able degree of information would be available to whomever was
at the bottom of this pyramid, hence the pyramid itself would
have to be carefully responsive to its members in order to
retain its integrity, continuity, longevity, and all the rest.
The mandate of heaven might still somehow apply, though in a
more timely manner. In other words, it does not seem impossi-
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ble or even unlikely that a Chinese government could emerge in
years hence that would be entirely satisfactory (and "accessi-
ble") to its people, yet be quite unlike what we now under-
stand as representative democracy, or a federal republic.
Plus, even though the governmental apex might well retain a
certain appearance of immutability, yet it could preside over
a vast array of ongoing change and innovation, provided - of
course - that all, or a sufficient majority within the
pyramid/society, were truly satisfied that their requirements
for quality of life were being met.
Regardless of the fate of the term "communist",
relative to the PRC, it is the studied opinion here that
ideology is, at best, an adjunct to other factors in the long
and short term courses of a nation's business. Fang Lizhi
firmly espouses that the hierarchy no longer believes in
Marxist principles (if they ever did).^-^°
Many in the West are now hailing the death of commu-
nism, or otherwise wondering how it has "changed", perhaps
even expecting new and wonderful things for the simple reason
that "Communism" is becoming unalterably compromised with
capitalistic ingredients. Quotes from Lenczowski and Hamrin




"Ideology plays a dynamic role (in all politi-
cal systems), to a greater or lesser extent.
That ideology is malleable does not in any way
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dismiss the fact that it performs certain
functions in shaping policy behavior"
.
Policies require 'justification' or 'ration-
alization', although this is something more
important than cynical window dressing for
naked pursuit of national interest."
Enforcement of ideological orthodoxy serves
actively to screen out ideas. (Assumptions
and prevailing world views also serve this
purpose) . "
Imposing Orthodoxy renders illegitimate any
policy options that would threaten the inter-
ests of those in power."
Foreign policy flexibility is (therefore)
constrained. In the short term, some policy
moves are easier and some more difficult. In
the long term, major departures in strategy
are almost always postponed; thus major chang-
es in policy occur normally only with a shift
in the leadership and without careful fore-
thought and planning. "^'^
George Lenczowski
"It is possible to debate whether (ideology)
is an independent entity, using the power of
the Soviet state, or whether the Soviet state
has employed ideology as a useful psychologi-
cal device .
"
Ultimately, a dynamic Soviet state interest to
expand and dominate is complemented by Commu-
nist ideology and vice versa."
Interpreters (Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev,
Gorbachev) , of dogma face the age-old dilemma
inherent in the adaptation of any old and
petrified document to current reality: either
the reality had to be molded to suit the dogma
or the dogma had to be changed."
Any change in dogma is risky: the modifier is
either a heretic (i.e. revisionist), or, if he
becomes the victorious leader, the true be-
liever . "
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Any comprehensive analysis of Soviet policies
should not, therefore, rest on a mere recon-
struction of observed behavior. To understand
the mainsprings of such policies, it is neces-
sary to take into account their doctrinal
foundations and to follow the evolution, if
any, of ideology.""^
Hamrin's position supports the role of ideology; for
Hamrin, ideology has a role not only within an ostensibly
ideological system, but also within any political system.
Lenczowski, on the other hand, does not provide ideology with
the same leverage, if he provides it with any leverage at all.
Rather than say outright that ideology serves no purpose,
however, he says that the same political outcome may be
observed whether ideology is claimed to be the originator or
not
.
Hamrin's assumption is that, given the ubiquitous
presence of ideology, and once ideology is given sway, it does
not cease to relinquish that sway. This premise is very
problematic. For example, even during the personal rule of a
Mao Zedong, where ideology supposedly has all the advantages,
it is difficult to say with certainty that decisions about
policy occur without forethought or planning, or that static
natures of policy are due primarily to ideology.
There is the further qualifier that interpersonal
relationships vary from culture to culture, which in turn
largely account for the not insignificant differences we
observe between democracies (U.S., U.K., West Germany, Japan,
Canada, Italy) , not to mention the differences between the
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formerly so-called communist bloc. The mechanisms of govern-
ing encompass a broader scope than mere bureaucratic structure
or the "reasons why" certain procedures are followed or
beliefs held. No doubt certain ruling individuals follow
prescribed procedures because they are correct or because they
believe in "the creed" above all else, but a ruling structure
that deals in realities and maintaining its own position makes
decisions because they are prudent or necessary. Structure
wins over creed. Basically, it was not primarily ideology
that safeguarded Mao's position (which was contested) , but his
early successes, the force of his personality and guanxi, and
the PLA. Likewise, reforms are being propounded by Deng to
give needed life to structures, not in order to find a pure or
correct socialism or communism. The Cultural Revolution was
largely a power struggle, not merely an exercise in ideologi-
cal purity.
Probably the most telling aspect of China's modified
communism was its initial appeal to the individual Chinese
peasant, unlike previous domestic rule in China and guaranteed
to give Mao at least the peasant's curiosity if not his
loyalty. Mao's utilization of translation, etc., for purposes
of leading and conveying ideas was a standard Chinese prac-
tice: that those phrases happened to incorporate or embody
Marxist or Leninist thinking is secondary. If it were not
Marxist then it obviously would have been something else. The
point is that very similar things, Chinese things, would have
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been done regardless of the reasoning provided; nomenclature
is, in the final analysis, supremely irrelevant.
In this sense, Lenczowski is more correct by suggest-
ing that ideology and the state serve or complement each
other. Leaders make choices, and in the course of exercising
judgment choose whether or not to chart new ground or follow
existing territory.
When Hamrin speaks of "a general ideological vacuum"
during the early 1980s as "the achilles heel of the (PRO
reformers", I believe she oversimplifies the dilemma of
instituting various novel reforms into a traditional societal
structure . ^"
It was earlier suggested that dialogue was essential
for any interaction between groups, that education or a
sharing of ideas was somehow a part, a prerequisite, for
dialogue. With that in mind, it is very instructive to note
the degree of North American culture and/or entertainment now
circling the globe and penetrating places like China. That
alone has probably had more effect on the Chinese (and French,
and Japanese)
,
populous than any heretofore diplomatic
interchange. The ability to turn on the TV and see Hong Kong
or Taiwan or Bangkok or Seoul television programs, many of
which might well have originated within the U.S., can be a
very powerful stimulous. Any number of subtle impressions
deposit themselves, so to speak, with the viewing audience,
such as economic choices, evolving western ideas of gender
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roles and sexual harassment, pluralism and participatory
government, etc.
2. Superpowers?
In order to state if China is a superpower, it becomes
necessary to define what a superpower is. It is presently
accepted that the U.S. is a superpower. It was previously
also accepted, just a short while ago, that the former USSR
was a superpower. Virtually every book printed until the
early 1990s, when discussing superpower reactions or relations
or competitions, invariably spoke both of the U.S. and USSR as
superpowers; only with rare exceptions was mention ever made
of China in this regard.
Now, however, we see that the USSR was a very strong
nut but with disparate pockets of meat inside, so disparate as
to be non-mutually supportive (i.e.: a lousy economy).
Indeed, that paucity of meat has given rise to questions of
whether or not the USSR could have in fact utilized the
strength of its shell, for any appreciable purpose or lengthy
intent, other than defense of the homeland. After achieving
this hindsight, our former certitude of assuming superpower
status for the USSR now develops into a question if that
status was appropriate in the first place.
Russia is still a strong country. The Central Asian
Republics, members of the C.I.S., are also strong countries.
As also are Israel, France, Pakistan, Iran, and (in the near
future, again) Iraq. It doesn't require superpower status to
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be "strong", or to be able to throw the world upside down or
divide the global coiranunity into divergent hostile camps
literally overnight. Russia is so strong as to actually be
dangerous; bureaucrats and academicians now ask themselves if
Russia can control the weaponry at its disposal, if it can
prevent the disappearance of an insignificant warhead, if it
can keep its troops from selling their arsenals. Superpower
status, it would seem, requires not only strength but a
certain stability and/or cushion (i.e.: infrastructure), from
which to direct that strength.
To be ranked a superpower, therefore, requires not
only a strong shell, but enough meat to hold it together and
to keep it vibrant. Resources, population, infrastructure,
economic and military strength, all far in excess relative to
international neighbors, are superpower prerequisites. Even
if these attributes are only perceived by others as resident
in the superpower, or as inevitable potentials that require
others to reassess their own actions in light of the looming
colossus over the horizon, this is enough to grant superpower
or candidate superpower status. Japan is on the verge of
acquiring this rank; Japan will also never quite make it. A
unified Europe is another superpower candidate; the odds are
excellent of this occurring. As for China - there is no doubt
that superpower status will someday be appropriate: the
question is when. Tacit recognition of this reality has
already been accorded China by other countries (e.g.: Israel
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and Japan) . This awareness of China as superpower, or as
candidate superpower, needs to spread, not because it is good
or bad, but because it is real.
By 2 010, given a Chinese average growth rate of only
4.7%, China would surpass the former USSR and be at 50% of
U.S. GNP (although have only 10% of U.S., European, or
Japanese PCGNP) . It's quite possible, due to sheer population
pressures, that China will always be stuck with PCGNP that is
appreciably lower than any other developed area of the globe.
Despite this fact, China's diversity and infrastructure would
guarantee continued growth, whether or not she was an active
member of the international community. The PRC ' s infrastruc-
ture is probably already more than sufficient to maintain its
own industrial modernization, although the rate of growth
might be slower since the Chinese operate from a smaller
PCGNP. Then again, as China is at least five times as
populous as any other country, having a low PCGNP is not a
major impediment for development of national resources; at
worst, China's GNP growth would be normal instead of meteoric.
For decades after World War II, the U.S. relied primarily on
its own market to fuel GNP: such a procedure for growth is
certainly feasible (it also has been responsible, as we know,
for the corresponding lack of U.S. ability to effectively
compete, now, in international markets). ^^^ In fact, since
much of China still lags decades behind the rest of the
industrialized world, and also since China could fuel its own
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GNP, then theoretically China could survive a global depres-
sion with comparative ease, serving possibly even to facili-
tate general recovery from such a catastrophe. All things
considered, the conservative growth rate of 4.7% posited for
PRC development by 2010 guarantees that China will become the
number two economic power and the eventual challenger to,
sharer and/or successor of America's global position. ^^^
Jonathan Pollack suggests another way of viewing
China's eventual superpower status:
"...weapons, economic strength, and power
potential alone cannot explain the imputed
significance of China in a global power equa-
tion. ...China has very shrewdly and even
brazenly used its available political, econom-
ic, and military resources. ...As a result,
China becomes all things to all nations. For
all these reasons, China has assumed a singu-
lar international position, both as a partici-
pant in many of the central political and
military conflicts in the post war era and as
a state that resists easy political or ideo-
logical categorization... Indeed, in a cer-
tain sense China must be judged as a candidate
superpower in its own right - not in imitation
or emulation of either the Soviet Union or the
United States, but as a reflection of Peking's
unique position in global politics . "^^^
While numbers do not tell the full story, the follow-
ing items are intriguing and further buttress the prognosis of
China as superpower:
USA PCGNP was $5000 during our first ICBM
test. China's PCGNP during their first ICBM
test (its range was 7000 nautical miles) was
$400."'
Based on 7% GNP annual growth, China's year
2000 GNP ($1600b) will exceed the (former)
USSR year 1978 GNP ($1254b) . China's growth
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has actually averaged 9% during the late 1970s
and into the 1980s.
By 1990, China - if she wishes - will be able
to spend $100b annually for defense (at 1979
Recently, 10% of all PRC industrial output
goes into defense. ^^^
The PRC became the 10th largest shipbuilder in
1980.''°
Although the PRC is approx. 75% rural and
requires extensive agricultural investment,
that still leaves, currently, 335 million
persons for urban industrialization (91 mil-
lion in Japan, 189 million in the U.S., and
Manchuria alone is as big as Western Europe)
.
A shift in PRC population to urban areas is
already occurring, but even if that shift was
controlled or forbidden, quality in the indus-
trial base could be maintained by the CCP
merely by threatening to relocate urban dwell-
ers into the countryside and vice versa. '^'
In Japan and the East Asian Four, the growth
of economic performance was due to growth in
productivity (i.e.: personal skills, training,
etc.), and not due to inputs into production
(i.e.: capital, etc.). China is well along
the path of growth in productivity.
China in the early 1930s had a University
enrollment of 40,000. In all of sub-saharan
Africa there were only about 70,000 students
in secondary school as late as 1960. ^'^
"China's total foreign trade has grown
from $38b in 1980 to $135. 7b in 1991. About
one third of this passes through Hong Kong,
and most of Hong Kong's direct trade repre-
sents ultimate trade with the U.S."''^
As a superpower candidate that is potentially self-
sustaining, China should be encouraged to remain an active
participant in international matters. There is no need to
have her discretionary power available to rulers in Beijing
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without any corresponding feedback or dialogue from the U.S.
and others to temper their judgment about why or how they
employ their discretionary power. Isolating Beijing serves no
productive purpose.
Those who persist in believing that the U.S. could
actually "punish" or hurt Beijing by withdrawing Most Favored
Nation (MFN) trade status, or by the imposition of general
sanctions, simply do not have a clear picture of the multitude
of facets that combine to form China. Rescinding MFN would in
fact slow the rate of China's GNP growth, but the net effect
would be diametrically opposite than intended by those wishing
to punish the PRC . While the U.S. market would no longer be
as accessible to China, other world-wide markets probably
would be, especially those markets not sympathetic to U.S.
policy ends. Further, as a considerable amount of Hong Kong
trade is with the U.S., an effect of slowing China's GNP would
actually be to hurt the U.S. and not China, because China
would keep growing (albeit slower), whereas America's already
slow GNP would become even slower (probably with the loss of
some employment)
,
plus the rescission of MFN could well invite
retaliatory measures. On top of that, the passage of each
year makes other markets stronger, relative to the U.S.
market, as they grow and establish themselves; this does not
mean that we are weakening, but that the world's resources are
experiencing broader distribution. Hence withdrawal of MFN in
1993 would not be as painful as it might have been in 1983;
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but regardless of the level of pain it might inflict, rescind-
ing MFN is not a good idea. It would be instructive for those
who think China can be "punished" or "hurt" to note a Congres-
sional joint study, with inputs from almost 60 independent
sources of widely diverging and responsible views, that
despite China's innumerable problems through the 1990s and
beyond, somehow she will "muddle through". ^^^ Lastly, Fang
Lizhi makes the eminently plausible suggestion that a few
specific and achievable political requirements, attached to
MFN, are attainable measures and beneficial to all parties,
rather than the barn door approach which would be ignored by
Beijing and not provide anyone with anything positive whatso-
ever.
Lastly there is the undeniable effect where moderniza-
tion of China assists the process of reform intended by the
ruling hierarchy. Increasing the trade, investment, and cash
flow in China obviously enhances modernization. However,
modernization also has the effect of increasing individual
responsibilities and personal realms of activity; how these
might spill into the political arena and/or be part of the
evolution of China's deep rooted sense of authority, remains
to be seen. The point is, modernization helps China and
hinders the CCP (as presently configured) , which may or may
not be apparent to current Chinese leaders; by the same token,
retarding modernization would hurt China without necessarily
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hurting the CCP. We saw that the Tienanmen events strength-
ened the hardliners' position, though only temporarily.
For those who think we compromise our principles by
not withdrawing MFN, nothing could be further from the truth,
precisely for the reasons elaborated here. Responsible trade,
within the realms permitted by national security concerns, is
the best thing we can do for the Chinese; those who truly wish
to hurt the "Butchers of Beijing" should encourage trade, not
restrict it.
a. Kezmedy, Nye, Toffler, et. al.
In recent years, a plethora of voices have emerged
describing purported aspects of U.S. decline, the juggernaut
of world trade, and so on. The following are just a few
comments on those issues:
As in the discussion of what being a superpower
meant, the topic of national decline also requires a relative
comparison with other states. During the first post-war
decade, the U.S. provided over 40% of the world's entire GNP.
Even in 1960 that figure was over 33%, but currently it is
probably less than 2 0%.^^^ These numbers do not mean that
the U.S. is shrinking. The truth is quite the contrary. What
these numbers mean is that the rest of the world has finally
picked up steam. That result is what we intended and worked
for after World War II. We ought not to decry those results
now that we have to become competitive again. (Indeed, it is
arguable that the U.S. never really had to compete on an
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international level, at least not at the extent required
today, either due to our preoccupation with home or through
the distinctiveness of our North American products prior to
World War II)
.
To underscore this point, Kennedy specifically
states that the rate of post-V7ar growth for Britain and the
U.S. was "unlikely to be as high as in those countries
recovering from years of military occupation and damage", also
that the Allies' decline and the growth of Germany was both
relative and natural. ^^"^ Great Power status (and by exten-
sion superpower status), is a joint function of the balance
between defense, consumption and investment (or military,
economy and infrastructure); when all three are present, then
Great Power status is achieved. When these elements are
present dispro-portionately, then Superpower status is
achieved. (By this description, it might be said that the
USSR was never a superpower) . That a country may once have a
surfeit of these elements relative to its neighbors, only to
lose them or be surpassed, is not to say that decline took
place, but that natural growth occurred.
Nye deals with much the same information, suggest-
ing that the U.S. can draw on its strengths and prepare a
strategic vision for ensuring the world's continued economic
and social evolution through unrestricted trade. This latter
suggestion is more of a mandate, due to the requirement for
maintaining open access to trade and other interaction as the
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world continues to grow smaller. If trade blocs were to
develop, tit for tat measures would actually increase the cost
of domestic economies rather than provide protection as
intended. ^^'
Reich touches on yet another aspect of global
economies, namely that regardless of ultimate ownership of a
particular product, what counts is the skill of your work
force, because they are your real asset. ^'^^ He goes on to
reiterate that closed borders and trade wars serve to do more
damage than not
.
Toffler's work addresses the interdependence of
contemporary life, but he goes beyond this and speaks of much
more fundamental change. Evolutions are now occurring which
will have the same impact that previously occurred with the
shifts from hunting to agriculture and from agriculture to
industry. The "powershift" now underway, which will profound-
ly alter the manner in which we do things, has to do with
speed and how economies and societies process information.
Wealth and power are now more dependent upon knowledge than
upon industrial might or raw armies. What you know, how fast
you know it, and the timeliness of deliveiry is what counts in
today's world. Again, continued interaction amongst societies
is crucial for cooperation and access to necessities. Speeds
of transactions and economies will approach real time; we can
expect, as a matter of natural course, interaction to cross
national borders in ways unimaginable a short while ago.^^^
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These comments all point to emergent times where
advances in communications and other processing devices
(computers, etc.), will have ineradicable effects on how we
live our lives and who we live them with. Flexibility and
openness are key elements. The U.S. may well be in a relative
state of "decline", but simultaneously the U.S. will be miles
ahead of other societies regarding issues of quality of life,
legal matters, education, religious tolerance, family, and the
new universal culture where races, cultures, creeds, and
genders genuinely intermix. Some of these issues seem
ephemeral and not the stuff of national pride, but those areas
that represent the highest danger for potential and real
damage in the decades ahead are precisely those areas where
fanaticism, ideology and nationalism gone awry - old solutions
for new dilemmas - will interrupt requisite global interaction
and interdependence, try to assert themselves, and cause
friction and harm to the possible point of hostilities.
These several authors, then, provide more ammuni-
tion for the premise that efforts must be made to maintain
interaction with China and to draw China into further partici-
pation in the world community.
The Chinese themselves are pursuing various
avenues of activity, as we have seen. We have also seen that
a very natural outlet for Chinese interest and activity is
into and through the Middle East. The U.S. should not be
upset by this turn of events, as long as international
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standards of decency, and so on, are met. It would be
appropriate, in fact, for the U.S. to encourage Chinese
involvement in the Middle East and wherever else, as long as
it is not intended in an exclusive manner. ^^°
Perspectives from Stephanie Neuman are added to
this section to highlight aspects of the evolving New Order,
also for the opportunity to stress that her difficult position
is now irrevocably untenable. Neuman 's premise has been that
the superpowers and other primary arms suppliers, in the event
of major conflicts, could and would - through concerted and
mutual overt or covert action - affect the outcome of the
conflict by regulating the flow of arms to that region.
Regardless of how nice it would be if this were true, the
sources for arms have - like everything else - grown and
represent not only an increase in suppliers or retailers, but
also in producers.
Traditional producers of armaments are of course
still active. These include the U.S., C.I.S. (former USSR),
France, Germany, Britain, Italy, China, Israel, and oth-
g^gisi There are also additional producers entering the
world arms industry, and old producers that are becoming more
active. Additionally, as the New Order emerges, those
countries who once may have relied on the U.S. or some other
power to provide their security, now are relying more on
themselves. Hence arms sales are finding new buyers.
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During the Iran-Iraq war, China's arms supplies to
those beliggerents were not part of U.S. and USSR equations to
control that conflict, rather the U.S. and USSR were reacting
to the PRC ' s sales/inputs to the region. These sales by China
indicated her willingness to be independent as an arms
producer and supplier; China did not first confer with the
U.S. or USSR before proceeding with those transactions. In
the words of a then contemporary observer:
"The extension of the Iran-Iraq war runs
counter to the will of the two superpowers,
but they cannot press the beliggerents to
cease fire as they did in the Arab-Israeli war
in 1973 . The ability of the superpowers to
control Middle East affairs is diminish-
ing."^"
As China, Israel, Brazil, and other producers of
arms become more active and independent, the ability of any
one power, or any one pair or trio of powers, on a regular
basis, to control the flow of arms to any particular area,
will be severely curtailed. Each case may well require
another coalition, diplomatically or in the field, to control
the flow of goods into and out of the region.
A significant aspect of (former) USSR and PRC
relations with the Middle East has been their respective
participation in the flow of arms to that region. In 1985 35%
of the world's arms imports went to the Middle East region,
which is a decrease from 1983 when the Middle East recorded
its highest intake of weaponry. While the U.S. and (former)
USSR together accounted for approximately 63% of all arms
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sales worldwide and over half of the arms sales going to
developing countries, China's arms exports reached $2b in
1984, or half that of France and one fifth that of the U.S..
Most of the PRC ' s arms sales have been going to the Middle
East and represent an older, though reliably constructed,
style of conventional weaponry which carries a lower price tag
than that of munitions available elsewhere. Even though over
half of all developing country's military needs are being met
by the U.S. and USSR, this added PRC source - again, almost
entirely going to the Middle East, sometimes via unofficial
channels - was an important factor which alone helped Iran and
Iraq to continue their war for 8 long years. The Soviet (and
American) arms exports represent fairly constant figures
throughout at least the preceding decade, whereas the PRC
figures indicate a sharp increase from a modest $175m level in
1977 to their current amounts. The $2b of Chinese arms sales
in 1984 fell to $575m in 1985 and $l.lb in 1986 as Middle East
demand slackened, but clearly the PRC capacity for production
and sales is there. These figures represent the following
percentages of total national exports: China 7.2% ($2b);
France 4.2% ($4. lb); USA 4.9% ($10. 6b); USSR 19.7% ($18b).^"
3 . The UN and Regional Issues
Concomitantly, it likewise behooves the U.S. to
maintain the strength and dispassionate character of interna-
tional organizations, particularly the UN.
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As we've seen, China is interested in stability, but
a stability where everyone is an independent actor, or at
least not dominated by the influence of any one major power or
superpower. This would be analogous, relative to the Cold War
period, of international anarchy, with China being the largest
bulwark to safeguard against it (the center) . Typically China
does not think in terms of alliances: "good relations do not
require an alliance" . ^^^ (This is the case even though China
may have sought normalization with the U.S. to offset Soviet
activity and less-than-agreeable presence along her northern
border) . As such, it therefore becomes incumbent on us to
keep China involved in international organizations.
Other regional issues that come to mind, and which
will be front and center both in China and the Middle East,
have to do with the environment. This is no longer a "pretty"
subject, to clean up the park or regional waterway. Rather,
this subject is taking on serious implications, with ramifica-
tions similar to those regarding the eventual disappearance of
liquid fossil fuel reserves. What happens when there is not
enough water to drink in the Nile, in the Jordan, when Turkey
gathers so much water behind the Ataturk Dam that Syria and
Iraq lose 40% of the Euphrates? Desalinization is one answer.
Whatever the response, it needs to be an international effort,
and both China and the Middle East need to participate in the
formulation and implementation of that effort.
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Then, once desalinization occurs, subsequent popula-
tion growth can not be allowed to grow unchecked, without some
sort of responsible mediation. There are still other resourc-
es to think about, employment to find, and space to breathe
in.
Regarding U.S. security requirements, much discussion
is now centered on the Pentagon's recent draft proposal of
endeavoring to keep the U.S. a military superpower. Further,
not only to keep the U.S. in superpower status, but also to
prevent anyone else from acquiring that same status. Without
wanting to sound alarmist or defeatist, I doubt if that is a
workable policy. It almost sounds like a blueprint for
confrontation; the world as it is developing does not need any
more confrontation built into it. We should remain strong,
but if others also wish to become militarily strong, it will
be difficult for us to preclude that.
The opening paragraphs in this chapter spoke of
intertwined and interacting economies, changing environments,
new trade patterns, an evolving New Order. The prognosis was,
aside from a period of transition, basically good - even going
so far as to postulate the high probability of having Japanese
and/or EEC representatives in our Congress. Regardless of how
shocking or unorthodox that particular scenario might seem,
there are other far less sanguine alternatives. If old
solutions are attempted for current dilemmas, if nationalism
is resurrected as a panacea, if ideology (east-west) or racism
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(occident-orient ) or wealth (north-south) become rallying
points, then sparks may well fly. Hard and fast trade blocs
could also generate unassuageable competition, leading again
to sparks. Sparks, as part of contemporary arsenals, with
delivery mechanisms, throw weight, TNT equivalencies, and ever
increasing accessibility (whether over-the-counter or via
basement laboratories), will render future overt arguments to
be very deadly and painful, as well as probably unnecessary,
regardless of how short or long the altercation might be. It
is absolutely imperative that the U.S. mandate, therefore, as
a basis for all of its policy directives, the requirement to
establish and maintain dialogue, leading to interaction on a
less-than-hostile plane. This mandate must include support of
the United Nations and other world bodies.
B. U.S. AND THE MIDDLE EAST
Interdependence between the U.S. and the Middle East was,
for several years, increasing almost on a daily basis. Israel
was alternately a democratic outpost in the region, or our
strategic ally to offset the strength of the Soviet Union.
The Islamic states were, of course, the great providers of
oil, and as such could be counted on to receive support from
almost any major industrial power in the world. Small items
that affected the Middle East were also felt in various places
around the globe.
Both Israel and the Arabs had procured and/or built vast
quantities of sophisticated arms. The Sinai, Negev, and Golan
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Heights were battlefields three times over, and new antago-
nisms have extended hostilities into other quarters of the
Islamic world. Mistrust between Persian and Arab is no less
than it has ever been, and even the Arabs themselves are now
looking over their shoulders
.
In addition to all this, the world decided to become a
different place. We still have two superpowers, but their
locations have changed, and one is doing his best to grow out
of adolescent development stages. Europe's police vigilance
has dissipated, and activity on the Pacific is escalating in
exponential increments.
Returning to the Middle East, we now have the same oil
producers, but the strategic value of Israel - aside from the
question of its survival as one country - is now of some
question. The central role the U.S. has played in the region
since World War II is also evolving. We needn't protect the
northern tier, at least not from Soviet hordes (but rather,
perhaps, from Islamic Fundamentalism). Israel is now on
speaking terms with the two other Major Powers who once tried
to make life so difficult for her. One of them is even giving
Israel a sizable chunk of its population, as they emigrate
south.
New questions arise as to who has what responsibility now,
and for what, or against what. Israel is still armed to
extremis, and has the most potent, inch for inch, arsenal in
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the world, as well as a mobilization factor that is terribly
efficient
.
What does the U.S. do now, with the Middle East almost a
different place? What emphasis do we continue to provide on
the peace process that has gotten underway?
1. Israel
Israel's "presence" within the U.S., as well as the
Levant, has always been significant: personal ties, families,
the Israeli lobby, military supply lines and increased high-
tech interaction (Star Wars), to name a few.
Two items that focus in even further when thinking of
this relationship: Israel's mind boggling annual aid figure
from the U.S. that obviously is carrying their economy, and
their hefty military arsenal (not to forget about Dimona)
.
Any policy developments between the U.S. and Israel in
the coming years must address at least these two items. We
should add a third: namely that of the Middle East regional
(and international) peace process that is now underway.
In dealing with those items, other issues will present
themselves, and they include the state of the Levantine
environment (water)
,
population pressures on economies that
are already strained (including Israel's), and the matter of
deciding how to go about maintaining a viable (conventional)
deterrent in the Middle East, when each opponent has an entire
array of hostile options from which to choose.
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Sooner or later, risks have to be taken; every
possible contingency simply can't be protected against or
warded off. But which risk? And who takes it?
Now that there is a big "General Store" over the
horizon, that adds another interesting variable to the already
complex equation.
Clearly, decisions can not be made without consulta-
tion, and no one should expect to receive what he wants, and
perhaps not even what he or she thinks he or she might need.
There will have to be introduced into the region a mechanism
whereby armaments can be kept track of, and perhaps with that
some sort of ceiling specifying what the arbitrary cut-off
point will be for weapons that are too dangerous and those
that are OK.
Equally as clear, the Israel economy will have to
stand on its own feet. Since the aid amounts are so incredi-
ble, some sort of phased program specifying so much percent
per year reduction in aid, with annual review of the formula,
as long as the aid keeps going down. Figures showing only 25%
of the labor force in industry, with a socialized center, and
productivity lower than most of western Europe, do not
indicate a healthy situation.
Israel's slice of the U.S. aid pie is one-fifth of
total U.S. economic, development, and military aid ($3b/year),
plus another $3b/yr from other sources. U.S. annually has
been buying $lb of defense related items from Israel. On top
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of these numbers, Israel has 20% of its work force in defense
related industries; if the U.S. was to reduce this defense
related support, it would be a significant blow to Israel.
Israel is basically addicted to U.S. aid, and needs to
start some sort of antabuse or AA program; Israel should be
able to stand on its own two feet. Current per capita U.S.
aid to Israel is $680, for Egypt it's $41, $4.80 for Pakistan,
and $1 for Africa. ^^^ With the imbalances now so prevalent
the world over, those ratios simply must become more equita-
ble. The New Order requires that we do what we can to redress
these imbalances
.
As for environmental resources, the inhabitants will
have to be the keepers of that issue, and decide how much they
want to do without, or how much they are willing to pay
(extra) to not do v/ithout (desalinization) .
Israel historically is not shy about following its own
dictates, or what it perceives to be in its best (security)
interests. We need only to recall the (still unresolved) USS
LIBERTY affair, also the Pollard spy scandal, and other items,
to realize the implications of Israel's intentional power. It
is crucial that we keep Israel involved somehow with interna-
tional organizations, much as it was crucial to do the same
with China. It will not be healthy for either China or Israel
to go off on their own to who knows where.
The UN should try as best it can to keep tabs on these
several issues, and feel free, within proper jurisdiction
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guidelines, to step in and see how watertight the ships of
state are.
a. Arab-Israeli Dilemma
The Arab-Israeli dilemma alone poses difficulties
that 4 years of diplomacy and several wars have not managed
to solve; in its most simple formulation the dilemma seems to
have devolved into a problem involving an exchange of territo-
ry for peace, although other ingredients underlie this
exchange. Compounding this dilemma are: 1) complex Israeli
politics; 2) Arab Petrol politics infused with degrees of
Islamic fervor; 3) indigenous technologies; 4) typically
unquestioned U.S. support to Israel; 5) (former) Soviet
presence within the region; 6) UN involvement; 7) old fash-
ioned hatred weaving through different strata; 8) an increas-
ingly internationalized interest in this problem by other
states including China; 9) the dilemmas attendant to tensions
or other outcomes when religious value is associated with
physical places or symbols.
The Knesset must be receptive to peace issues.
Deliberate sandbagging to gain time and a larger status quo
are not honorable methods. Shamir, on the day after the
elections, openly said that if he had had the opportunity, he
would have dragged out the peace talks as long as possible so
as to build as many settlements as possible all over the West
Bank. Intransigence, regardless of the side of the fence that
it's on, is equally damaging to the fence.
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It should be noted that: 1) Israel's negotiating
team for the Mid East peace talks indicated that Israel is
prepared to bargain with Syria over new borders - a reference
to the Golan Heights - but not insofar as it would mean a
return to the 1967 frontiers; 2) Retired senior officers, in
1972, were more willing to trade land for peace than was the
Israeli population in general.
The U.S., or the UN, may have to decide to what
extent it is willing, or unwilling, to allow its policies and
actions to be dictated by religious ideologies. In other
words, the separation of Church and State as an issue is not
yet settled, because it may well have to be applied on a
global basis, and not just internally by various national
polities. Applicable topics include the status of Jerusalem,
international terrorism, nationalism that is indistinguishable
from proselytizing.
b. Israeli U.S. Lobby
The legendary Israeli lobby, that is "virtually
unmatched" , might acquire principles in keeping with the
realities of a complex situation. The sixty pro-Israel PACs
in the U.S., up against only 2 or 3 pro-Arab PACs, are holding
forth in a grand manner, but also in a very grand style; the
style does not match the complexity. As a small example of
their power, the Israeli military attache went to the Pentagon
in October 1973, and requested Maverick anti-tank missiles:
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"If you can get the missiles, we can take care of
6
Another example of resources, where the cost does
not quite match the justification: Carter decided in March
1979 to provide Israel access to the KH-11 satellite, some-
thing Israel had wanted since its launch 3 years earlier.
This decision was very unpopular with U.S. Intel community,
because it meant that the satellite's fuel would be used
faster, and it would be less available for U.S. agencies.
As if all that were not enough, AIPAC was prepared
to argue (over a year ago) that a further increase in U.S. aid
to Israel was justified, "even if programs for Americans must
be cut back".^" That does not compute.
2. Other Middle East States
The Middle East is clearly in the midst of an exciting
stage in its history. Lifestyles are changing, relationships
and responsibilities are undergoing redefinition, new possi-
bilities and new requirements are being tempered by tradition-
al textual interpretations. There is clearly much to be done,
and much to redefine. The region should be able to deal with
itself without resort to hostilities. When aberrations are
noted, there needs to be some sort of procedure to be able to
deal with it.
If and when fundamentalist regimes are voted in by
democratic means, we should not exert undue influence to
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having them removed. Sooner or later they will be voted out;
the inhabitants must reach those conclusions themselves.
Recent finds, via satellite and ancient maps, of the
lost Arabian city of Ubar in present day Oman provide glimpses
of a time when the Silk Road was in full tilt; how appropriate
for that city to be unearthed when the Silk Road is about to
go back into operation. Also the discovery, in the same
fashion, of what may be the ancient metropolis of Saffara near
what is now Salalah. This second site probably controlled the
entire coastal sea trade from at least 1500 B.C.E. until 300
C.E., when both cities were abandoned, probably because the
frankincense trade lost its value after the Roman Empire
collapsed. ^^^
Regional methods of discourse and redress and planning
should be devised. The GCC and ACC, along with the UN and
current Peace process should all be investigated for timeli-
ness, purpose, efficacy, and all the rest. Clearly the region
is not communicating or performing as optimally as it could
be.
a. Infrastructure and Resources
Environment is now just as crucial an issue as
ideology ever was. Who lives where is surely just a moot
question, if in fact underlying it is the reality that no one
is able to live anywhere. In a semi-perverse kind of way,
"quality of life" now has a real tangible side to it. The
fact that water is rapidly becoming another precious commodity
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throughout the Middle East, and a primary bargaining chip or
bone of contention between states, speaks of the way resources
have been mismanaged.
The other intangible environment should be
addressed. Religion and government need to accommodate each
other. Fear or misunderstanding ought not be the principles
which guide unknowns. Governments need to be able to communi-
cate to other governments, and the inhabitants need to gear up
for a period of potential protracted change.
Water resources again need to be examined and
equitably resolved: the Jordan River basin, Dead Sea, Arabian
Aquifer, desalinizatin : they are issues that mandate regional
interaction, and not unilateral control.
b. Islam
The Middle East is probably experiencing, as we
saw in chapter three, a similar adjustment in its relationship
to the practice of power as now occurring in China. Starting
with the patriarchal tradition, conjoined with Islam (where
sacred and secular are indistinguishable) , and experienced
through a Sheikh or Imam or Sultan or some other figure whose
word was literally law, and where law was not complicated but
fairly black and white {lex talionis in the desert), the
result is more of a familiarity with or expectation of
absolutes, rather than discussion or voting or even the work
of a jury. From this it follows that Sadat and King Fahd and
Saddam and King Hussein are, to a certain extent, solitary
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figures. Also that they are even expected to be that way. In
other words, they continue to utilize time honored methods,
but in settings where populations have mushroomed, education
is engendering opportunities, the rank and file are finding
choices and want to choose, and nascent (but basically
foreign) institutions of national scope are just beginning to
find their way in a world still in the shade, more or less, of
patriarchy. Also, these rulers are aware of possibilities
that the rank and file are not, the hierarchy have intelligen-
tsia in their families, more and more persons are being
schooled in other cultures, and Islam is having to deal with
modernization in a big way.
Typically the response has been to attack
westernization as evil or imperialistic. But in order to
compete with modernization, to garner its benefits without the
dross, Islam will first have to embrace it and make its own
determination instead of standing afar off
Islam is struggling to define what is Islamic.
Somehow it needs to be able to function in the contemporary
world without thinking that the world is out to get it . Means
need to be established whereby Middle East/Arab nations find
ways to compete with non-Islamic countries (in economic
markets, on the battlefield, in the classroom)
.
Among the changes we are dimly witnessing may well
be the forefront of an Islamic Reformation, or another way in
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which the Koran is seen so as to become a part of life,
instead of life itself, or to understand life more equitably.
d. An Honest Broker
Israel will have to generate an effective combina-
tion of creative diplomacy with military and commercial R&D to
combat the regional advantage provided by the petro-dollars of
her neighbors. More and more, whether it's missiles or salt
resistant plants, it can be had in exchange for $ or services.
Israel will not find that working from strength will be
sufficient, because everyone will be a goliath in a few years.
Quite possibly the U.S. will eclipse its opportu-
nity to serve as an honest broker in the Middle East, espe-
cially after recent history. Part of that lies with the Arabs
having been diplomatically and collectively behind the Eight
Ball for so long. Part of that lies in the seeming duplicity
with which the U.S. has apportioned its decisions and aid.
But an International Conference is in the works, which means
that Russia and the PRC, among others, are on the scene. It
might even mean that China alone becomes the "disinterested"
mediator; the "General Store" with a heart.
What is clear in the midst of all this conjecture,
is that the U.S., as part of its policy formulation prepared-
ness, will need to be able to gauge as accurately as possible
the intentions and perceptions of the C.I.S., PRC and Middle
East. Again, ideology and polarity should not be topics that
hold sway or overwhelm; they must be reconsidered to emphasize
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the need for clarity and to avoid categorizing issues under
traditional rubrics that may have long since ceased to be of
value, if indeed they ever had any value. The methodology of
analyzing issues - knowing what to analyze - is seen to be
just as important as the issues themselves.
3 . The UN and Regional Issues
The UN is acquiring its own raison d'aitre. The Gulf
War, engineered by President Bush, may have sent more prece-
dent in the direction of the United Nations Security Council
than was perhaps intended. The U.S. must come to grips with
our relative position; the U.S. must stand for what it
believes and believe what it stands for, but it should not
coerce, and should also recognize that the goals and percep-
tions of an international body will not always coincide with
those of our own; when that happens, we must not assume that
one side or the other is correct.
Israel's refusal to allow UN observers into Gaza and
the West Bank spells another ominous precedent; unfortunately,
such a precedent cannot be encouraged. It could be that we
are entering an era where the primary roles for armed forces
are international peace keeping, or some sort of environmental
policing.
Recent discovery of oil in a disputed region between
Saudi Arabia and Yemen is starting to draw out true colors
among the inhabitants of the Peninsula. Yemen desperately
needs the money from oil revenues, and regards the territory
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in question as Yemen's. Saudi won control over the area in
1934 during a war with N. Yemen, and the treaty will be up for
renewal in 1994. Yemen is now producing 200,000 bpd, and
expects new finds to generate a total of 800,000 bpd; 12 of
the 20 oil concessions currently working this oil find are in
this area claimed by Saudis.
One of Saudi Arabia's concerns might reflect that with
a larger population in Yemen (13m) than in Saudi Arabia (10m),
this oil find might well tip the balance scales over a period
of 20 years or so in the direction of Yemen. Yemen's unifica-
tion is doing well, but the country needs income from the oil.
Current production is 220,000 bpd, and is expected to rise to
350,000 bpd by 1995.
Yemen joined Iraq, Jordan and Egypt to form the Arab
Cooperation Council before Gulf War, to balance the GCC
.
During the Gulf War, Yemen appeared to back Iraq and Saudi
Arabia evicted about 800,000 Yemeni migrant workers (hundreds
of millions of remittances per year) ; unemployment increased
by more than a third and now 40%. Saudi Arabia is serious
about this episode, and has said it will take "any necessary
action to protect the sanctity of its borders" in a letter to
the oil companies in the region. The Saudis must genuinely be
concerned, even scared. Hunt Oil of Texas is the only
concession to ignore the Saudis, and continues to pump 180,000
bpd in the Marib area.^^^
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One hopeful indication is the slowing of population
growth around the world. Egypt and Thailand family preferenc-
es are changing from 4 children per family (cpf) in the 1970s,
to just over 2 cpf in the 1980s. But only half of all women
in the developing world yet have access to family planning.
East Asia has compiled the best record for reducing population
growth, from 6.1 cpf in early 1960s, to 2.7 cpf in late 1980s.
70% of couples in China practice some form of birth control.
World population, now 5.4 billion, has more than doubled this
century and can be expected to rise to 6.2 billion by the year
2000. UN projections are forecasting that number to double
again, or perhaps to even triple, before stabilizing in the
middle of the next century. Pakistan's current population
could also double again in another 20 years at its present
rate of growth. (Japan's birth rate now 1.53, which is a
declining rate, and one of the lowest among industrialized na-
tions) .^'°
As a major supplier of weapons for Israel, the U.S. is
being left in the lurch: a 1977 GAO study found that it took
the U.S. four years to rebuild its supply of M-113 tanks after
the Israeli 1973 war, due also to the U.S.' policy of continu-
ing weapons sales and deliveries to other international
customers (e.g. Morocco), before supplying our own troops.
The U.S. confirmed Saudi Arabia's illicit transfer of
military hardware, reportedly indicated to us by two PRC
diplomats, to Iraq, Syria and Bangladesh. This transaction
307
is, by present standards, fairly harmless, coming as it does
in the aftermath of the Gulf War. Saudi Arabia is now trying
to purchase 72 F-15 aircraft from U.S. (San Diego Union-
Tribune, 21 April 1992).
Saudi Arabia, after the Gulf War experience, is
seeking to thoroughly improve its own forces to the extent of
having offensive capabilities. The U.S., seeking its own land
based materiel located in the region, and not looking forward
to a squabble between the Saudis and Israelis, is not support-
ing the Saudis desire on this point. In terms of expenditure,
by 1980 Saudi Arabia was ranked 6th overall and 1st in per
capita military spending. The Saudi total military budget was
then $20. 7b. Military purchases from the U.S., through 1980,
totaled $34. 9b (most of which had been made since 1973). In
that same Gulf region, from 1950-1970, a total of $1.2b of
U.S. arms went to Iran, and from 1971-1977 that figure
escalated to $21. Ob, with $5. 7b in 1977 alone. "^"
The U.S., therefore, needs to come to terms with how
it allocates aid funding, needs to accept its position as the
major arms supplier for the Middle East, and needs to encour-
age the peace process, along with doing what it can to
alleviate and solve pressing environmental problems (that will
shortly be crises)
.
Charles Birch, the 1990 Templeton Prize winner, speaks
to some of these issues in his book On Purpose , and he
suggests very simply that we need to be concerned about our
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surroundings whether or not they are useful to us. We no
longer have the luxury of choice over what to save and what to
despoil: there are no more Wild Wests. Quality decisions
require seeing or placing equal value on all things. Generic
values, rather than mere management, will make the difference.
Policy formulation's new challenge will be to cut
across traditional national fences and address the heart of
the issue(s). Ideologies, assumptions, and prejudices,
whether of nationalistic, religious, or worse varieties,
simply do not apply any more, and can not be tolerated.
To reiterate earlier suggestions regarding the
fluidity of the Middle East and China, it is helpful to keep
in mind the region's development, geography, neighbors, and
avenues of discourse with surrounding regions (particularly
China) . The Middle East is a natural window on Asia, it is a
region of movement
.
In retrospect, regarding Chinese-Middle East rela-
tions: I discovered little in the literature that dealt with
the subject as a whole. Aside from sporadic articles, plus a
few pre-Tienanmen journal pieces that broached the topic of
"China wooing the Arabs", there are exceptionally few students
of this subject. Even if we do not take an interest in the
relationship between those two regions, both the Middle East
and China are doing just that: there is considerable activity
between them, and it is going to increase.
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New Year's Day (PRC)
New Fourth Army Incident
Zhou Enlai
La Ba Festival




Feb. 28 Incident (ROC)
aka: 2-28
Qingming Festival
aka: Clear and Bright Festival
April Fifth Incident 5 Apr





aka: Tienanmen (or) 6-4
Dragon Boat Festival
Marco Polo Bridge Incident
Army Day








aka: Double Ten; 10-10
Double Ninth Festival







8 Jan 1976 (d)
22 Jan ( 8th day, 12th lunar month)
12 Feb 1912
13 Feb ( 1st day, 1st lunar month)
27 Feb (15th day. 1st lunar month)
28 Feb 1947






15 Jun ( 5th day, 5th lunar month)
7 Jul 1937
1 Aug (PLA founded in 1927)
9 Aug ( 1st day. 7 th lunar month)
15 Aug ( 7th day. 7th lunar month)
21 Sep (15th day. 8th lunar month)
28 Sep 551 B.C.E.
1 Oct 1949
10 Oct 1911
15 Oct ( 9th day. 9th lunar month)
21 Oct
31 Oct 1887 - 5 Apr 197 5
12 Nov 1866 - 12 Mar 1925
2 6 Dec 1893 - 9 Sep 1976
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ISRAEL
Fatah Day 1 Jan
Purim 19 Mar
Egyptian-Israeli Peace 26 Mar 1979
Pesach (Passover) 18 Apr
Holocaust Remembrance Day 30 Apr
Theodor Herzl 2 May 1860-1904
Independence Day 14 May 1948
Six Day (June) War 5 Jun 1967
Shavuot 7 Jun
Rosh Hashana 28 Sep (1st and 2nd days of
Yom Kippur 7 Oct (10th day of Tishri)
October (Yom Kippur) War 6 Oct 1973
Sukkot (Tabernacles) 12 Oct
David Ben Gurion 16 Oct 1886-1973
UNSC Resolution 338 22 Oct 1973
1956 (Sinai-Suez) War 29 Oct 1956
Balfour Declaration 2 Nov 1917
Chaim Weizmann 17 Nov 1874-1952
UNSC Resolution 242 22 Nov 1967
Intifadah Anniversary 8 Dec 1987
Hanukkah 20 Dec (2 5th day of Kislev)
OTHER MIDDLE EAST STATES:
Islamic Calendar; The Muslim calendar is based on actual
sightings of the moon. Accordingly, the observations of
various feast days may vary by one or two days from place to
place. The Islamic (lunar) year is 11 days shorter than the
Gregorian (solar) year; hence Islamic feast days occur 11 days
earlier each year when measured on the Gregorian calendar.
Lailat Al-Ma'raj (Prophet's Night Journey to Heaven,
aka: Ascension Day) 27 Rajab 1 Feb 1992
Ramadan Mth before Shawwal 5 Mar 19 92
Eid Al-Fitr (End of Ramadan)
1 Shawwal 4 Apr 1992
Hajj (Mecca Pilgrimage) 9 Dhu'l-Hijja 10-18 Jun 1992
Eid Al-Adha (Feast of the Sacrifice)
10 Dhu'l-Hijja 11 Jun 1992
Muslim New Year 1 Muharram 1411 13 Jul 1991
Mawlid Al-Nabi (Muhammad's Birthday)
12 Rabia 17 Sep 1991
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2 Aug '90 (Kuwait/Iraq)
6 Aug (Abu Dhabi)
11 Aug (Jordan)
3 Sep (Qatar)
23 Sep (Saudi Arabia)
6 Oct (Egypt)
14 Nov (Jordan)
18 Nov ( Oman
)






1. The Middle East is still "coalescing" and has arguably been
involved in that process since long before the middle of the 20th
century. However, for purposes of this discussion, a temporal
sounding board (which, when placed at 1949, is not entirely
incorrect), is helpful to facilitate the generation of regional
perspectives
.
2. Lucian W. Pye, The Mandarin and the Cadre (University of
Michigan, 1988) Chapter I.
3. Bruce Swanson, Eighth Voyage of the Dragon: A History of
China's Quest for Seapower (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press,
1982) 28-43.
4. According to James Chambers' The Devil's Horsemen , Mongolian
advances beyond the Danube were halted only due to Genghis Khan's
fortuitous death, requiring the collective absence of his Field
Commander sons from their lines of advance for attention to
requisite familial burial proceedings and rites of succession in
Mongolia. The resultant hiatus included a redistribution of power;
when added to logistic complications, this provided the breather
required by a sleepy, divisive and incredulous Europe to stave off
further Mongol encroachments.
5. This predilection was responsible for the initial breakup of
the Indian sub-continent into two (now three) states after gaining
independence from Britain, not to mention the current strife
occurring in India. It is also a major concern for the Soviets as
many of their southern constituent Republics are composed primari-
ly, if not entirely, of Islamic peoples.
6. Yitzhak Shichor, The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy
1949-1977 (Cambridge University Press, 1979) 2.
7. Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy ,
(University of California Press, 1970) 10-18. Lillian Craig
Harris and Robert L. Worden, eds, China and the Third World
(Dover, Massachusetts: Auburn House, 1986) Chapter II.
8. Kaifeng, in Henan, once housed the largest Jewish settlement in
China. They arrived via the Silk Road around 1040 A.D., becoming
very active in local society. The last rabbi in Kaifeng died in
1850; a few hundred Sinified descendants remain. "China Discourag-
es Ties With Jewish Minority, " Christian Science Monitor (CSM) (17
July 1990) 5.
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in part, to offset local Islamic majorities. CSM (2 August 1988) .
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